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HANDLING

A GLOBAL BRIEF

HYDROGEN

INTELLIGENT SAFETY AT EVERY STAGE



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HANDLING HYDROGEN

Intelligent Safety at Every Stage: A Global Brief

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Hydrogen occupies a unique position in the global energy transition, serving both as an energy carrier and as a widely used industrial gas.

The purpose of this report is to assemble, in a single brief, the core safety knowledge needed to plan, design, operate, and oversee hydrogen systems across production, compression, storage, transport, distribution, and end use.

It does this in four linked steps. It explains the physical and chemical features that shape hydrogen risk, and it connects those fundamentals to controls that repeatedly matter in practice, including ventilation strategy and detector placement, prevention and early detection of flammable mixtures, rapid isolation, controlled venting, emergency shutdown, and materials selection, qualification, and inspection. It consolidates learning from the Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents Database (HIAD) 2.1 through analysis of over 900 recorded incidents across regions and applications, drawing out recurring failure patterns, human and organizational contributors, and safeguards that have limited escalation. It then deepens that learning through three case discussions, Hindenburg, Fukushima Daiichi, and Santa Clara 2019, showing how interfaces, handovers, and abnormal operations influence outcomes. Finally, it outlines how intelligent safety systems can strengthen established process safety practice through sensing, safety instrumented functions designed to integrity targets, integrated monitoring platforms, digital twins for scenario work and emergency planning, predictive maintenance, and AI-assisted anomaly detection, while keeping competence, verification, and governance central.

The brief is offered to support shared understanding across industry, government, and research, and to encourage learning from near misses, and it is best read alongside applicable standards and project-specific engineering studies, with suitable expert review before implementation.

PURPOSE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Hydrogen can accelerate global decarbonization, yet the operational record shows incidents across every stage of the value chain, from production and storage to transport and end use, with consequences ranging from small leaks to major fires and explosions. Because hydrogen is colorless and odorless, exhibits a wide flammability range in air, and can ignite at very low energies, safe deployment depends on hydrogen-specific engineering and disciplined operating practice, not a simple transfer of methods developed for conventional fuels. Drawing on contributions from practitioners and researchers across multiple regions and sectors, and informed by consolidated incident learning from HIAD 2.1 (954 hydrogen-related incidents), this brief explains why hydrogen risk is real, how it manifests in practice, and how it can be managed to a high level of safety through sound design, competent operations, and rigorous governance.

The report grounds safety in fundamentals: hydrogen's buoyancy and rapid dispersion can be advantageous outdoors, but in confined and semi-confined spaces it can stratify near ceilings and reach flammable conditions quickly, making ventilation design and detector placement decisive. It emphasizes that ignition source elimination alone is not a dependable safety strategy, so priority shifts to preventing and rapidly detecting flammable mixtures, followed by prompt isolation, controlled venting, and emergency shutdown through engineered protections. Material compatibility is treated as central, including hydrogen embrittlement and related degradation mechanisms that must be addressed through materials selection, qualification, inspection, and conservative operating limits.

Three case discussions, Hindenburg, Fukushima Daiichi, and the 2019 Santa Clara incident, translate hydrogen fundamentals into practical lessons for design, operations, and intelligent safety systems. Building on these lessons and broader incident databases, the brief shows that escalation is often driven by interactions between technical failures and organizational factors such as maintenance quality, purging discipline, verification practices, and management of change. A recurring theme is that modern hydrogen equipment can be mechanically robust, yet risk rises sharply when hydrogen is inadvertently confined, when venting and relief functions are not maintained as intended, or when procedures rely on perfect human performance during infrequent high consequence tasks.

Accordingly, the report frames safety as a system property that must be engineered, verified, and sustained across interfaces, handovers, and abnormal operations, not only within individual components. A major contribution of the brief is its focus on intelligent safety, where instrumentation, automation, and human supervision form a continuous feedback loop that detects, interprets, and responds before harm occurs. It highlights practical digital enablers now appearing across hydrogen projects, including networked sensing, safety instrumented functions designed to appropriate integrity targets, integrated monitoring platforms, digital twins for scenario testing and emergency planning, predictive maintenance, and AI-assisted anomaly detection for early fault recognition. The report also stresses that advanced analytics do not remove the need for accountable human decision making in safety-critical systems, and that governance, competency, and verification must evolve alongside digital capability.

Overall, the brief positions safety as the enabling condition for scale: public trust, regulatory confidence, insurability, and investment readiness depend on transparent safety performance and a demonstrated ability to learn from incidents and near misses. Its central message is that hydrogen can be handled safely at industrial and public scales when safety is treated as an essential design requirement across production, transport, storage, and end use, supported by both established process safety methods and well-governed intelligent monitoring.

What Makes **Hydrogen** Unsafe

The Foundations of Safe Design



Hydrogen's reputation as an inherently dangerous fuel rests not on misconception but on genuine physical properties that demand serious engineering attention. As the simplest and lightest element, hydrogen exhibits characteristics that initially seem to compound into overwhelming hazard: it burns with nearly invisible flames emitting far less radiant heat than conventional hydrocarbon fuels; it rises through air at nearly 20m/s, roughly twice as fast as helium and 6-8 times faster than natural gas, while diffusing at rates 3-4 times faster than natural gas; it is entirely odorless, colorless, and tasteless, making human detection impossible; it combines in air across an extraordinarily broad flammability range spanning 4-75% by volume; at its most chemically reactive concentration around 29% in air, it ignites at merely 0.02 millijoules, roughly 1/15th the ignition energy of natural gas; and under high pressure and confinement, it can transition from subsonic deflagration to supersonic detonation, creating blast waves and overpressures.^{1,2,3,4} Additionally, atomic hydrogen diffuses into metallic lattices, degrading fracture resistance and accelerating fatigue crack growth by orders of magnitude, a phenomenon called hydrogen embrittlement.^{5,6} Under specific conditions of temperature and pressure, it undergoes hydrogen attack, forming methane within metal structures.^{7,8} Hydrogen absorbed during manufacturing can accumulate at internal surfaces and cause blistering. If hydrogen becomes liquid at minus 253 degrees Celsius, it causes severe cryogenic burns.⁴ Under proximal storage conditions, thermal pressure relief devices can activate during external fires and trigger cascading secondary releases. This cascade of hazards appears formidable.^{9,10} Yet the same set of physical properties that make hydrogen dangerous also provides the precise foundation for designing systems where hydrogen can be managed with safety comparable to natural gas, ammonia, and other industrial gases that society uses routinely at industrial scale.

The path from understanding hazard to achieving safety is not through innovation but through disciplined application of established engineering principles grounded in hydrogen's actual behavior. Hydrogen's extreme buoyancy and rapid dispersal, seemingly disadvantageous, become the engineer's primary advantage: natural ventilation in garages needs less than 1 (higher for modern high-pressure hydrogen applications) ACP (air changes per hour) to keep hydrogen concentrations safely below the lower flammability limit; building design that leverages upward flow, ceiling vents, open structures, prevents the accumulation of hydrogen at dangerous concentrations without mechanical intervention.^{11,12} The invisibility of hydrogen flames demands specialized flame detection systems and infrastructure.¹³ Hydrogen-specific sensors, placed at ceiling height to intercept rising hydrogen before it concentrates, form the first electronic safeguard; these systems, rated to Safety Integrity Level 2 or higher, trigger ventilation fans and alarms automatically when hydrogen concentration approaches 1% by volume (25% of the lower flammability limit (LFL)), far below the 4% LFL.^{14,15,16} The broad flammability range and low minimum ignition energy at stoichiometric concentration define the sizing of pressure relief devices with mathematical precision: engineers use under-expanded jet theory to calculate the exact orifice diameter that prevents a flammable cloud from ever forming during a hydrogen release; leading a dimension so small that separation distances are reduced by an order of magnitude compared to under-engineered systems.^{17,18}

The deflagration and detonation hazards are addressed by preventing the conditions where they arise: confining hydrogen is extraordinarily difficult because physics works against it; in open-air systems, hydrogen rises and dilutes rapidly; in enclosed spaces, controlled ventilation prevents concentration from reaching the eighteen to fifty-nine percent detonation range; in storage systems, pressure vessel design, safety factors, and material qualification ensure structural integrity even if a deflagration occurs; thermal pressure relief devices are sized so their fire-resistance rating exceeds the time required to empty the hydrogen inventory, preventing catastrophic failure from external fire.^{19,20,21}

Hydrogen's embrittlement of high-strength steels is addressed not by abandoning structural metals but by understanding precisely how hydrogen is absorbed and designing to prevent it: chromium-molybdenum steels, standard in pressure vessels and pipelines for decades, are safe for hydrogen service when designed with fatigue and fracture analysis that accounts for property degradation; protective oxide films on metal surfaces, maintained through appropriate chemical passivation, minimize hydrogen absorption; temperature and pressure limits are set conservatively below the thresholds where hydrogen attack becomes a chemical concern.^{5,6,7,8,22,23,24,25,26} The cryogenic hazard of liquid hydrogen is managed through double-walled vacuum-jacketed insulation that minimizes boiling, thermal pressure relief devices that vent safely during temperature rise, and materials selected for brittleness resistance at operating temperatures.^{27,28,29,30,31} The pressure hazard from high-pressure storage is controlled through conservative design pressures, safety factors of around 1.5 to 5 times the operating pressure (even more depending on the design and control), robust rupture discs, fail-safe venting, and damage-tolerance inspections.^{32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39}

These individual control strategies are not isolated decisions but are integrated through a systematic framework of engineering disciplines. Hazard Identification (HAZID) workshops enumerate all conceivable failure modes and scenarios. Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) then systematically explore what happens if each property deviates from safe conditions.^{40,41,42,43,44,45} Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) evaluates the adequacy of protective layers.^{46,47,48} Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) operationalize these layers, implementing automated detection and response at rated Safety Integrity Levels (SIL).^{14,48,49} Finally, Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) ties all of this together: validated engineering models for hydrogen jet dispersion, deflagration overpressure, thermal radiation, and ignition probability are used to calculate safe separation distances and verify that cumulative risk from all scenarios combined remains below acceptable thresholds.^{50,51,52,53,54}

This framework is not new to hydrogen. It has been refined through nearly a century of industrial hydrogen experience. Major hydrogen pipelines have crossed continents for decades without incident when properly maintained. Recent large-scale pilot projects in the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Germany have demonstrated that hydrogen can serve as a heating fuel with safety comparable to natural gas.⁵⁵ The hazard is real and requires respect. But the path to safety is not uncertainty or innovation; it is the steady application of fundamental engineering principles grounded in understanding how hydrogen actually behaves at every stage: production, compression, storage, transport, distribution, and use. What makes hydrogen unsafe is precisely what makes it manageable when design respects that reality.

How Physical Characteristics Drive Risk and Inform Engineering Controls

Hydrogen's safety profile is fundamentally determined by how its physical and chemical properties (Table 1) manifest in real operational scenarios. Because hydrogen behaves differently from methane or gasoline in almost every dimension that matters for safety, an intuitive understanding of these differences is essential for anyone responsible for facility design, operations, or regulation.

Buoyancy and Rapid Dispersal: Advantage and Liability

Hydrogen is extraordinarily buoyant. At normal temperature and pressure (NTP, 20°C and 1atm), its density is ~0.0838 kg/m³, compared to 1.204 kg/m³ for air. This makes hydrogen roughly 14 times lighter than air. For a practical sense of scale, 1,200 kilograms of hydrogen released at normal conditions would occupy a sphere with a radius of ~15 meters and would rise at a terminal velocity of approximately 27.92 m/s. For comparison, an equivalent mass of methane would occupy a sphere of 7.61 meters radius and rise at only 13.93 m/s.³ The buoyancy advantage of hydrogen becomes apparent in outdoor scenarios: released hydrogen rises quickly away from ground level, disperses upward, and dilutes into the atmosphere within seconds, significantly reducing the horizontal extent of any flammable cloud. Determining a meaningful "rising velocity" for hydrogen or methane releases under actual operating conditions proves difficult because the terminal velocity represents an equilibrium between three competing forces: buoyancy acting upward and both gravitational and aerodynamic drag acting downward. The aerodynamic component depends on the plume's shape and exposed surface area, quantities that are inherently difficult to characterize in field releases and vary depending on release transients, ambient turbulence, and prevailing wind. Adding another layer of complexity, atmospheric drag coefficients themselves shift as air density changes with humidity levels.

Indoors, this same buoyancy property creates a critical safety challenge. Rather than remaining mixed throughout an enclosed space, hydrogen naturally rises and accumulates at ceiling level, roof peaks, and other high points where ventilation is often poorest. This ceiling-level stratification places hydrogen directly where ignition sources, electrical fixtures, heating elements, and equipment mounted overhead, are commonly located. The consequence is straightforward: traditional ventilation strategies designed for heavier-than-air fuels become unreliable for hydrogen. A facility that was safe for methane, with floor-level exhaust vents and modest air change rates, may not adequately manage hydrogen without fundamental redesign of ventilation routing and positioning.

A related subtlety affects cold hydrogen releases from liquid spills. When liquid hydrogen at 20 K (-253°C) evaporates, the resulting cold vapor is initially denser than air and does not immediately rise. However, this period of non-buoyancy is brief. Hydrogen needs only 2 K of warming (to 22 K or -251°C) to become less dense than air and begin rising. Methane, by contrast, requires a ~53 K temperature rise (from 111 K or -162°C to 164 K or -109°C) before its vapor becomes buoyant.³ The practical meaning is that even very cold hydrogen vapor will transition to buoyant behavior rapidly as it mixes with warmer ambient air, making sustained ground-level concentrations unlikely in outdoor settings but making ceiling accumulation a virtual certainty

in confined spaces. Cryogenic hydrogen spills evaporate exceptionally fast due to low heat of vaporization (0.92 kJ/mol; nine times less than methane), forming transient pools lasting mere seconds with minimal cooling, reducing embrittlement risks yet requiring rigorous safety modeling.^{3,56,57}

Table 1. Comprehensive Comparison of Physicochemical and Safety-Related Properties.^{3,58,59,60,61,62,63,64,65}

Property (units; conditions)	Hydrogen (H ₂)	Methane (CH ₄)	Gasoline
Molecular & Physical Properties			
Molecular Weight (g/mol)	2.016	16.043	~107
Density at NTP, gas @ 293 K (kg/m ³)	0.0838	0.651 - 0.717	~ 3 - 4.8
Density at NBP, liquid (kg/m ³)	70.8	422.6	700 - 780
Normal Boiling Point, NBP (°C)	-253	-161.6	27 - 225
Kinetic Diameter (nm)	0.28	0.38	NA (0.4 - 0.7; C5-12)
Vapor specific gravity, NTP	0.0696	0.555	3.66
Diffusion Coefficient in STP - NTP Air (cm ² /s)	0.61 - 0.756	0.16 - 0.21	0.05 - 0.09
Diffusion velocity in NTP air (cm/s)	< 2	< 0.51	< 0.17
Energy Content			
Lower Heating Value, LHV (MJ/kg)	120	50.0	43.4 - 44.5
Higher Heating Value, HHV (MJ/kg)	142	55.5	46.5 - 48
LHV, Vapor, volumetric @ 0.101 MPa and 15°C (MJ/m ³)	9.92 - 10.8	32.6 - 39.8	~ 170-210 (<i>hypothetical Vapor</i>)
LHV, liquid form (MJ/m ³)	8,491	20,920	31,150 - 32,000
Flammability Limits in Air			
Lower Flammability Limit, LFL (vol%)	4.0	~5.3	1 - 1.4
Upper Flammability Limit, UFL (vol%)	75.0	15.0	7.6 - 7.8
Flammability Range Width (vol%)	~ 71	~ 10	~ 6.5
Limits of flammability (equivalence ratio) (lean - rich)	~ 0.1 - ~ 0.71	~ 0.53 - ~ 1.7	~ 0.7 - ~ 3.8
Ignition Properties			
Minimum Ignition Energy in air, MIE (mJ)	0.017 - 0.02	0.29	0.24 - 0.96
Auto-Ignition Temperature, AIT (°C)	510 - 585	537 - 540	228 - 480
Minimum spontaneous ignition pressure, bar	~41	~100	
Flash Point (°C)	<-253 (gaseous)	-188 (gaseous)	-11 - -45
Hot air-jet (0.4 cm diameter) ignition temperature (°C)	670	1220	1040
Burning velocity in NTP air (cm/s)	265 - 346	37 - 45	37 - 43
Quenching Gap in NTP air, (mm)	0.6 - 0.64	2 - 2.3	1.7 - 2
Maximum Experimental Safe Gap in NTP air, MESG (mm)	0.08	1.2	0.7 - 1.02
Flame Characteristics			
Laminar Flame Speed @ stoichiometric, air (m/s)	1.85 - 3.25	0.37 - 0.45	0.37 - 0.51
Flame Visibility	Invisible (pale blue)	Visible blue	Visible orange
% of thermal energy radiated from flame to surrounding	17 - 25	23 - 32	30 - 42
Adiabatic Flame Temperature in air (K)	2,200 - 2480	1,900 - 2226	2,250 - 2580
Normalized flame emissivity 2000 K, 1 atm	1	1.7	1.7
Detonation & Explosion Parameters			
Lower Detonability Limit in air, LDL (vol%)	11 - 18.3	6.3	1.1
Upper Detonability Limit in air, UDL (vol%)	59.0	13.5	3.3
Detonation Cell Size @ stoichiometric (cm)	1.1-2.1	—	—
Detonation velocity in NTP air (m/s)	1480 - 2150	1390 - 1640	1400 - 1700
Energy of explosion, (g TNT)/(g fuel)	~24	~11	~10
Energy of explosion, (g TNT)/(cm ³ NBP liquid fuel)	1.71	4.56	7.04
Thermal Properties			
Specific Heat of gas at NTP, (kJ/(kg·K))	14.3 - 14.9	2.2	1.2 - 1.8
Specific Heat of liquid at NBP, (kJ/(kg·K))	9.69	3.5	2.2
Specific heat ratio of NTP gas	1.383	1.308	1.05
Specific heat ratio of NBP liquid	1.688	1.676	—
Heat of Vaporization, liquid (kJ/kg)	445.6	510	309 - 400
Heat of combustion, vapor (KJ/kg air)	3370	2900	2830
Thermal Conductivity of gas at NTP (mW/(m·K))	187 - 191.4	32.1 - 34	11.2

Thermal Conductivity of liquid at NBP (mW/(m·K))	99	186	131
Stoichiometric Combustion			
Stoichiometric Air/Fuel Ratio, mass basis (kg/kg)	34.3	17.2	14.7
Stoichiometric Concentration in Air (vol%)	29.53	9.48	1.65 - 1.8
Stoichiometric Concentration in Oxygen (vol%)	66.66	33.3	7.4 - 7.5
Permeation & Material Compatibility			
Permeation through seals (relative severity)	Extreme	Moderate	Low
Hydrogen Embrittlement Risk (high-strength steels)	High	None	None
Solubility in Water (vol%) (~20 °C; 1 atm gas partial pressure)	1.8 - 1.9%	3.3 - 3.5%	Insoluble/Negligible
Cryogenic/Storage Properties			
Density ratio: NBP liquid-to-NTP gas	845	649	156
Expansion Ratio, gas/liquid (ratio)	848-865:1	622-650:1	—
Liquid Thermal Expansion (1/K) (Relative to water at 20°C)	~23 - 70× (~20 K)	~17 - 30× (~90 – 160 K)	~4 - 5× (~293 K)
Compressibility factor in NTP gas	1.0006	1.0243	1.0069
Compressibility factor in NBP liquid	0.01712	0.004145	0.00643
Isothermal bulk modulus of NBP liquid, MN/m ²	50.13	456.16	763
Volume expansivity of NBP liquid, K ⁻¹	0.01658	0.00346	0.0012
Typical Vehicle Storage Pressure (MPa)	35 - 70	20 - 25	Atmospheric
Environmental & Health			
Toxicity	Nontoxic	Nontoxic	Toxic
Odor	None (cannot odorize)	Odorless (odorized)	Strong inherent/natural
Global Warming Potential, 100-year	0	28 - 34	N/A (fossil CO ₂)
Carcinogenic Compounds	None	None	Yes (benzene, PAHs)

Exceptional Diffusivity: Rapid Mixing as a Double-Edged Property

Hydrogen's molecular dimensions and exceptional diffusivity in air create a fundamental paradox in safety management. At normal conditions, hydrogen diffuses at roughly 0.61 cm²/s, a rate three to four times faster than methane. This rapid mixing behavior cuts both ways depending on the setting. Outdoors or in well-ventilated spaces, fast dilution works to hydrogen's advantage: once a release stops, the hydrogen cloud disperses below flammable concentrations within seconds, confining the hazard to a brief and localized window. The picture changes dramatically indoors. In confined spaces, that same aggressive diffusion becomes problematic. A slow leak accumulates at hazardous concentrations near its source with concerning speed, and the buoyant mixture rises to ceiling level in a matter of seconds rather than minutes. The core safety issue is that we cannot rely on passive dilution to manage hydrogen in enclosed environments because the hazard develops too rapidly, even though it would eventually dissipate on its own.

This dual nature of hydrogen's mixing behavior reveals a deeper tension. Diffusion and buoyancy together govern how quickly hydrogen integrates with surrounding air, and this integration simultaneously creates and destroys flammable mixtures. Hydrogen reaches combustible concentrations rapidly, which is clearly undesirable. Yet the vigorous mixing that produces this hazard also ensures that hydrogen clouds exit the flammable envelope with equal speed during the dilution phase. The practical consequence is that while hydrogen presents genuine ignition risks due to how swiftly it forms combustible atmospheres, the acute danger window is inherently constrained by the same physical mechanisms that generate it. In open settings, this temporal compression favors safety. In enclosed spaces, it demands active engineering countermeasures because passive reliance on eventual dilution leaves too much time for ignition sources to act.

Both diffusion and buoyancy together govern how hydrogen mixes with air. The speed of mixing depends on many factors including the size and geometry of the released volume, the presence of turbulence, wind conditions, and atmospheric humidity.^{65,66,67,68,69,70} The practical implication for indoor facilities is that ventilation system design must actively account for hydrogen's natural tendency to rise and mix, rather than assuming passive safety margins from dilution.

Low Ignition Energy: Why Ignition Source Control Alone Is Insufficient

Hydrogen's minimum ignition energy at stoichiometric concentration (29.6% hydrogen in air; roughly 22-30%) is extraordinarily low: approximately 0.017 to 0.02 millijoules.⁷¹ To place this in context, a typical static discharge from a person is 1 to 40 millijoules (even more in extreme, dry conditions), roughly 50 to 2,400 times more energetic than the amount needed to ignite hydrogen at optimal combustion conditions.^{72,73} The common electrostatic spark from touching a doorknob or shuffling across carpet easily exceeds hydrogen's ignition threshold. This single property fundamentally changes the safety philosophy for hydrogen systems compared to heavier fuels.

It is important to note that ignition energy is concentration-dependent. At very lean mixtures (say, 5% hydrogen) or very rich mixtures (above 60%), the minimum ignition energy rises sharply.^{62,74} The danger zone, where ignition is easiest, centers on concentrations between 10% and 60% (equivalence ratio, ϕ near to 1). Nevertheless, throughout this concentration range, ignition energy remains low enough that routine ignition sources including, friction sparks, mechanical impacts, sudden adiabatic compression, diffusion, hot-surfaces, electrical arcing, and static discharge; are all capable of igniting hydrogen-air mixtures.^{74,75}

The consequence for facility design is decisive: attempting to manage hydrogen safety by eliminating ignition sources is impractical. Lightning strikes, electrical faults, friction sparks, and static electricity from ordinary human activity cannot be completely prevented. Instead, the engineering response shifts to prevention of flammable mixtures. Facilities are designed to detect hydrogen at concentrations far below the lower flammability limit (typically 0.5% to 1.0%) and to trigger automated ventilation and isolation before any meaningful accumulation occurs. Detection becomes a primary safety function, not a backup warning system.

Extraordinarily Wide Flammability Range: Confinement as a Critical Barrier

Hydrogen's flammability range in air extends from ~4.0% to ~75% by volume, a span of roughly 71 percentage points. Methane, in contrast, is flammable between ~5% and ~15% (approximately 10 percentage points). This enormous difference means that there is a very large "danger window" once hydrogen is released into an enclosure. In a methane facility, if concentration can be kept reliably below 5%, a safety margin exists. For hydrogen, the threshold is 4%, a narrower target, and, more importantly, even a brief loss of ventilation effectiveness can allow concentration to climb through many percentage points of flammable range before remedial action takes hold.

A secondary concern is hydrogen's detonation range, which is narrower than its flammability range but still extremely broad. Detonation is possible between approximately ~11-18% and ~59% hydrogen (though some researchers have documented

Potential Ignition Sources

Hydrogen's extremely low minimum ignition energy of 0.017 mJ makes it vulnerable to a wide range of ignition sources, which can be systematically categorized by type and severity.

Electrical sources present the highest risk. Static electricity from human activity or equipment operation can generate energies around 0.14 mJ, approximately eight times the minimum required for ignition. Electrostatic discharges are the most common cause of unintended ignition, particularly at hydrogen concentrations between 8 and 58% by volume where ignition energy requirements are lowest. Electrical sparks from non-flameproof motors and equipment pose similar threats.

Mechanical sources including friction, impact, and metal fracture generate energetic sparks capable of igniting hydrogen mixtures. These sources are particularly concerning in high-velocity releases where particulate matter may become entrained and abraded from piping or valve surfaces.

Thermal sources such as open flames, hot surfaces (above 500-580°C), vehicle exhausts, and high-velocity jet heating readily ignite hydrogen. While these require higher energy thresholds than electrical sources, they are commonly present in industrial and transportation environments.

Chemical sources, including catalytic surfaces and certain reactants, can lower the effective auto-ignition temperature, though they occur less frequently in typical operational scenarios.

detonability up to 70% under worst-case geometry with obstacles and high-energy ignition sources). Detonation produces supersonic flame speeds exceeding 1,968 m/s (faster than the speed of sound) and generates overpressures around (or higher than) 1.56 MPa (Chapman-Jouguet pressure), pressures that exceed the design limits of most ordinary structures and equipment.⁷⁶ Most ordinary buildings and facilities are not designed for hydrogen explosion loads: even “moderate” deflagration overpressures can exceed accepted injury (16.5 kPa) and fatality (100 kPa) thresholds for people and can cause serious to near-total building damage (about 4.8 to 48.3 kPa), while worst-case confined deflagrations can be far higher and detonations (CJ pressure ~1.56 MPa) are higher still.^{76,77}

Facility design addresses this dual challenge through multiple strategies. First, maintaining lower operating pressures directly reduces the mass flow rate from any leak, easing ventilation requirements. For the same leak opening, the hydrogen mass release rate increases with system (upstream) pressure; under choked (critical) flow conditions, it is commonly modeled as approximately proportional to the upstream pressure.^{78,79} Second, maintaining generous open-air facility geometry prevents confinement that would allow deflagration acceleration or detonation initiation; in practice this means avoiding enclosed, low ceilings, congested layouts, interior obstacles, and providing robust natural airflow paths. Third, sensor-triggered ventilation fans can force concentration down within seconds of detecting hydrogen approach to safe thresholds, before accumulation progresses into the mid-range flammability zone.

Nearly Invisible Flames and Low Radiant Heat: Detection and Hazard Assessment Challenges

A hydrogen flame burning in air reaches temperatures of approximately 2,000 K to 2,400 K, comparable to or exceeding many hydrocarbon flames. Yet the flame appears nearly colorless or as a faint or pale blue glow that is essentially invisible in daylight and difficult to discern even indoors. The reason is that hydrogen combustion produces primarily water vapor and hydroxyl radicals, which emit little visible light, whereas hydrocarbon flames produce soot and carbon particles that radiate brightly across the visible spectrum. Even the visible appearance that hydrogen flames sometimes show comes mainly from impurities and hot air surrounding the flame zone, not from the flame itself.

This invisibility creates a deceptive hazard. The flame is extremely hot but produces no visual warning that personnel would recognize. Severe burns have been documented from direct exposure to hydrogen flames, precisely because victims were unaware, they were in the flame envelope, they could not see it; and the low radiant heat did not produce the unmistakable sensation of standing in front of an open fire. The danger is compounded because observation alone, so often a first line of defense in conventional fuel fires, is completely unreliable for hydrogen.

An additional property is that hydrogen flames emit significantly lower thermal radiation (radiant heat) to the surroundings compared to equivalent-sized hydrocarbon fires. This difference arises from two distinct mechanisms. First, hydrogen flames have a lower radiant fraction, meaning a smaller proportion of combustion energy is released as thermal radiation. For a fire of equivalent total energy release, a hydrogen fire radiates roughly 2-3 times less thermal energy than a methane fire.³ The second favorable effect relates to the nature of hydrogen flame radiation itself. Thermal energy from hydrogen combustion is emitted predominantly in the infrared spectrum, specifically through vibration and rotation bands of water molecules produced during burning.^{3,80} Atmospheric water vapor is a strong absorber of infrared radiation in these spectral regions, at specific wavelengths.⁸¹ This atmospheric absorption mechanism further attenuates hydrogen flame thermal radiation as it propagates through humid air, reducing hazard distances for personnel. In contrast, methane and hydrocarbon flames emit radiation across a broader spectrum including visible wavelengths from luminous soot particles, which experience less atmospheric attenuation over typical separation distances. As a result of both the lower radiant fraction and the enhanced atmospheric absorption of infrared radiation, hydrogen fires present reduced thermal hazards compared to hydrocarbon fires of similar size and heat release rate.⁸² However, actual safe approach distances depend on multiple scenario-specific factors including storage pressure, leak diameter, flame orientation, wind conditions, and the particular thermal dose threshold selected for personnel protection, so no fixed universal distance ratios can be applied across all cases.^{77,83}

The design response is unambiguous: engineered detection and automated isolation systems become mandatory. Standard smoke detectors and heat detectors are inadequate for hydrogen because hydrogen fires produce negligible smoke and the low radiant heat signature may not trigger conventional thermal alarms. Hydrogen-specific detection uses ultraviolet or infrared optical flame sensors that detect the emission spectrum of hot combustion products, or catalytic and thermal conductivity

sensors that detect hydrogen gas before ignition occurs. The choice depends on the application: for confined spaces or equipment where early gas detection is feasible, hydrogen concentration sensors feeding into Safety Instrumented Systems are preferred; for open-air scenarios, where early detection is less critical, flame detection provides backup. In all cases, the response is automatic; immediate shutdown, isolation, and ventilation activation. No reliance is placed on human observation or emergency response time.

Impossible to Detect by Human Senses

Hydrogen is odorless, colorless, and tasteless. These basic properties mean that a hydrogen leak cannot be detected by any of the human senses. The absence of any sensory warning is where hydrogen most starkly differs from natural gas, which has been safely distributed for over a century using mercaptan odorant; a pungent-smelling chemical added in small quantities so that even trace leaks produce detectable odor long before dangerous concentrations accumulate.

Hydrogen cannot practically use odorant-based detection for two interconnected reasons. First, odorants are denser than hydrogen and do not disperse with it. When hydrogen is released, it rises and mixes rapidly with air at different rates than the added odorant. The odorant segregates from the hydrogen plume and reaches a person's nose significantly after hydrogen concentration is already in the flammability range, if it reaches the person at all. Second, for hydrogen destined for fuel cell use, sulfur-based odorants (mercaptan, thiophene, sulfides, etc.) and other chemical odorants poison fuel cell catalysts, degrading or destroying performance.^{84,85} However, a few odorants (non-sulfur odorants such as 5-ethylidene-2-norbornene) could, in principle, serve a mixed network of boilers and fuel cells, but only if any hydrogen supply destined for fuel cells undergoes downstream purification to completely remove the odorant before it reaches the cell.⁸⁶ Despite this possibility, fuel cell applications across all major regulatory frameworks and international standards explicitly prohibit odorization as a safety measure.

Properties as Design Drivers: Integration and Design Philosophy

Detection as a Primary Safety Function

The physicochemical properties of hydrogen impose fundamental constraints on facility design, particularly with respect to detection systems. Unlike methane or gasoline facilities where leak detection serves a supplementary monitoring role, hydrogen detection constitutes a critical element of the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) in hydrogen facilities.¹⁶ This distinction arises from hydrogen's exceptionally low minimum ignition energy (0.017-0.02 mJ), extreme buoyancy relative to air (density 0.0838 kg/m³ at NTP), and high diffusion coefficient in air (0.61-0.756 cm²/s), which collectively enable hazardous conditions to develop within minutes and propagate through confined volumes where conventional detection approaches prove inadequate.^{16,77}

Industrial practice mandates continuous monitoring rather than periodic sampling, with sensor placement determined by hydrogen's buoyant behavior.¹⁶ Ceiling-level positioning is required because hydrogen naturally stratifies at elevated locations in enclosed spaces, contrasting with denser gases that distribute more uniformly or accumulate at floor level.^{16,55} Detection systems must initiate protective actions when hydrogen concentrations reach 0.5 to 1.0% by volume, well below the lower flammability limit of 4.0%, ensuring intervention during the latent phase before ignitable mixtures develop.^{16,77}

Detection system reliability must satisfy Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 1 or 2 requirements depending on consequence severity, as specified in IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 standards for safety instrumented systems.^{5,14,48,49} This requires redundant sensor channels, automatic self-diagnostic capabilities, and independence from human judgment or periodic assessment. Detection signals trigger automated responses including increased mechanical ventilation, alarm notification, and hydrogen source isolation, occurring without awaiting personnel evaluation.^{16,55}

This transition from manual sensory awareness to engineered automated detection represents the most fundamental departure from conventional fuel facility design. It is not an incremental modification to existing methane or gasoline detection infrastructure but rather a complete reconfiguration of the early-warning foundation upon which the entire safety architecture depends.^{13,16}

Integrated Hazard Profile and Design Consequences

Hydrogen's physicochemical properties do not operate as independent hazards but form a coupled system where each property influences the effectiveness of mitigation strategies designed for other properties. Hydrogen's exceptional buoyancy combined with molecular diffusivity creates vertical stratification and rapid mixing at facility boundary layers, rendering floor-level ventilation ineffective. The low minimum ignition energy and wide flammability range (4.0 to 75% by volume) eliminate traditional ignition source control as a foundational safety strategy.^{59,77} The invisible flame (emitting primarily in the ultraviolet and infrared spectra) and absence of suitable odorant compounds make instrumental detection the sole reliable early-warning mechanism.^{84,85}

The detonation cell size for stoichiometric hydrogen-air mixtures (1.1 to 2.1 cm at atmospheric pressure) fits within common industrial confinement geometries, rendering detonation a credible failure mode rather than a theoretical concern.^{77,87,88} Hydrogen embrittlement necessitates material specifications unavailable in equipment originally designed for hydrocarbon fuels.^{6,25} Cryogenic expansion ratios (approximately 1:850 for liquid to gas at normal boiling point) and material brittleness at low temperatures (20.27 K) introduce engineering requirements beyond those governing methane systems.^{3,16,58,89,90,91,92}

Consequently, facility conversion from methane or gasoline service to hydrogen service requires substantial engineering redesign rather than incremental modification. This includes ventilation system reconfiguration from floor-level extraction to mechanical removal at ceiling height with minimum rates of 1 cfm/ft² of floor area.^{12,16,93} Leak detection must transition from odor-based sensing to continuous instrumental monitoring with automatic isolation capability at concentrations of 1% by volume (25% of LFL) for general enclosed areas and 0.4% by volume (10% of LFL) for permit-required confined spaces.¹⁶ Materials must be verified against hydrogen compatibility criteria, with replacement often necessary, particularly for high-strength ferritic steels that exhibit susceptibility to hydrogen embrittlement.^{5,6,25,94,95,96,97,98,99} Pressure relief systems require resizing based on hydrogen's different thermodynamic properties (specific heat ratio $\gamma = 1.384$ at 25°C, molecular mass 2.016 g/mol).^{58,100,101,102,103,104,105} Confinement geometries must be evaluated for detonation cell resonance and potential for flame acceleration.^{19,77,106,107,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115} Personnel training must address hydrogen-specific phenomena including invisible flames, dependence on automated shutdown systems, and rapid accumulation dynamics.

Engineering Implications and Facility Specifications

These physicochemical properties translate directly into facility specifications with no equivalent in methane systems. Ventilation ducting must exit at ceiling or roof level rather than wall level, requiring structural and architectural modification. Hydrogen detection sensors must be positioned at or near the ceiling in all enclosed volumes, including pipe chases, cable trays, and process areas where hydrogen can accumulate, avoiding direct airflow paths between inlet and exhaust. Mechanical ventilation must be sized to achieve air change rates sufficient to prevent stratification during normal operation and execute rapid dilution during postulated leak scenarios, often requiring higher air handling capacity (minimum 0.003 m²/m³ of room volume for inlet and outlet combined) than equivalent methane facilities.^{12,16,116}

Automated isolation systems must respond to sensor signals without operator involvement, with logic solvers programmed to shut off hydrogen supply, trigger alarm signals, and activate backup ventilation within seconds of reaching set-point concentrations. Such systems require regular functional testing as mandated by SIL requirements and industrial standards.^{5,14,15,16,48,49} Materials of construction in piping, valves, regulators, and relief devices must be verified for hydrogen compatibility, with ferritic steels below certain strength thresholds requiring replacement with austenitic stainless steels (e.g., types 304, 316, 316L), nickel alloys, or other hydrogen-resistant alloys.^{5,6,16,97,98} Sealing materials must be evaluated for permeability to hydrogen, as molecular hydrogen exhibits exceptionally high diffusivity through elastomers.^{11,16,25,117,118,119,120,121,122,123,124}

Distinction from Converted Facilities

A methane facility retrofitted to hydrogen operation without systematic redesign of these systems will fail to provide equivalent safety margins despite rigorous operational practice. Conventional ventilation strategies will not reliably prevent hydrogen accumulation in ceiling regions where buoyancy-driven stratification occurs. Odor-based or periodic detection will not provide early warning of leaks that can reach hazardous concentrations within minutes due to hydrogen's high diffusion rate. Ignition

source control becomes unreliable as a primary defense given the extremely low minimum ignition energy and the potential for electrostatic discharge ignition (as low as 0.141 mJ under certain conditions). Material incompatibility can lead to unexpected failures including crack initiation in high-strength steels or accelerated permeation losses through seals. These deficiencies represent design-level failures that operational procedures cannot overcome.

Understanding hydrogen's physicochemical properties is therefore not an academic exercise but an engineering prerequisite for safe facility design. It defines where ventilation must be located, how sensors must be distributed, what materials must be specified, how protective systems must be automated, and what consequences follow from any component failure. This understanding must inform decisions at the facility concept stage, not be applied retroactively as corrective measures after commissioning.

Hydrogen Embrittlement and Beyond: Material Damage Pathways

Hydrogen embrittlement (HE) is the loss of ductility, toughness, or fatigue resistance that occurs when hydrogen enters a metal and interacts with its microstructure under stress, with outcomes spanning delayed fracture, accelerated crack growth, and reduced resistance to crack extension. In steels, the practical danger is often driven by diffusible hydrogen because it can migrate toward stress concentrators and make damage strongly time-dependent rather than purely overload-driven.^{125,126}

How does hydrogen enter? Molecular hydrogen adsorbs on the surface, dissociates to atomic hydrogen, dissolves into the lattice, and then diffuses, while defects and interfaces provide trapping sites that can either slow transport or concentrate hydrogen locally. Entry is strongly surface-controlled, so roughness, pores, pinholes, cracks, and coating imperfections can either act as barriers when intact or become fast paths when damaged or poorly bonded.^{125,127,128} Hydrogen embrittlement in metals arises from several competing mechanisms that operate concurrently, with the dominant mode shifting according to local hydrogen concentration, applied stress state, and underlying microstructural features.^{129,130,131,132} Fig. 1 illustrates hydrogen molecules adsorbing on the stressed metal surface and dissociating, so atomic hydrogen enters the lattice, diffuses, and accumulates at highly triaxial regions such as defects, dislocations, and grain boundaries. The resulting local enrichment weakens cohesion and modifies plasticity, promoting embrittlement, crack nucleation, and sustained subcritical advance, while continued hydrogen supply accelerates growth toward unstable propagation and rupture. At lower hydrogen activities, plasticity-mediated processes prevail, wherein enhanced dislocation mobility occurs through elastic shielding of microstructural obstacles, ultimately manifesting as quasi-cleavage fracture surfaces with fine-scale ductile features that reveal localized void coalescence at the nanoscale.^{130,132,133,134} As hydrogen concentration increases and exceeds critical thresholds locally, decohesion mechanisms become active, weakening interfacial and grain boundary cohesive strength and precipitating an abrupt transition from ductile to brittle fracture behavior.^{129,130,132}




Figure 1. Schematic representation of hydrogen embrittlement: dissociative adsorption of H_2 at the metal surface, diffusion and trapping of atomic hydrogen at stressed defects, hydrogen-assisted crack initiation and subcritical propagation, leading to final rupture.

In systems with strong affinity for hydrogen, brittle hydride phases nucleate preferentially along crystallographic planes, fundamentally altering the fracture path.¹³² Beyond these classical mechanisms, failure can also proceed through surface blistering when atomic hydrogen recombines at buried interfaces, generating internal pressure sufficient to drive coating delamination, or through subsurface cracking caused by molecular species formation at elevated temperatures, where localized pressures build to levels that surpass the intrinsic strength of the material.^{129,130,132} Understanding which mechanism dominates under specific service conditions remains central to designing hydrogen-compatible structural alloys and predicting their long-term integrity.

Where and when is HE most severe? Risk rises when three conditions coincide: a susceptible microstructure, a hydrogen source, and a stress state that concentrates hydrogen, particularly under sustained load or cyclic loading where hydrogen has time to participate in crack-tip processes. High-strength steels are often more sensitive, and the need for hydrogen-specific inspection and maintenance logic is amplified in pipelines and other pressure equipment subjected to fatigue loading.^{125,126,127} The Fig. 2 summarizes hydrogen embrittlement as a coupled problem governed by material, mechanical and environmental variables. Each circle lists representative variables in that domain that promote or mitigate HE in metallic components for hydrogen service. HE initiates and grows only in the central overlap, where an embrittlement-prone microstructure, sufficient tensile stress, and an aggressive hydrogen environment coincide, providing a practical framework for diagnosis and safe design.




Figure 2. Interacting variables governing hydrogen embrittlement.

Failure modes are not only “brittle cleavage”. In practice, hydrogen-assisted fracture can arise from a combination of localized plasticity, decohesion, and void-related processes, and the apparent fracture morphology can vary even for similar alloys depending on ingress conditions, stress state, and microstructure. A related but often under-accounted degradation mode is hydrogen blistering, where hydrogen accumulates and molecularizes at subsurface discontinuities or at coating, buffer-layer, or substrate interfaces, generating local pressure that drives interfacial cracking, buckling, and eventual delamination.^{125,128} Additionally, high-temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA), hydrogen-induced cracking (HIC), cryogenic embrittlement, and permeation loss consequences extend the scope of hydrogen damage across the energy infrastructure lifecycle through several distinct pathways that span different temperature regimes and operational timescales.¹³⁰ HTHA, represents a chemical degradation mechanism distinct from embrittlement. When steels are exposed to hydrogen at temperatures above approximately 200°C under high pressure, absorbed hydrogen undergoes a chemical reaction with carbon atoms and carbides such as

cementite, forming methane gas.¹³⁰ This methane gas, possessing a significantly larger molecular diameter than hydrogen itself, accumulates at grain boundaries and microstructural defects, exerting internal pressure that initiates fissuring, decarburization, and microcracking. While hydrogen embrittlement occurs gradually through diffusion and trapping at ambient and moderately elevated temperatures, HTHA requires specific thermal and chemical conditions and develops over months to years of service. The distinction is operationally critical: embrittlement prevention relies on material selection and surface barriers, whereas HTHA prevention requires operating below defined pressure-temperature thresholds where the chemical reaction becomes negligible. HIC, occurs in manufacturing phases including welding, casting, and electroplating.^{130,135} Unlike embrittlement, which manifests as gradual strength loss during service, HIC appears as delayed cracking in welds and stress concentrators hours to weeks after hydrogen exposure ends. This mechanism involves hydrogen diffusion into pre-existing microstructural defects, residual stress concentration, and ultimately brittle crack initiation at interfaces between ferrite and precipitates. Prevention requires stress relief heat treatment, hydrogen bake-out protocols at 190-230°C for 10-24 hours post-plating, and careful control of manufacturing processes to minimize internal hydrogen sources. Cryogenic embrittlement, distinct from hydrogen embrittlement, emerges at the extreme cooling associated with liquid hydrogen storage.^{58,136} At 20 Kelvin (-253°C), ferritic steels experience pronounced reduction in impact toughness and ductility purely through thermal effects on lattice atomic motion, independent of hydrogen absorption. While liquid hydrogen's exceptionally low latent heat of vaporization (roughly nine times less than methane) creates rapid evaporation and minimal cooling duration, the cryogenic environment itself mandates material selection favoring austenitic stainless steels and aluminum alloys that maintain impact resistance at these temperatures. Hydrogen permeation and slow storage loss, occurs when hydrogen diffuses through seals, gaskets, and even thin metallic films. Hydrogen permeation is governed by the hydrogen diffusion coefficient, which varies dramatically by material.^{137,138,139,140} Over weeks and months, hydrogen escapes from storage systems, reducing usable capacity and requiring replenishment. This loss mechanism, while not causing acute mechanical failure, drives operational and economic penalties in long-term hydrogen storage for seasonal balancing or remote applications.

Detection and diagnosis are therefore multi-layered. At the component level, the objective is to detect and size cracks before unstable growth, because hydrogen damage can evolve with time and loading history, especially in fatigue-relevant service.^{125,126,131} At the laboratory and failure-analysis level, permeation testing (including electrochemical approaches) and thermal desorption are widely used to quantify uptake and transport behavior, while microscopy and surface analytics diagnose whether barriers failed through pores, cracks, or interface separation.^{128,132,141}

What has worked so far is a hierarchy: (1) reduce entry, (2) slow transport, (3) reduce the driving force for localization and cracking.^{125,128,131,142,143} Barrier coatings can help, but they must stay intact and well-adhered; for example, even coatings used for hydrogen barrier and wear resistance can degrade when hydrogen reaches buried interfaces, where blistering and hydrogen-induced interfacial cracking can trigger roughness increases (up to 3.8×), delamination (about 58%), and reduced scratch-critical load for complete delamination (up to 2.0 N decrease).¹²⁸ Mechanical surface engineering can also be effective by reducing near-surface uptake; compressive residual stress introduced by cavitation peening reduced hydrogen content in 316L to about 15% of untreated at 378 MPa compressive residual stress.¹⁴⁴

Hydrogen trapping occurs at various microstructural defects and impurities, each characterized by a binding energy that reflects the thermodynamic favorability of hydrogen occupancy at that site. Single iron vacancies (24-78 kJ/mol), dislocation cores (60 kJ/mol), and carbide interfaces such as TiC (46-116 kJ/mol) constitute strong traps classified as effectively irreversible at ambient temperature, whereas grain boundaries (32 kJ/mol), dislocation strain fields (23-27 kJ/mol), and cementite interfaces (11-18 kJ/mol) represent moderate to weak reversible traps; solute atoms including titanium (26 kJ/mol), nitrogen (13 kJ/mol), and aluminium (6 kJ/mol in austenite) also trap hydrogen with binding energies dependent on their local atomic environment and crystal structure.¹⁴³ The practical significance of this trapping hierarchy is that hydrogen immobilized at strong, irreversible sites becomes unavailable for diffusion to stress concentrators and crack tips, thus reducing the diffusible hydrogen fraction and mitigating embrittlement; even weak traps collectively reduce the apparent diffusion coefficient and increase total hydrogen solubility in the steel, and the distinction between reversible and irreversible traps becomes critical for predictive modeling of mechanical property degradation, since irreversibly trapped hydrogen (> ~60 kJ/mol) does not re-enter the lattice during service life and is therefore "innocuous," whereas reversibly trapped hydrogen can re-equilibrate and contribute to localized concentrations under stress. A trap with a binding energy of 100 kJ/mol is often considered irreversible at ambient temperature

but becomes reversible at a sufficiently high temperature.¹⁴⁵ Despite of smaller hydrogen diffusion coefficients of Cadmium and tin, used as a sacrificial coating on steel, but its application is declining due to toxicity issues. To protect against corrosion, strong steels are often electroplated with cadmium or zinc but the plating process itself introduces hydrogen into the steel; however, alloying zinc with nickel greatly reduces this penetration of hydrogen into the steel.^{146,147} Nickel (Ni) in ferritic iron (α) repels hydrogen due to its smaller hydrogen diffusion coefficient than ferrite and its negative binding energy (-12 kJ/mol), acts as a diffusion barrier to hydrogen when plated on steel.^{143,148} Hydrogen embrittlement manifests through multiple competing mechanisms whose dominance depends on local hydrogen concentration, stress state, and microstructure.

Looking ahead, robust HE control is moving toward integrated design that treats the surface, interfaces, and bulk microstructure as a coupled system, rather than relying on a single lever.^{125,131,142,143} Exploratory routes that modify near-surface defect populations to trap hydrogen and delay diffusion, including implantation and irradiation approaches in iron, illustrate the broader principle that engineered trapping can suppress embrittlement when it is implemented without creating new dominant damage paths.¹⁴⁹

Table 2 consolidates prevention and mitigation strategies for hydrogen embrittlement in steels used throughout the hydrogen energy infrastructure lifecycle. The approaches are organized into two complementary strategies: limiting hydrogen entry at material surfaces and controlling hydrogen behavior within the bulk microstructure. Preventing hydrogen entry involves barrier coatings (ceramics, metals, polymers), surface oxidation treatments, thermochemical modification, manufacturing process controls, and appropriate electroplating system selection with post-plating thermal relief. These methods aim to reduce the flux of hydrogen reaching the steel substrate. Rendering hydrogen harmless relies on microstructural design to trap diffusible hydrogen at carbides, dislocations, vacancies, and grain boundaries. Phase engineering favors low-diffusivity microstructures such as austenite or pearlite. Microalloying additions (titanium, vanadium, niobium) create strong trap sites, while compressive stress engineering modifies trap density and crack-driving forces. Trapped hydrogen, when immobilized at these sites, contributes minimally to mechanical degradation. Practical applications frequently employ multiple mechanisms simultaneously. The dominant control mechanism shifts depending on local hydrogen concentration, applied stress, temperature, and pressure. Evidence shows that processing metallurgy is as important as alloy composition. Manufacturing history determines both the initial hydrogen content and the dislocation-precipitation state that governs trapping efficiency.

Defect control remains foundational. Inclusion content, grain size, and carbide morphology influence both hydrogen transport and crack initiation. Surface treatments and coatings must remain continuous and well-adhered; microscopic defects such as pinholes or delamination severely compromise performance. Temperature and pressure regimes shift the relative effectiveness of different strategies. Industrial deployment of emerging approaches (graphene coatings, ion implantation, nanocomposites) lags significantly behind laboratory demonstrations, primarily due to scalability and cost challenges.

Table 2. Hydrogen embrittlement prevention methods.^{125,130,142,143,149,150,151,152,153,154,155,156,157,158}

What It Does (Principle)	Main Cautions and Failure Modes
Hydrogen source control in manufacturing	
Reduces internal hydrogen introduced during melting, casting, welding, pickling, electroplating, and heat treatment. Less diffusible hydrogen is available to concentrate at stressed regions.	Manufacturing-induced hydrogen often leads to delayed failures in service; prevention must be embedded in process control from the beginning rather than treated as a final inspection item. Different manufacturing routes (casting vs forging) produce different levels of internal hydrogen.
Post-process dehydrogenation (bake-out, hydrogen relief)	
Removes diffusible hydrogen after hydrogen-charging steps (notably electroplating) by thermal activation before it can drive delayed cracking.	Heat treatment must be compatible with prior tempering state and final hardness; low-temperature baking may redistribute hydrogen into deeper traps in some cases; time-to-bake windows are critical and must be met to prevent delayed fracture.
Diffusion-barrier coatings (general ceramic and metallic systems)	

Suppresses hydrogen entry by adding a low-permeability layer so that surface reaction kinetics and near-surface diffusion become rate-limiting, slowing the cascade that leads to bulk embrittlement.	Coating effectiveness is often dominated by defects (pinholes, cracks, porosity), surface degradation, and mechanical incompatibility with the substrate. Under localized stress, coatings can wear out or detach. Intrinsic hydrogen diffusivity alone does not determine barrier effectiveness; structural integrity is equally critical.
Conversion oxides (black oxide and related passive films)	
Adds a thin oxide layer that can retard hydrogen diffusion and sometimes improves tribological and corrosion-related surface crack initiation conditions.	Benefits often do not persist under severe wear or chemical attack; the oxide film is inherently porous and may allow localized corrosion and hydrogen ingress. Not a substitute for controlling hydrogen generation at the surface. Effectiveness is reduced in severe operating conditions (high speed, high stress).
Electroplating with sacrificial and barrier metals (Cd, Ni, Zn-Ni)	
Balances corrosion protection with lower hydrogen uptake by selecting coating systems that either reduce hydrogen charging (recombination-enhanced) or act as diffusion barriers (low permeability).	The plating process itself is a major hydrogen source; post-plating thermal relief is often mandatory. Defects in coatings (pinholes, cracks) leave substrate exposed to continued charging. Galvanic coupling can accelerate localized corrosion. High silicon substrate content may result in poor coating adhesion.
Hard ceramic barrier coatings (TiN, TiC, Al₂O₃, Cr₂O₃, SiN, multilayers)	
Creates ultra-low-permeability films that dramatically slow hydrogen transport through orders of magnitude, relying on dense microstructure and high activation energy for hydrogen diffusion through the ceramic lattice.	Real-world effectiveness depends critically on coating continuity, adhesion, and resistance to mechanical damage. Ceramic coatings are brittle and susceptible to failure under localized stress or thermal mismatch. Grain boundaries can act as fast hydrogen diffusion channels (energy barriers ~0.69 eV for bulk vs ~1.10 eV for boundaries in α -Al ₂ O ₃). Manufacturing defects (pinholes, cracks) remain a central barrier to industrial adoption.
Electroless Ni-P coatings	
Applies a dense metallic/amorphous barrier layer with inherently low hydrogen diffusivity (depending on phosphorus content) uniformly to complex geometries without introducing hydrogen during deposition.	Porosity and defects significantly reduce effectiveness; ISO 4527:2003 recommends surface roughness Ra below 0.2 micrometers to prevent corrosion initiation. Adhesion can be poor if substrate preparation is inadequate. Phosphorus content drives microstructure and mechanical properties; optimization is material- and application-specific.
Surface thermochemical treatments (plasma nitriding, ion nitriding, carburizing, carbonitriding)	
Creates near-surface conditions that lower hydrogen uptake via austenite stabilization, compressive stress generation, and formation of nitride/carbide phases that serve as hydrogen traps.	The nitride/carbide layer must remain intact and continuous; defects leave the underlying steel exposed to hydrogen ingress. Compressive stress can relax during service, reducing protection. Treatment must not introduce excessive distortion or surface degradation. Temperature and time must be carefully controlled to avoid over-hardening or embrittlement of the treated layer itself.
Compressive-stress surface engineering (shot peening, laser peening, cavitation peening)	
Reduces crack-opening stress and can hinder near-surface hydrogen entry by compressing the crystal lattice while simultaneously altering trap density near the surface, creating a work-hardened layer with higher effective hydrogen solubility sites.	Peening can be double-edged: if it introduces damage or creates very high dislocation density without adequate trapping, irreversible HE risks increases. Residual compressive stress can relax during service or at elevated temperature. Recent work indicates that reversible versus irreversible hydrogen trapping effects depend sensitively on peening pressure; excessive pressure may increase irreversible HE. Parameter control is essential.

Microalloying and precipitate-based hydrogen trapping	
Reduces the mobile (diffusible) hydrogen population by intentionally creating "benign traps" such as precipitate interfaces and carbides that are energetically favorable for hydrogen but mechanically immobile.	Trap design must avoid sacrificing toughness or introducing new crack-initiation sites (e.g., coarse precipitates, inclusion-precipitate interfaces). Trap potency depends critically on precipitate size, morphology, distribution, and interface coherency. If trap density is very high relative to dislocation density, the balance between embrittlement resistance and strength can become unfavorable. Microstructural control during processing is demanding.
Phase and microstructure engineering (austenite stabilization, pearlite, bainite morphology)	
Uses phases with inherently lower hydrogen diffusivity and more favorable crack-resistance characteristics to reduce pathways for rapid hydrogen transport and localization at crack tips.	Austenite can act as a hydrogen reservoir if hydrogen becomes trapped and later released during deformation or thermal cycling. Austenite stability under service stress state (pressure, temperature, strain) is critical; unstable austenite transforms to martensite, degrading the intended benefit. Phase transformation-induced cracking (TRIP effects) can backfire if not carefully designed. Strength penalties and cost of austenite-stabilizing elements must be weighed.
Cleanliness and inclusion control	
Reduces preferred crack initiation sites (especially inclusion-matrix interfaces and segregation bands) where hydrogen-assisted cracking commonly nucleates and propagates fastest.	High trap density alone is not automatically beneficial if the microstructure also creates strong stress concentrators or promotes brittle crack paths (e.g., large undeformable inclusions). Inclusion engineering must balance reduction of harmful sites with preservation of strength-giving features. Cost and complexity of ultra-clean steelmaking are significant industrial constraints.
Emerging barrier films: Polymeric coatings and nanocomposites	
Targets permeability reduction via polymer chain structure and crosslinking, sometimes combined with inorganic nanoparticles (graphene, ZrO_2 , silica) to create tortuous diffusion paths and interfacial barriers.	Real-world feasibility depends on coating continuity, defect tolerance, adhesion to steel substrate, mechanical compatibility, and manufacturing scalability. Polymer coatings are softer and more flexible than ceramics but may suffer greater permeation under aggressive chemical environments or at elevated temperature. Graphene-based coatings promise ultra-low permeability but are still research-forward; industrial-scale deposition and quality control are not yet established.
Emerging barrier films: Graphene and reduced graphene oxide	
Leverages the geometric impermeability (pore size ~ 0.064 nanometers) and high energy barrier for hydrogen passage (2.89 eV to traverse) compared to favorable C-H bonding sites (0.18 eV) to create ultra-dense barriers.	Manufacturing scalability, cost, and long-term durability under service conditions (mechanical wear, chemical attack, thermal cycling) remain unproven at industrial scale. Coating defects and delamination can compromise performance. Interaction between hydrogen and graphene is still being characterized; optimal layer thickness and substrate preparation are not yet standardized.
Emerging defect engineering: Ion implantation and irradiation-induced traps	
Attempts to immobilize hydrogen by creating controlled trap populations (vacancies, vacancy clusters, dislocation loops) near the surface or by modifying dislocation behavior through sub-atomic damage.	These approaches remain research-forward with limited industrial deployment. Scale-up to large components and realistic geometries is unproven. Long-term property impacts (fatigue, creep, thermal stability) under service conditions must be validated. Dose control and reproducibility are challenging. Cost and availability of ion-beam facilities restrict practical applicability.

Despite substantial progress in understanding hydrogen embrittlement, blistering, high-temperature hydrogen attack, hydrogen-induced and stress cracking, cryogenic embrittlement, and permeation loss, several fundamental uncertainties still

limit confident design and life prediction for hydrogen infrastructure. Across these damage modes, the threshold combinations of hydrogen concentration, stress, temperature, and microstructure that separate reversible degradation from irreversible cracking or attack remain poorly constrained for most engineering alloys and component geometries. The combined effects of multiple mitigation measures, such as hard or ceramic coatings used together with microstructural hydrogen traps and engineered compressive residual stresses, are rarely quantified in a systematic way, and there is very little data on the long-term stability of such measures under realistic cyclic pressure, thermal, mechanical, and corrosive loading. At the modelling level, available descriptions of hydrogen entry, diffusion, trapping, microstructural evolution, and crack growth are still largely qualitative, lack standardized test protocols for extracting transferable parameters, and struggle to bridge the gap from atomistic or small-scale experiments to component-scale predictions, particularly under corrosion fatigue and variable-amplitude loading where hydrogen interacts with time-dependent stress fields. Scaling laws that relate specimen behaviour to full-scale pipelines, pressure vessels, valves, and storage tanks are not yet established, and systematic validation data from operating assets that experience different hydrogen pathways and time-scales of damage are scarce. Key research gaps therefore include rigorous definition of mechanistic thresholds for each damage mode, quantitative studies of synergistic or antagonistic interactions among combined mitigation strategies, development and validation of multiscale predictive models that can be used reliably at the component level, and generation of long-duration field datasets that capture the evolution of hydrogen damage and protection effectiveness over the full-service life of hydrogen systems.

Hydrogen is not more dangerous nor safer than other fuels by virtue of its chemistry alone. Its safety depends entirely on how completely and competently hydrogen's actual physical and chemical properties are understood and accommodated in system design, from the choice of materials through the sizing of every vent and relief device, to the layout and ventilation of the buildings where hydrogen will be used. The path to safe hydrogen deployment is not innovation for its own sake but disciplined engineering respecting the physical reality of how hydrogen behaves. A century of industrial experience, combined with recent research, demonstrates that this path is well-established, proven, and scalable.

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CASE DISCUSSION - 1

The Hindenburg Disaster (May 1937)

The Hindenburg's legacy is not "hydrogen is dangerous"; it is "intelligent safety design, continuous monitoring, and human competency transform hydrogen into the safe fuel of the future."

LAYER 0: STRUCTURAL FAILURE

- Sharp control during landing
- Extreme stress on aluminum frame
- Bracing wire snap in Gas Cell
- Hydrogen release into envelope

LAYER 1: SYSTEM DESIGN DEFICIENCY

- Electrically isolated skin
- Non-conductive fastening (ramie)
- No grounding/bonding system

LAYER 2: ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD

- Thunderstorm in vicinity
- Charged atmospheric conditions
- High potential for electrostatic

LAYER 3: IGNITION TRIGGER

- Capacitive charge accumulation
- Spark on ground contact
- Coincides with H₂ leak point

LAYER 4: HAZARD REALIZATION

- Wide H₂ flammability range
- Extreme flame speed
- No detection system active
- No emergency venting pathway

Total Loss



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Event and Immediate Consequences

Root Cause:

Electrostatic Discharge and Design Failure

The Hindenburg's legacy is not "hydrogen is dangerous"; it is "intelligent safety design, continuous monitoring, and human competency transform hydrogen into the safe fuel of the future."

On May 6, 1937, the LZ 129 Hindenburg, a 245-meter hydrogen-filled airship, caught fire during mooring at Lakehurst Naval Air Station (New Jersey). The fire consumed the vessel in 32 seconds, resulting in 35 fatalities aboard and 1 ground crew member. The disaster ended commercial airship travel and introduced the "Hindenburg Syndrome", the misconception that hydrogen is inherently dangerous compared to other fuels.

Table 1. Flammability and Ignition Comparison

Property	Hydrogen	Natural Gas	Gasoline	LPG
Flammability Range (% in air)	4.0 - 75.0%	5 - 15%	1.4 - 7.6%	1.9 - 9.5%
Minimum Ignition Energy (mJ)	0.02	0.29 - 0.31	0.24	0.25 - 0.48
Auto-Ignition Temperature (°C)	510 - 585	540	228 - 480	220 - 490
Flame Speed in Air (m/s)	2.65 - 2.83	0.37 - 0.45	0.4 - 0.45	0.46
Vapor density (air = 1)	0.0696	0.55	3.4 - 3.7	1.52 - 1.55

Historical Context: Why Hydrogen?

It was not a failure of hydrogen chemistry. It was a systems-level failure:

- Absent grounding design
- No detection capability
- Inadequate material standards
- No automated emergency response
- High-risk landing in thunderstorm
- Insufficient crew training

Rigid airship development began with pioneering work in early 1900s design innovation. While the commercial era demonstrated initial operational success, over 200 fatalities from hydrogen-filled airship accidents between 1917 and 1930 led multiple nations to abandon hydrogen technology, yet commercial operations continued with hydrogen due to constraints on access to the safer helium alternative.

The airship's design specifications called for helium, the lighter element offering superior safety. However, international supply restrictions during the 1930s made helium unavailable to commercial operators, forcing a choice between hydrogen-filled service or operational discontinuation. This decision to proceed with hydrogen despite documented safety concerns reflected technological constraints imposed by material availability rather than disagreement about hydrogen's hazards. The incident underscores a persistent tension in hydrogen deployment: technological viability does not guarantee safe scaling when critical enabling technologies remain controlled or restricted by geopolitical factors beyond individual operators' control.

Technical Analysis

Hydrogen's minimum ignition energy (0.02 mJ) is 10× lower than natural gas (0.29 mJ) or gasoline (0.24 mJ) (refer Table 1), making it susceptible to electrostatic discharge. However, its flame speed (2.65 m/s) and buoyancy (0.07× air density) mean hydrogen disperses rapidly in outdoor/ventilated environments, safer than denser fuels like propane (1.5× air density) or gasoline (3.4× air density) that accumulate in confined spaces.

Investigations by national commissions and modern forensic analysis identified electrostatic discharge igniting a hydrogen leak as the cause. The airship's fabric skin was electrically isolated from the metal frame by non-conductive ramie cords. During descent through a charged thunderstorm atmosphere, the skin accumulated positive charge while the grounded frame accumulated negative charge, creating an unintended capacitor. When mooring ropes contacted the ground, charge redistribution triggered a spark coinciding with a hydrogen leak near the stern (Gas Cell 4 area). Sharp control inputs during final approach created extreme stress on the aluminum frame. A bracing wire (in Gas Cell 4) failed, slashing through the gas cell protective covering and releasing hydrogen into the space between gas bags and outer skin.

The Hindenburg disaster resulted from system-level design failures, not hydrogen's inherent properties. The specific combination of electrical isolation, structural failure, atmospheric conditions, and absence of automated detection/response systems converged to enable catastrophe (refer Table 2).

Table 2. Five-layer cascade failure analysis: Root causes and corresponding engineered safety countermeasures with applicable codes and standards

Safety / Failure Defense Layer	Gap/weakness	Current engineering & operational controls
Layer 0: Structural	Bracing wire snapped during sharp landing maneuver; extreme stress on aluminum framework; hydrogen released from ruptured Gas Cell 4 into confined envelope space between gas bags and outer skin	Material certification with hardness limits (≤ 250 HB); 100% weld non-destructive testing (NDT) using ultrasonic/radiographic inspection; structural stress analysis during design phase; hydrogen-compatible materials per ASME B31.12; fatigue analysis accounting for cyclic and operational loads
	<i>Relevant standards/codes: ASME B31.12, ASME BPVC Section VIII, EN 13480, ISO 11114-1, ISO 11114-4, API RP 578</i>	
Layer 1: Electrical	Electrically isolated fabric skin separated from metal frame by non-conductive ramie cords; unintended capacitor effect; charge accumulated on skin while frame remained at different potential; no grounding provisions before landing	Comprehensive equipotential bonding (≤ 1 ohm resistance); all conductive surfaces bonded to central ground bus; charge dissipation by design through conductive coatings; mandatory grounding protocols before hydrogen operations; continuous bonding integrity verification; electrical classification per IEC 60079 series
	<i>Relevant standards/codes: NFPA 70 (NEC), incl. Article 500, IEC 60079-10-1, IEC 60079-14, NFPA 77, ATEX 2014/34/EU, ATEX 1999/92/EC</i>	
Layer 2: Environmental	Thunderstorm in vicinity during landing; charged atmospheric conditions; no protection against atmospheric charge accumulation; electrostatic buildup unchecked	Grounding system drains atmospheric charge safely to earth; no capacitive buildup possible through engineered charge dissipation; hazardous area classification (Zone 0/1/2 per IEC 60079-10-1 or Class I/Division per NFPA 497, as applicable); environmental monitoring systems; lightning protection to prevent discharge into hydrogen zones; operations restricted during adverse weather conditions
	<i>Relevant standards/codes: IEC 62305, NFPA 780, IEC 60079-10-1, EN 60079-10-1, NFPA 497, ATEX 2014/34/EU and 1999/92/EC</i>	
Layer 3: Ignition Trigger	Spark at ground contact coincided with hydrogen leak point near stern (Gas Cell 4); leak went undetected; no early warning system; coincidence of ignition source and flammable mixture	Continuous hydrogen detection at ppm-level sensitivity (alarm typically at 0.5–1% H ₂ , well below 4% LFL); multi-point sensor arrays with redundancy (if one sensor fails, others remain operational); automated alarm and sub-second to few-second automated shutdown; real-time monitoring with Safety Integrity Level (SIL) rated systems; flame and gas detection integrated with control systems
	<i>Relevant standards/codes: ISO 19880-1:2020, NFPA 2, ISO 26142, IEC 60079-29-1, IEC 60079-29-2, NFPA 72, IEC 61508 / IEC 61511</i>	
Layer 4: Hazard Realization	Rapid hydrogen combustion (32 seconds from ignition to total destruction); wide flammability range; extreme flame speed; no automated emergency response; no pressure relief; uncontrolled venting led to 36 fatalities	Automated emergency shutdown on detection; flame arrestors prevent fire propagation through system; redundant pressure relief devices (thermally activated and manual); emergency venting discharged to a safe outdoor location per applicable code requirements; trained personnel execute evacuation protocols; passive fire protection on critical components; separation distances per consequence modeling
	<i>Relevant standards/codes: NFPA 2, NFPA 55, CGA G-5.5, EN ISO 16852, NFPA 68, NFPA 69, EN 14797, EN 15089, EN 14373, EN 14460, OSHA 29 CFR 1910.103, OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119</i>	

It is also important to recognize that the five layers did not fail independently. They formed a cascade (refer Table 2), in which each unmitigated condition raised the probability of the next and amplified the eventual consequence, and this is precisely the mechanism that defense-in-depth safety architecture is designed to interrupt before it runs to completion. The Hindenburg fire was not inevitable; it was the result of multiple safety gaps that converged at once. Today, each of those gaps is addressed by modern standards.

Hydrogen Ignition

Hydrogen's minimum ignition energy (0.02 mJ) is 10–15× lower than natural gas, gasoline, and LPG, and its flame speed (2.65 m/s) is 3–7 times faster than natural gas, gasoline, and LPG. This extreme reactivity, combined with hydrogen's widest flammability range (4–75%) and buoyant behavior (0.07 times the air density), makes it vulnerable to ignition from various distinct sources (Fig. 1) requiring multilayer detection, bonding, and mitigation systems per standards (NFPA 2, IEC 60079-series, ISO 19880-1).




Figure 1. Hydrogen Ignition Sources and a few relevant standard codes

What Changed: Today's hydrogen infrastructure operates under fundamentally different assumptions. Multi-layer detection systems respond in milliseconds. Bonding protocols prevent electrostatic charge buildup. Materials are certified for hydrogen service. Trained personnel execute protocols. Redundancy is built into every critical function. The Hindenburg's vulnerabilities are not design choices anymore, they are violations of code.

The Path Forward: As hydrogen deployment accelerates across maritime fuel cells, railway systems, port bunkering facilities, and industrial production, the Hindenburg case study serves as a calibration tool. It reminds operators and designers that safety is not a single barrier, it is a cascade of defenses. No single failure should trigger catastrophe. The lesson is not "hydrogen is dangerous"; it is "incomplete safety systems are dangerous." Modern hydrogen systems demonstrate that when design rigor, material certification, detection systems, and trained personnel work together, hydrogen is safely deployable at scale. The energy transition depends on translating this principle across every application and every operator globally.

CASE DISCUSSION - 2

The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant

(March 2011)

Intermittent and Unintended Hydrogen is as Hazardous as Planned Hydrogen

Magnitude 9.0 (32× more powerful than design basis (M7.5)) earthquake strikes 70 km east of Tohoku coast; All 3 operating reactors (Units 1-3) automatically shut down; control rods inserted; reactors safe; Consequently, offsite AC power lost; Backup diesel generators activated

March 11 14:46 JST

March 11 15:37-15:41 JST

Tsunami wave (14.5 m) destroys ALL backup power systems; Consequently Units 1-5 undergone complete power loss; all cooling systems inoperable

Emergency core cooling injection systems fail due to power loss; Consequently, uncontrolled core heating begins, meltdown inevitable without external cooling

March 11 16:36 JST

March 11 20:50 JST

Water level in Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel drops below Top of Active Fuel (TAF); fuel cladding exposed to steam; Consequently, hydrogen started leaking into reactor building; accumulation begins hydrogen generation continues for ~12-15 hours until explosion

Hydrogen EXPLOSION in Unit 1 Reactor Building upper floors; 5 workers injured; emergency response disrupted; Hydrogen risk now became REAL and VISIBLE to all; public anxiety surges

March 12 15:36 JST

March 12 18:25 JST

Evacuation Zone expansion from 10 km to 20 km radius; Massive evacuation (~300,000 residents); roads congested; hospitals and care facilities disrupted

Unit 3; Cooling system failure; ARTICLE 15 Emergency Event; Core uncovering sequence begins; Unit 3 core damage expected to progress faster than Unit 1; H₂ GENERATION BEGINS (estimated 30-35 hr duration)

March 13 05:10 JST

March 15 06:14 JST

UNIT 4 hydrogen EXPLOSION due to UNEXPECTED cross-unit ventilation from Unit 3, backward flow into Unit 4. (Unit 4 had NO fuel in the core, H₂ travelled via shared SGTS); 'Shared infrastructure = failure vector'

UNIT 3 hydrogen EXPLOSION - more VIOLENT; Deflagration-to-Detonation Transition (DDT) - flame accelerated to supersonic speed; 11 injured; site evacuation intensified; Large quantity of fission products dispersed to atmosphere; 'longer accumulation = worse explosion'

March 14 11:01 JST

March 15 08:11 JST

Unit 4 hydrogen explosion triggers Article 15 Emergency Event (abnormal radioactive release); uncontrolled radioactive release: fission products (Iodine-131, Cesium-137, Strontium-90, and other radionuclides) released to atmosphere; long-term contamination & environmental impact begins



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The Hidden Risk of Hydrogen in Unintended Processes

Hydrogen can be the quiet troublemaker of industrial systems. Most of the time, it is a harmless gas, until one tiny oversight turns it into the star of the worst day of someone's career. Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Ōkuma, Fukushima, Japan made that painfully clear: hydrogen generated *outside intentional hydrogen-production process* triggered catastrophic explosions, and no one at the site understood that they were "handling" hydrogen at the time.

Event & Context

Fukushima nuclear accident is considered as the 2nd worst nuclear disaster in history, after Chernobyl. Earthquake of magnitude 9.0 and subsequent tsunami on March 11, 2011, sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan and initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant.

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant had 6 Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). The 15 m. high tsunami wave overtopped the seawalls of the plant and flooded the facility. **Flooding resulted in the extended loss of onsite AC and DC power with the consequent loss of reactor monitoring, control, and cooling functions in multiple units** which in turn disabled cooling of fuel inside the reactor and resulted in unanticipated Hydrogen generation in the system. This unintended **Hydrogen became the system's most destructive output. The Explosion Sequence** tells a devastating story:

- **March 11, 2011:** Units 1 to 3 were in operation and Units 4 to 6 were under shut down for periodic inspection. Unit 1, 2 and 3 reactors had automatically tripped after the earthquake, and the control rods had been inserted.¹ Emergency Diesel pumps started automatically, and reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) started operating. However, flooding of the facility by Tsunami waves knocked off all the power sources.
- **March 12, 15:36 JST:** A hydrogen explosion blew the roof of Unit 1, collapsing concrete walls and leaving behind only the steel framework, injuring four workers.
- **March 14, 11:01 JST:** An explosion at Unit 3 was larger than Unit 1 and was felt up to 40 km away, injured 11 people.
- **March 15, ~6:00 AM JST:** An explosion at Unit 4 destroyed the top of the building, even though Unit 4 was in a planned outage and shut down at the time. Post-accident investigations found that highly contaminated vent gas, including hydrogen, flowed backwards through the SGTS (Standby Gas Treatment System) piping and accumulated in UNIT 4.²

The SGTS was a safety system to maintain a negative pressure in the reactor building and filtering any radioactive/ hydrogen gas releases to the environment during normal or accident conditions, such as loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). However, SGTS was unavailable because it lost its emergency electrical power supply.

As per Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, Japan estimates, around 800-1000 kg of hydrogen was accidentally produced in each unit which leaked from the containment vessel and turned a nuclear emergency into a full-scale catastrophe.³ As superheated fuel pumped out hydrogen, the gas built up went unnoticed until it ignited with explosive force, ripping apart reactor buildings and shattering containment safety measures.

FLACS simulation modelling showed that between 130-210 kg of hydrogen may have accumulated on the 5th floor, where it eventually found an ignition source and exploded with devastating force.⁴

¹ Leyse, M., 2014. Preventing hydrogen explosions in severe nuclear accidents. NRDC report. <https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/hydrogen-generation-safety-report.pdf>

² Yamashita, T., Honda, T., Mizokami, M., Nozaki, K., Suzuki, H., Pellegrini, M., Sakai, T., Sato, I. and Mizokami, S., 2023. Comprehensive analysis and evaluation of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station unit 3. Nuclear Technology, 209(6), pp.902-927. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00295450.2022.2157663>

³ World Nuclear Association, Information Library, 29 April 2024. Safety and Security - Fukushima Daiichi Accident. <https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-daiichi-accident>

⁴ Fujisawa, N., Liu, S. and Yamagata, T., 2021. Numerical study on ignition and failure mechanisms of hydrogen explosion accident in Fukushima Daiichi Unit 1. Engineering Failure Analysis, 124, p.105388. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.engfailanal.2021.105388>

Accident Cause Analysis

The accident chronology confirms similar sequence across multiple units: prolonged loss of cooling → overheating → zirconium-steam reaction → hydrogen generation → leakage → explosive ignition in the superstructure.

What appeared to be caused by Tsunami or Earthquake, initiated a Chain of failures that led to ultimate explosion, as follows:

The Zirconium-Steam Reaction: An Exothermic Nightmare - The loss of cooling led to overheating of fuel rods in the reactor cores of units 1,2 and 3 which in turn caused formation of hydrogen gas formation in Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) due to chemical reaction between **overheated zirconium cladding** (the metal tubes encasing nuclear fuel) and **steam** according to the reaction:

$\text{Zr} + 2\text{H}_2\text{O} \rightarrow \text{ZrO}_2 + 2\text{H}_2$, releasing 190 kJ/mol of heat.

- a) **Zirconium cladding oxidized** rapidly at temperatures above 1,200°C when fuel assemblies were no longer fully covered by liquid water.
- b) Once temperatures exceeded 1,200°C, the reaction became self-sustaining. Such reaction rates are often **underpredicted** by safety models, leading operators to believe they had more time than they actually did.

Gas Migration & Accumulation: The Silent Buildup - Hydrogen escaped from the primary containment through imperfect seals/seal failures, equipment penetrations, and structural leakage paths. Due to its low density and buoyancy, the hydrogen migrated upward and accumulated unnoticed in the upper floors of the reactor buildings. Loss of ventilation and monitoring due to the blackout allowed formation of hydrogen pockets which subsequently reached flammable and potentially explosive concentrations to create conditions for explosive detonations.

Ignition: The Final Catastrophe - Accumulated hydrogen finally contacted a static electrical charge or sparks from failed electronics or Hot surfaces from damaged equipment for ignition.

Hydrogen explosions are exceptionally violent because hydrogen ignites with minimal energy (0.02mJ), has a wide flammability range in air (4 - 75%) and has a high laminar flame velocity of ~3 m/s, which is much **faster** than Natural Gas, ~0.3-0.4 m/s at peak. This rapid, highly exothermic combustion causes sudden gas expansion and severe overpressure, sometimes escalating from fast burning to detonation with destructive shock waves.

At Fukushima Daiichi, massive hydrogen generated during core overheating leaked into confined reactor buildings, where these properties enabled rapid flame acceleration in obstructed spaces and catastrophic explosions outside primary containment.

Critical Safety Gaps

Events at Fukushima were largely unanticipated, so may be the plant was not fully equipped to manage such unforeseen worst-case scenario.^{5,6} However, analysing the events, following gaps were revealed which are equally important and should be equally applicable for any industrial facility;

- **Single-Point Power Failures:** Simultaneous loss of all power collapsed every defence mechanism.
- **Limitations in existing containment design:** BWR containments proved inadequate to accommodate this amount of hydrogen generated. Multiple leak paths, and seal failures allowed hydrogen to escape into reactor buildings, triggering the catastrophic explosions in Units 1, 3 and 4.

⁵ Kaisha, T.D.K., 2012. Fukushima nuclear accident analysis report. Tokyo Electric Power Company, Incorporated.
https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf

⁶ Magwood IV, W.D., Creswell, L., Gauntt, R., McCree, V.M., Weightman, M., Muroya, N., Morita, S., Hah, Y., Vasquez-Maignan, X., Ivanova, T. and Rouyer, V., 2021. Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Accident, ten years on: Progress, lessons and challenges (No. NEA--7558). Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Nuclear Energy Agency-OECD/NEA, 46, quai Alphonse Le Gallo, 92100 Boulogne Billancourt (France). <https://inis.iaea.org/records/2a07y-p2f68/files/52024959.pdf>

- **Insufficient Hydrogen monitoring** outside containment area: Hydrogen monitors at Fukushima were not designed for a total blackout and did not have any redundant back up. The hydrogen that exploded was in the superstructure and operators were effectively unaware about its presence and associated threat.
- **Inadequate emergency response capabilities:** Simultaneous reactor failures, earthquake damage, Tsunami destruction, extended station blackout and loss of communications exceeded operators' response capacity and exposed gaps in multi-unit emergency planning.

Key Learnings for the Hydrogen Value Chain

Whether you are making hydrogen on purpose - or may accidentally churn out hydrogen as a side effect of chemical, metallurgical, or nuclear process, lessons from Fukushima apply universally.

Intermittent and unintended Hydrogen is as Hazardous as planned Hydrogen - This is the most critical lesson from Fukushima.

Industrial plants handling metals, high-temperature aqueous systems, or catalysts may unknowingly generate hydrogen at rates they might never have anticipated. That makes following safety measures to be made standard;

- **Redundant Power Architecture:** Independent AC and DC power Sources, Emergency generators must be placed in protected areas, safe from natural hazards. The failure mode at Fukushima, where earthquake, tsunami, and flooding knocked out all power sources including emergency Diesel generators simultaneously, must never happen again. Considering past accidents and anticipating worst of the worst scenario, adequate redundancy shall be inbuilt in the power systems.
- **Passive Safety Devices:** Passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) to remove hydrogen from containment during an accident by combining hydrogen with oxygen on platinum or palladium catalyst surfaces, operating without external power.
- **Hardened Venting and Dispersion System:** Ventilation system should be designed to withstand the accident conditions, should have safety relief valves accompanied with mechanical vents that fail open and automatic dampers to prevent backflows.
- **Comprehensive Monitoring and Detection:** Distributed hydrogen sensors across all facilities, not just in official hydrogen handling zones, with independent/ redundant power supplies to ensure un-interrupted electricity back-up during emergencies. Detection inside building voids (a key gap in Fukushima Units 1–3) and **real-time alerts** with automatic notification systems tied to emergency response can help monitoring the Hydrogen leaks and potential buildups.

Systems must be designed to escape cascading failures and unanticipated scenarios to avoid losing main power, backup power, emergency cooling, and monitoring line in one blow. Every hydrogen-bearing system intentional or accidental must remain leak proof and alive even if half the facility is underwater.

Mandatory training for worst conditions considering catastrophic multi-point failures and total loss of instrumentation. Operators must be skilled in hydrogen detection, isolation, rapid depressurization and taking decisions under highly uncertain situation.

Knowledge sharing across industries as hydrogen physics doesn't differentiate industries.

Conclusion: Designing for Reality, Not Hope

Fukushima's accident was not merely a nuclear only problem; it was a hydrogen safety failure. Flammability range of 4-75% hydrogen in air makes Hydrogen a particularly combustible and ignition-sensitive gas.

Hydrogen is **safe** or **unsafe**, depends on situation. Hydrogen, the smallest molecule can penetrate through the interstitial spaces of materials and cause embrittlement, but it also disperses very quickly in well-ventilated spaces making gas accumulation and combustion less likely.

What matters is whether the system is designed to handle the **unpredictable reality** where **hydrogen appears suddenly, accumulates silently, and ignites violently**. System design shall account for reasonably practicable worst-case scenarios while due consideration of underlying regional hazards and site-specific conditions like seismic activity and the potential for flooding or tsunamis.

Any industry that can generate unintentional hydrogen like refining, metals, ammonia, electrolysis, petrochemicals, or with high temperature steam systems must treat accidental hydrogen with the same seriousness as intentional use. Adopting a holistic, systems-level approach will ensure that hydrogen, which is critical for decarbonization, and clean energy transition is produced, transported, and used without putting people or facilities at risk.

Ignoring hydrogen because **"we don't produce hydrogen"** is exactly how you **end up producing headlines** instead.

CASE DISCUSSION - 3

Hydrogen Explosion and Fire Incident, Santa Clara, California
(June 2019)

Implications for High-Pressure Hydrogen Loading and Unloading Operations

On 1 June 2019, an uncontrolled release of high-pressure hydrogen occurred during filling of a multi-cylinder tube trailer at Air Products' transfill facility in Santa Clara, California, leading within seconds to a hydrogen-air deflagration, a jet fire, and secondary fires affecting nearby vehicles. Response protected nearby liquid hydrogen storage. The Hydrogen Safety Panel review reported an estimated 250 kg release and identified interacting failures: an initial leak near a module isolation valve, an unauthorized repair attempt with the trailer still connected, and miscommunication between a trainer and trainee that inadvertently re-enabled the trailer, releasing hydrogen from an open, disassembled pipe for about three seconds. The event shows how human factors, unclear control actions, and delayed isolation can overwhelm separation and protection measures. Engineering implications for hydrogen transfer operations include tightness verification before full-flow transfer, automatic shutoff on abnormal flow or pressure signatures, and passive fire barriers to limit escalation.



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Incident Overview

On June 1, 2019, a serious hydrogen incident occurred at the Air Products hydrogen trailer transfill facility in Santa Clara, California. During the filling of a hydrogen tube trailer, a high-pressure hydrogen release took place, followed by an explosion and a jet fire. The fire subsequently spread to nearby vehicles.

Fortunately, maintenance personnel were not seriously injured, and the prompt response of emergency services prevented the fire from spreading to nearby liquefied hydrogen storage tanks. This incident clearly demonstrates how the coincidence of several unfavorable technical and organizational factors can escalate into a major accident.

A detailed investigation was conducted, and an incident review report was issued.¹ The report analyzed the root causes of the event and proposed recommendations to prevent similar incidents. However, these recommendations remain largely general in nature. To enhance practical safety, it is necessary to define specific technical and organizational measures aimed at improving the safety of compressed hydrogen loading and unloading operations.

Background on Hydrogen Production and Transport

Industrial hydrogen production began in the early 20th century and expanded steadily with the growth of the chemical industry. Traditionally, hydrogen was produced in the vicinity of the consumption site and was delivered to consumers through pipelines. Transportation of liquefied hydrogen by road commenced in the mid-20th century, driven primarily by demand from the aerospace and rocket industries.

Although cylinders for storing and transporting compressed gas appeared as early as the 19th century, their use for Hydrogen delivery was limited to minor users, particularly laboratories. The capabilities of road transport and use as automotive fuel were restricted due to the high weight of metal cylinders and the lack of mass-produced cylinders with pressures exceeding 200 bar.

However, this situation began to change in the 1990s with the development of high-pressure composite cylinders and the onset of the decarbonization era. Currently in active use are composite cylinders with pressures of 350 and 700 bar for hydrogen-powered vehicles and compressed Hydrogen transport trailers, and even up to 1000 bar for filling stations. Public hydrogen refueling infrastructure has expanded in several regions, with the most developed networks currently found in China, followed by South Korea, Japan, Germany, France, and the United States, particularly California.²

Safety Characteristics of High-Pressure Hydrogen Systems

Due to the extremely high pressures of compressed hydrogen, hydrogen systems are characterized by a high risk of ruptures and leaks. Vehicle refueling systems are the most vulnerable, as they include flexible hoses and reusable connectors. Incident statistics from the Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (HIAD)³ show cases of hydrogen releases during refueling operations with varying intensity, ranging from minor leaks through seals and defects to explosions when refueling hoses rupture. As a rule, small leaks do not cause fires, unlike leaks through the entire cross-section of the refueling hose. Given the extremely low ignition energy of hydrogen mixtures (about 0.02 mJ), a possible cause of ignition of the gas-air mixture in the event of a massive Hydrogen discharge is electrostatic sparks occurring at high speeds of significant volumes of gas flowing from the ruptured section.

Analysis of the Santa Clara Incident

Returning to the analysis of the Hydrogen Explosion and Fire Incident in Santa Clara, California, 2019, it should be noted that this event was caused by a combination of several adverse factors:

¹ Panel, H.S., 2021. *Report on the June 2019 Hydrogen Explosion and Fire Incident in Santa Clara, California*. PNNL-31015-1, Hydrogen Safety Panel. https://h2tools.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/AP_Santa_Clara_Incident_Review_Report_Rev1.pdf

² Station Operational Status System. <https://m.h2fc.org/>

³ HIAD 2.0. The hydrogen incidents database HIAD 2.0. <https://hysafe.info/hiad-2-0-free-access-to-the-renewed-hydrogen-incident-and-accident-database/>

- a small hydrogen leak;
- an unauthorized attempt by personnel to repair the leak on their own;
- miscommunication between a trainer and a trainee, which led to a massive release of hydrogen through the disconnected hose;
- a delay of approximately three seconds in shutting off the hydrogen supply after the release began.

The amount of hydrogen released (approximately 250 kg) was sufficient to create an explosive gas-air mixture, the explosion of which, followed by a hydrogen flare, damaged the trailer's cylinder tubing, resulting in additional leakages of hydrogen. An additional negative factor in the development of the emergency was the absence of fire barriers and the spread of the fire to neighboring trailers.

Role of Automation and Engineering Controls

Organizational issues regarding staff procedures are important, but this accident could have been avoided with a more sophisticated automation system. In particular, when properly organized, the Control System is capable of performing preliminary checks on the tightness of the hose and the connector, as well as quickly shutting off the hydrogen supply in the event of a sudden massive leak.

It is also possible to mechanically solve the problem of stopping leakage in the event of a hose rupture by installing a speed valve on the hydrogen supply side that closes when the velocity in its cross-section reaches 70-100 m/s, while a non-return valve must be installed on the hydrogen receiving side.

Recommended Safe Design of the Hydrogen Transfer Line

The safe design of the gas transmission line between the vehicle hydrogen system and the storage system, depicted in Fig. 1, includes the following configuration:

- Control System;
- AT1 sensor for detecting explosive hydrogen concentrations near the refueling hose;
- Hydrogen source;
- CV1 full-bore control valve (normally/emergency closed) for supplying the main hydrogen flow;
- CV2 small-bore control valve (normally/emergency closed) for supplying hydrogen at a low flow rate through orifice D1 to the high-pressure hose with a detachable connection,
- CV3 valve (normally/emergency open) valve for pressure relief from the hose (CV2 and CV3 can be replaced by a single three-way valve, which switches to hydrogen relief from the hose in case of failure);
- PT1 pressure sensor;
- SV1 speed valve that shuts off the hydrogen flow at an unacceptably high gas velocity (in conjunction with flow-limiting nozzle D2), manually cocked;
- V1 shut-off valve, manually operated;
- PT2 pressure sensor (with visual indication or with an additional pressure gauge);
- H1 hose, with detachable connection C1;
- V2 manual valve and small diameter discharge line;
- V3 manual shut-off valve;
- V4 manual valve and small diameter relief line;
- NRV1 non-return valve;
- Recipient of hydrogen.




Figure 1. Process Flow Diagram (PFD) of Hydrogen Loading

Additionally, for high-performance systems or systems with increased product-purity requirements, an automatic air-replacement system in the hose using nitrogen, followed by nitrogen replacement with hydrogen, can be added.

Operating Sequence of the Proposed System

The proposed system, shown in Figure 1, operates according to the following sequence:

1. The operator initiates the Control System and follows on-screen instructions.
2. The Control System verifies that no pressure exists between CV1 and V1, in which case the operator is permitted to assemble the line.
3. The operator connects hose H1, seals connector C1, opens valves V1 and V2, informs the Control System of the connection, and confirms readiness for purging.
4. The Control System supplies hydrogen through CV2 to replace the air in the hose with hydrogen (the air escapes through the open V2), after which the operator is notified of the end of purging, and permission is given to open V3.
5. The operator opens V4, verifies the absence of continuous flow (confirming check-valve malfunction), opens V3, closes V4 and V2, and notifies the Control System.
6. The Control System raises the pressure in the hose to the residual pressure level in the vessel being filled by opening CV2. In this mode, the pressure rise rate is monitored during the first 30 seconds; if there is no pressure rise, the system stops supplying hydrogen and signals a malfunction. The pressure rise mode ends when the pressure stops rising for 30 seconds or more.
7. Once pressure stops rising, the Control System stops supplying hydrogen and checks the tightness of the system by maintaining a constant pressure level in the hose for 1-2 minutes. Due to the small volume of the hose, this time is sufficient for a noticeable drop in pressure in the event of a leak. If the pressure drops by more than the preset value, the Control System signals a malfunction and blocks the transport process.
8. Upon confirmation of tightness, the Control System opens CV1, and hydrogen is transferred to the recipient until the target pressure in the receiving system is reached or the pressures in the transferring and receiving systems are equalized. At the same time, the absence of sharp drops in PT1 and PT2 pressure is monitored at least once per second, and if any are detected, the CV1 valve is immediately closed.
9. After the completion of the transport of Hydrogen, the Control System closes CV1 and opens CV3.
10. After the pressure in the PT2 hose drops to near atmospheric pressure, the Control System instructs the operator to close V3 and V1, open V2, and perform operations to disassemble the hose connection.

If the sensor AT01 detects pre-explosive concentrations of hydrogen gas, the Control System immediately stops the hydrogen supply by closing CV1, releases the pressure from the hose through CV2, and reports the incident to the operator, who is closing V1, V3, and opening V2 with a delay of 5-10 minutes after the incident report.

Lessons Learned from the Santa Clara Event

With such a control system in place, the Santa Clara accident would not have occurred. Hose disconnection would have prevented pressure rise, triggered an automatic fault and blocked the supply of hydrogen through the main line. In the event of a sudden hose rupture during refueling, the SV1 self-acting valve would have shut off the hydrogen flow almost instantly, and

if it had failed, the system would have shut off the hydrogen supply after 1 second by closing CV1, significantly limiting the volume of the release.

Passive Safety and Site Layout Considerations

In addition to active safety systems, passive protection measures are essential. It is important to note the need to protect cylinder assemblies from direct exposure to pressure waves or jet fire. Metal enclosures with non-combustible thermal insulation or fire-retardant coatings are technically optimal.

Also, when loading several trailers simultaneously, it is recommended to provide partition walls between them with a height of at least the height of the trailer, which, in the event of a jet fire, will significantly reduce the thermal impact on neighboring vehicles, thereby preventing the spread of fire.

Lessons Learned from **Hydrogen Incidents**


Across Regions, Applications, and Operations

The Global Hydrogen Value Chain

Low-Carbon Production Pathways




Renewable Energy



Green Electrolyzer
(Electrolysis)



Natural Gas






SMR Plant
(Steam Methane Reforming)



Hydrogen Type	Primary Method	Carbon Footprint
Grey	Steam Methane Reforming (SMR)	High
Blue	SMR + Carbon Capture (CCS)	Low
Green	Electrolysis (Renewable Power)	Zero

Multi-Modal Storage & Transport

Land and Sea Transport



Land and Sea Transport

Storage Mediums



High-Pressure
Tanks



Liquid
Organic
Carriers



Solid-State
Materials
(Metal Hydrides)

Downstream Distribution & End-Use

Industrial & Power Applications

Replaces Fossil Fuels in Steelmaking, Ammonia Production, Long-Duration Grid Storage



Zero-Emission Mobility

Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEVs) Power Buses, Trucks, Maritime Ships, Aviation



Refueling Station



Sector-Specific Distribution

Distribution Flows to Urban Refueling Stations, Industrial Pipelines, Localized Microgrids



Urban Infrastructure



Industrial Pipelines



Localized Community
Microgrids

This chapter provides a consolidated set of hydrogen safety insights obtained from the Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents Database (HIAD) 2.1¹, covering historical events across regions, applications, operational conditions, and types of consequences. This analysis is based on 954 hydrogen-related incidents, and these events were categorized according to data quality indicators as defined in HIAD 2.1, indicating that most events fall within low to moderate quality levels, with a smaller proportion classified as high-quality, fully validated, or scientifically controlled records. The analysis integrates the incident information and insights to reveal consistent failure patterns, human and organizational factors, and successful safety measures. By examining hydrogen incidents across the full value chain, from production and transport to end-use, this chapter aims to support risk-informed design, operation, and regulation of hydrogen systems, while reinforcing the importance of learning from past events and near-misses.

Following the global and regional overview, the lessons learnt are presented below in a structured, category-wise manner. This approach enables a systematic understanding of how hydrogen incidents evolve, from initiating mechanisms and physical effects to application scenarios, operational conditions, and outcomes, while highlighting common technical and human factors across the hydrogen value chain.

Region

The regional perspective provides the first layer of insight, illustrating how hydrogen appears variably across different geographic areas. By comparing experiences from Europe, North America, and Asia, the analysis highlights both shared failure patterns and region-specific challenges shaped by infrastructure development, regulatory frameworks, and operational culture. Hydrogen incidents across Europe, North America, and Asia often arise from a combination of technical failures (corrosion, material degradation) and organizational weaknesses (training gaps, inadequate Management of Change). Insights from various regions highlight the importance of learning from near-misses, preserving safety systems, and recognizing human factors. A strong safety culture, tailored procedures for each site, and thorough maintenance practices are crucial for avoiding escalation.

Key Regional Insights

Figure 1 illustrates the global distribution of hydrogen-related incidents and associated casualties and injuries, highlighting a significant concentration of casualties in developed countries, with the United States leading significantly with over 658 casualties. Higher concentrations of events are observed in regions with long-standing industrial hydrogen use, reflecting both greater exposure and more comprehensive reporting practices. The top seven countries alone represent approximately 78% of the global hydrogen-related casualties, highlighting the need for enhanced safety protocols in regions with mature hydrogen economies.

A deeper analysis of incident categories reveals explosion as the predominant cause of casualties across all major hydrogen-utilizing nations. The United States reports an overwhelming 533 explosion-related incidents out of its total 658 casualties, representing over 81% of all incidents. Similarly, China's casualty profile is dominated by explosions with 236 cases, followed by only 4 fire-related incidents.

The frequency of explosion incidents globally indicates potential vulnerabilities in hydrogen containment, storage, and handling procedures that require immediate attention from safety regulators and industry stakeholders. As the global hydrogen economy expands to meet decarbonization goals, international collaboration on safety standards, incident reporting mechanisms, and best practice sharing becomes imperative. This analysis serves as both a cautionary overview and a pathway for prioritizing safety investments and continued growth in the hydrogen sector.

Classification of Physical Effects

The physical effects of incidents, reveals how initial failures translate into hydrogen release, ignite, or containment. This classification clarifies why some events escalate into severe consequences while others remain controlled or result in near-misses. It has been found that hydrogen systems, despite robust safety designs, can transition from minor leaks to catastrophic events due to ignition sources or failed secondary protections. Technical failures, such as corrosion and improper use of

¹ European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre, Petten, the Netherlands.
<https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/shorturl/capri/hiadpt>

materials, are often worsened by human factors, including neglecting safety protocols. Unignited Hydrogen Releases demonstrate that modern PRDs are effective, with 71% of incidents avoiding fire when venting systems function properly. Events with No Hydrogen Release highlight the effectiveness of crashworthy tank designs in preventing confinement loss during roll-overs and the necessity of proactive monitoring systems to prevent failures.




Figure 1. Global distribution of hydrogen-related incidents and fatalities by country and event outcome (Source: HIAD 2.1¹).

Key Lessons Learnt by Physical Effect

- **Automation over Manual Actions:** Complex or infrequent tasks must be supported by automatic controls and additional safety measures should be taken rather than relying solely on human performance.
- **Material Integrity:** Mild steel is not suitable for high-pressure hydrogen service; resilient alloys and regular inspections are required to detect hydrogen damage and wall thinning.
- **Effective Purging & MOC:** Multiple evacuation and inert gas refill cycles are safer than pressure flushing, and all facility changes must undergo Management of Change review.
- **Physical and Layered Protection:** Vibration-resistant valve locking, accessible emergency shut-offs, and the combined use of preventive and mitigating measures are essential for safe operation.

Figure 2 presents a structured overview of hydrogen incidents categorized by region, initiating system, physical effects, application type, supply chain stage, location, operational condition, release type, ignition source, and consequences. The visualization highlights recurring patterns, such as the dominance of hydrogen-system initiators, the prevalence of open and confined locations, and the strong influence of operational and organizational factors on escalation. Together, these distributions emphasize that hydrogen safety is shaped by both technical design and human-system interaction.

Application Type

The application type recognizes that hydrogen risks vary significantly depending on how and where hydrogen is used. This perspective highlights how industry-specific practices, equipment configurations, and workforce training influence incident likelihood and severity. The analysis of various application types reveals that while hydrogen is a versatile resource, its safety




Figure 1. Distribution of hydrogen incidents by system characteristics, application, operational conditions, and consequences
(Source: HIAD 2.1¹⁾)

depends heavily on moving away from manual reliance toward automated safeguards and robust management of change (MOC) protocols. In high-stakes environments like petrochemical and chemical plants, the sources emphasize that "dead-end" piping and aging infrastructure are prime locations for undetected corrosion, necessitating specialized inspection techniques beyond standard "soap tests". The findings reveal that assumptions about system status can be hazardous, necessitating strict adherence to specific procedures and ongoing sensor monitoring. Although technical solutions like crashworthy vehicle tanks are useful, effective training and safety culture are crucial in preventing incidents.

Key Lessons Learnt by Application Type

- **Material Integrity and Industrial Safety:** Chemical and petrochemical facilities must replace mild steel with hydrogen-resistant alloys, closely monitor dead-end piping for accelerated corrosion, and ensure maintenance activities are supported by automatic controls and flame-resistant clothing.
- **Transport, Storage, and Outdoor Operations:** Hydrogen transport systems must address vibration-induced valve movement through improved locking or protection, and hydrogen should preferably be stored and transferred outdoors to allow rapid dispersion.
- **Power Plants and Road Vehicles:** Hydrogen cooling systems in power plants require dedicated attention, adequate staffing, and automated pressure shutdowns, while modern vehicle tanks demonstrate strong crash resistance but require specialized training for first responders on hydrogen-specific hazards.
- **Laboratory Use and Hydrogen Production:** Laboratories should avoid on-site gas mixing in favor of certified mixtures, administrative controls must be regularly reviewed, hydrogen by-products must be safely vented before storage, and new production technologies demand a strong understanding of high-pressure hydrogen behavior.

Specific Application Supply Chain

Extending beyond individual applications, the analysis considers the hydrogen supply chain as a whole, emphasizing that safety vulnerabilities often emerge at interfaces between production, transport, storage, and end use. This category highlights the importance of managing transitions and handovers where human mistakes are most likely. The Specific Application Supply Chain analysis reveals that safety in hydrogen management extends beyond hardware to encompass every transition from production to delivery. Crucial findings reveal that human error often occurs during delivery phases, with operators making unsafe assumptions, such as unverified valve statuses. Across all stages, from coolant utilization in power plants to gas applications in refineries, specialists recommend implementing automated safety measures and robust Management of Change (MOC) protocols to mitigate risks and prevent near-misses from escalating into disasters.

Key Lessons Learnt Across the Supply Chain

- **Transport and Transfer Controls:** Vibrations from the road and frequent hose connections increases risk of release, requiring secure valve locking, protective barriers, and strict use of site-specific checklists during delivery and transfer.
- **Unintended Hydrogen Production and Storage Integrity:** Unexpected hydrogen production and improper material selection can lead to explosions; suitable PRD materials and regular inspection of steel components are essential.
- **Process and Fuel Applications:** Dead-end piping requires monitoring and purging, while modern hydrogen fuel systems in transport applications demonstrate strong inherent safety when properly designed.
- **By-product Control and Emergency Preparedness:** By-product hydrogen must be vented or monitored before storage, and first responders need targeted training on hydrogen-specific behaviors such as TPRD discharge direction.

Location Type

This section focuses on location type, demonstrating how the physical environment (open, confined, or semi-confined) strongly affects hydrogen dispersion, accumulation, and escalation potential. This perspective emphasizes the importance of ventilation, layout, and environmental exposure in determining incident outcomes. Insights from various location types highlight the

physical environment's critical role in determining the severity of hydrogen leaks. Open locations, like highways and outdoor industrial areas, take advantage of natural ventilation, facilitating swift hydrogen dispersion; about 71% of transport-related leaks are non-flammable due to this dispersion and absence of ignition sources. However, these areas face challenges from road vibrations, risking valve malfunctions and loose connections. In such environments, safety must prioritize automated controls, continuous sensor monitoring, and the removal of "dead-end" piping to prevent local corrosive accumulation.

Key Lessons Learnt by Location Type

- **Open Locations (Highways, Airports, and Outdoor Industrial Sites):** Managing vibrations in transport trailers requires enhanced locking mechanisms or metal gaskets to prevent manual return or vent valves from unintentionally opening due to road vibrations. Modern hydrogen transport tanks exhibit a crash-resistant design preserving structural integrity under intense impacts. Safety components like hand-operated shut-off valves must be positioned for accessibility during emergencies like cryogenic spills. Moreover, outdoor incidents indicate an urgent need for first responders to undergo rigorous training on hydrogen properties, particularly concerning pressure relief discharges, to improve safety.
- **Confined & Semiconfined Locations (Plant Buildings, Labs, and Enclosures):** The accumulation of hydrogen in enclosed equipment like compressors poses serious risks, necessitating constant surveillance with sensors and an adequate ventilation plan, including trenching for piping. Risk assessments must focus on identifying "dead-end" pipes susceptible to corrosion and gas accumulation. Moreover, when creating restricted industrial zones, the TNT(Trinitrotoluene)-equivalent approach for estimating explosion impacts should be employed carefully because of the complexities of real-world situations that can affect blast predictions.

Operational Condition

Attention then turns to operational conditions, distinguishing between risks present during normal operation and those introduced during abnormal states. The analysis of Operational Conditions reveals a tension between predictable daily risks and critical human mistakes during "Abnormal" operations like maintenance and startups. Regular operations experience safety declines from stressors such as vibrations, causing manual valves to loosen or corrosion in "dead-end" piping, while Abnormal operations are impacted by organizational failures with workers making assumptions or neglecting procedures due to time constraints. Effective safety design necessitates MOC procedures for new risks, automated interlocks to ensure compliance with safety steps, and robust materials to tackle long-term deterioration issues.

Key Lessons Learnt by Operational Condition

- **Human Reliability and Procedural Discipline:** Accidents often arise from assumptions about system status, making verification, clear communication, and strict compliance with operating procedures essential during both normal and abnormal conditions.
- **Automation, Purging, and Change Management:** Automated safety measures are necessary for complex or rare tasks instead of depending on manual processes, effective purging through multiple evacuation and inerting cycles, and rigorous Management of Change evaluations for any facility alterations.
- **Material Integrity and Aging Effects:** Risk assessments must account for plant aging, including replacement of hydrogen-susceptible materials, as well as identification of dead-end piping where corrosion and gas accumulation accelerate.
- **Vibration Control and Competency Training:** Systems must address vibration-induced valve movement through improved fittings, implementing locking mechanisms, and monitoring, supported by site-specific training and material verification to prevent incompatible component use.

Release Type

With operational context established, the analysis categorizes incidents by release type, illustrating how gaseous, liquid, or combined releases introduce different hazard mechanisms. This classification supports targeted prevention strategies based on the physical behavior of hydrogen under varying conditions. An analysis of insights from various Release Types shows that

hydrogen systems, although highly mechanically robust, frequently encounter safety issues due to human mistakes, inadequate maintenance, and environmental factors. For Gaseous Mixture releases, there's an urgent need for advanced leak detection methods, like precise torque measurements and automated controls, to minimize human mistakes. In incidents involving liquid and gaseous mixtures, specific challenges occur due to cryogenic temperatures, which obstruct manual shut-off valves and lead to ice formations. In contrast, No Release incidents demonstrate the success of contemporary safety engineering, showing strong tank designs. Overall, proactive Management of Change (MOC), tailored training, and appropriate equipment positioning are essential for ensuring hydrogen safety.

- **Gaseous Mixture:** Standard post-assembly inspections often fail long-term safety needs; precise bolt torque and metal gaskets are essential. Effective cleaning requires multiple vital gas evacuations. Maintenance should utilize automatic controls; worker performance alone isn't enough. Flame-resistant clothing policies and proper infrastructure designs are crucial for injury prevention and safety.
- **Liquid & Gaseous Mixture:** Manually operated shut-off valves must stay reachable during cryogenic leaks. Maintenance is essential for PRDs to avoid failures. Backup vent stacks are essential for preventing ice blockages. Comprehensive training for operators, responders, and the public on hydrogen's properties is essential.
- **No Release:** Modern hydrogen transport trailers exhibit mechanical robustness, reliable protective barriers, and outdoor safety incentives, with 71% of releases remaining non-ignition. Proactive monitoring can prevent significant mechanical failures and enhance overall safety in hydrogen transportation.

Ignition Source

The ignition sources analysis identifies how sparks, static electricity, hot surfaces, electrical faults, and environmental factors contribute to incident escalation. This category emphasizes that ignition prevention requires both technical controls and disciplined work practices. The analysis of Ignition Sources highlights that hydrogen's rapid burning capability, combined with technical mistakes and organizational gaps, leads to catastrophic events. Standard safety measures, like grounding and relief valves, may fail during extreme weather or events involving sparks and static electricity, especially during maintenance. Significant hazards arise from hot surfaces and open flames when standard procedures for purging or hot work permits are overlooked. Effective prevention of ignition necessitates transitioning from a basic safety approach to continuous monitoring, tailored training, and a comprehensive Management of Change protocol to identify emerging risks during modifications.

Key Lessons Learnt by Ignition Source

- **Sparks and Static Electricity:** Maintenance should avoid explosive atmospheres; use suction and sniffers. Gas systems require specialized assembly. Release hydrogen by-products equipped with alarms. Avoid in-lab gas mixtures; opt for pre-mixed, low-concentration gases.
- **Hot Surfaces and Open Flames:** Hydrogen pipes must be spaced away from heat sources, equipment must be reliable, "hot work" requires permits and purging, and during maintenance, hazardous areas should be isolated with slip plates to maintain safety.
- **Short Circuits and Electricity:** Accidental valve closures necessitate improved fault tree analysis and unit isolation evaluations. Relocate electrical systems away from hydrogen pipelines. Incorporate voltage drop monitoring in safety reports; ensure emergency power supplies meet Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 2 standards.
- **Weather and Grounding:** Transporting hydrogen should be restricted in adverse weather to prevent accidents, and although grounding is crucial during filling, it doesn't ensure the prevention of ignition; deluge systems require regular inspections

Nature of Consequences

The nature of consequences ranges from explosions and fires to leaks without ignition and near-misses. This framing highlights how similar initiating events can lead to very different outcomes depending on system design and human response. The analysis of hydrogen event consequences highlights that the severity of outcomes, from explosions to near-misses, largely depends on the interaction between human factors and automated safety systems. Catastrophic explosions often arise from over-reliance on human performance during complex maintenance, necessitating automated controls and safeguards to avoid skipped steps.

For fire incidents, emergency management is critical, mandating flame-resistant clothing for responders. Data on unignited leaks emphasizes modern engineering successes, like crashworthy tank designs, while also exposing vulnerabilities such as road vibrations affecting manual valves. Ultimately, fostering a robust organizational culture that views "near-misses" as learning opportunities is deemed essential for enhancing safety.

Key Lessons by Nature of Consequence

- **Explosion Prevention:** Automation should reduce reliance on worker performance during complex maintenance, employing automated interlocks for safety. Management of Change mandates new risk assessments for facility modifications, focusing on potential hazards like "dead-end" pipes. Caution is advised with the TNT-equivalent method for blast assessments, as it might inaccurately reflect explosion impacts in specific industrial environments.
- **Fire & Emergency Management:** Employees in refinery areas must wear Flame Resistant Clothing, while responders require specialized thermal equipment. Open flames in proximity to hydrogen activities pose risks; sensors are crucial for identifying invisible hydrogen flames.
- **Leak (No Ignition) & Transport Safety:** Outdoor dispersal is essential since 71% of hydrogen leaks during transport do not catch fire; therefore, transfers must take place in well-ventilated locations. Moreover, enhanced locking mechanisms and robust gaskets are essential to address road vibration problems.
- **Near Misses & Design Resilience:** Modern hydrogen transport trailers exhibit excellent structural integrity, surviving collisions without losing confinement. Effective overpressure management relies on regularly maintained Pressure Relief Devices to prevent malfunctions. Additionally, specialized training for first responders is crucial due to near misses, emphasizing the importance of understanding hydrogen behavior, like the upward flow of safety vents.

Leak / Fire / Explosion Outcome

Finally, the analysis focuses on incident outcomes, particularly the progression from deflagration to detonation. This section integrates lessons from all previous categories, demonstrating how confinement, design changes, and operational decisions collectively determine whether an event remains localized or becomes catastrophic. The transition of hydrogen release from deflagration to detonation is influenced by environmental factors, particularly facility modifications that restrict gas dissipation. To mitigate risks, organizations must implement a comprehensive MOC procedure to evaluate how structural changes may introduce hazards. Although technical measures such as automatic shut-off valves and LEL (lower explosive limit) sensors are crucial, they should be integrated with a robust safety culture that emphasizes site-specific training and stringent degasification processes before "hot work." Ultimately, safety is achieved through a layered defense approach, incorporating blast and fire resistance design, equipment inspections, and safe management of gas mixtures.

Key Lessons Learnt by Outcome Category

- **Deflagration (Localized/Lower Velocity Explosion):** Mud logging units and laboratories must be equipped with automatic shutdown systems for gas cylinders and auditory alarms activated when ambient air approaches lower explosive thresholds. Researchers should use a 95:5 nitrogen-hydrogen mixture instead of pure hydrogen to lower explosive risks. Operators require dependable oversight with automated alerts and comprehensive analyses. Recorded repair procedures must be implemented, guaranteeing that "hot work" occurs solely after thorough purging and verified degasification.
- **Detonation (High Velocity/Catastrophic Explosion):** Building design must prevent placing high-pressure equipment within confined, heated areas, using explosion-proof walls instead. Safety verification is essential, requiring complete degasification testing before tank operations. Designers need to carefully utilize the TNT-equivalent approach for assessing hydrogen explosions since real-life factors can make predictions more challenging. Furthermore, emergency systems must incorporate shut-off valves to prevent total storage unit emptying during accidents, and enhanced separation standards for buildings should be established to lessen cascading effects.
- **Deflagration to Detonation (Transition):** Systematic MOC procedures are essential to prevent hazards, such as the risk of detonation in newly enclosed spaces. Comprehensive design reviews are crucial to identify failure points across various operational conditions. Components should be positioned to avoid extreme temperature gradients that could cause mechanical failures and high-pressure releases. Additionally, control rooms must be designed to integrate critical data,

enabling operators to promptly identify emergency alarms and respond effectively to prevent leaks from escalating into major explosions.

The lessons presented in this chapter demonstrate that hydrogen safety is not governed by a single failure mechanism, but by the interaction of materials, design choices, operational conditions, and human decision-making. Data from the HIAD 2.1 database consistently show that while modern hydrogen systems are mechanically robust, incidents often escalate due to assumptions, inadequate change management, insufficient automation, or containment failure in restricted spaces. Consequently, efficient hydrogen safety depends on multilayered protection approaches, systematic management of change, automation of essential safeguards, and ongoing learning from near-misses. As hydrogen deployment expands across industries and regions, integrating these insights into design, operation, and emergency preparedness will be essential to preventing recurrence and ensuring safe, sustainable adoption.



Intelligent Safety Systems
Across the Hydrogen Value Chain

Hydrogen has been safely used for over a century in industrial applications, including oil refineries, ammonia production, and the space program. Despite this history, the significant growth in hydrogen production, infrastructure, and end-use applications driven by decarbonization goals presents new safety challenges on an unprecedented scale. The global drive toward hydrogen technologies, emphasized by international climate commitments, highlights hydrogen's pivotal role in achieving net-zero emissions by 2050.¹ Hydrogen is set to play a transformative role in the global energy transition, offering a clean, versatile energy carrier that can decarbonize hard-to-abate sectors, including heavy industry, transportation, and power generation. However, the unique properties of hydrogen include its wide flammability range (4-75%), low ignition energy (0.02 mJ), high diffusivity, and high leakage probability, which present significant safety challenges throughout its entire value chain from production through storage, transportation, and end-use applications.²

Artificial Intelligence (AI), Machine Learning (ML), and emerging digital technologies present a unique opportunity to transform hydrogen safety management. These technologies enable real-time monitoring, predictive analytics, anomaly detection, and autonomous decision-making that far exceed the capabilities of traditional safety systems. With AI-driven leak detection systems achieving 99.14% accuracy in hydrogen refueling stations and digital twins providing millisecond-level risk predictions, the integration of intelligent technologies is fundamentally transforming how we approach hydrogen safety.^{3,4}

This chapter highlights the necessity of human supervision in safety-critical hydrogen systems, even with progress in AI and ML. Complex scenarios require human judgment and ethical decision-making, ensuring technology enhances rather than replaces human capabilities, thus avoiding vulnerabilities from over-reliance on automation.

Role of AI in Safety across the Hydrogen Value Chain

Hydrogen Production

- Electrolysis Process Optimization and Safety:** Electrolysis, particularly through Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM) and alkaline technology, is essential for green hydrogen production, with safety reliant on optimal process parameters and anomaly detection.⁵ AI systems enhance safety and efficiency in electrolysis processes. Emerging Physics-informed neural networks (PINNs) combine physical knowledge with machine learning for precise control during critical operations like start-up and shutdown, ensuring alignment with scientific principles.⁶ Furthermore, machine learning-based real-time anomaly detection systems are vital. AI-driven predictive maintenance systems analyze operational data from electrolysis components to detect early instances of degradation, enabling proactive safety measures and reducing the risk of unplanned failures.⁷
- Hydrogen Production Facility Safety Management:** Hydrogen production facilities can enhance safety management through advanced AI technologies, notably utilizing digital twin technology. Digital twins serve as virtual replicas of hydrogen production systems, harnessing AI-driven analytics and real-time sensor data for evaluating operational strategies, predicting issues, and simulating performance. A digital twin-based safety model was developed for hydrogen refueling stations, utilizing convolutional neural networks (CNN) for risk prediction, achieving high accuracy and rapid decision-making capabilities with 3D visualizations of risks. The digital twin approach provides several safety benefits: risk-free testing of intervention strategies, simulation of various operational scenarios for emergency response planning, continuous learning for improved prediction accuracy, and enhanced collaboration among stakeholders.⁸ Additionally, integrated safety monitoring systems combine diverse data streams, such as weather forecasts, renewable energy availability, sensor readings, and market prices, into unified predictive models, enabling coordinated emergency responses, improved resource allocation, and proactive risk management in hydrogen production. The integration of AI into hydrogen production safety offers substantial advantages over conventional approaches are provided in Table 1.

Despite these remarkable abilities, AI-enhanced systems in hydrogen production face fundamental limitations that necessitate human supervision because many advanced ML models make it vital for human experts to interpret decisions and validate recommendations.⁹ Additionally, these models struggle with novel scenarios, lacking the contextual understanding and problem-solving skills that humans possess. Ethical decision-making is another area where human judgment is essential, particularly when balancing multiple objectives like safety and environmental impact.^{10,11} Finally, AI functions within specific boundaries and might fail to recognize when conditions exceed these limits, thus requiring human supervision necessary to ensure appropriate recommendations in real-world applications.¹²

Table 1. Comparison of traditional and AI-embedded hydrogen production safety systems.

Aspect	Traditional Methods	AI - Enhanced Systems
Detection Speed	Manual inspection or threshold alarms usually involve considerable delays.	Real-time continuous monitoring responds to the millisecond level.
Accuracy	Limited by sensor positioning and human interpretation, susceptible to false alarms	Higher accuracy with dramatically reduced false alarms
Predictive Capability	Reactive maintenance based on schedules or failures	Predictive maintenance prevents major unplanned outages
Adaptability	Fixed protocols requiring manual updates	Self-learning systems that adapt to changing conditions

Hydrogen Storage

- High-Pressure Storage Safety Management:** High-Pressure Storage Safety Management employs AI-driven technologies to enhance structural integrity and leak detection. AI Algorithms analyze data from high-pressure hydrogen storage tanks to forecast material fatigue and failure, minimizing risks of catastrophic incidents.¹³ Zhou et al. provided a comprehensive review of ML applications in solid-state hydrogen storage, demonstrating high-throughput composition-performance scanning and predictive modeling for various materials, helping accelerate the discovery of safer, more durable storage solutions.¹³ Advanced sensing technologies combined with AI enable early detection of hydrogen embrittlement, using nanomaterial-enhanced sensors for precise monitoring of hydrogen purity, pressure, and temperature fluctuations. For leak detection, AI-enhanced systems have shown significant improvements due to hydrogen's small molecular size. An infrared image analysis method that utilizes thermal imaging to detect gas leaks, particularly focusing on invisible hydrogen through thermal signatures analysis. AI algorithms also integrate data from various sensor types, achieving higher accuracy in leak detection, even for small leaks, while reducing false alarms. Upon detection, AI can autonomously initiate isolation protocols and alert personnel, significantly shortening response times to critical levels given hydrogen's rapid diffusion
- Cryogenic Liquid Hydrogen Storage:** Cryogenic liquid hydrogen storage at -253°C faces safety challenges such as boil-off losses, material embrittlement, and explosive re-gasification risks.¹⁴ Machine learning (ML) may continuously monitor cryogenic materials for thermal stress and insulation degradation, allowing for early maintenance. Safety-critical process automation through robotics enhances safety by automating hazardous procedures: connecting/disconnecting transfer lines, inspecting tank exteriors, and managing intelligent pressure relief systems to prevent over-pressurization and reduce hydrogen loss, ensuring safer operations in cryogenic environments.
- Material-Based Storage Systems:** Material-Based Storage Systems utilize advanced materials like metal hydrides and MOFs, necessitating accurate monitoring of hydrogen kinetics. Real-Time Performance Monitoring through AI enables continuous assessment of hydrogen release rates, cycling stability, and safety boundaries, ensuring optimal and safe operation of storage systems.
- Underground Hydrogen Storage:** Large-scale underground hydrogen storage in salt caverns, depleted gas fields, or aquifers represents a critical component of future hydrogen infrastructure. Advanced acoustic sensing combined with AI pattern recognition technologies enables the detection of hydrogen migration through geological formations, providing early warning of containment failures, enhances the safety monitoring in these complex geological systems.
- Advantages Over Conventional Storage Safety:** AI-enhanced storage safety systems improve with 24/7 monitoring, early degradation warnings, faster emergency responses, extended equipment life through predictive maintenance, and minimized human exposure to hazards through robotic systems.
- Human Supervision in Storage Safety:** Human intervention is crucial for safe storage operations despite technological advancements. Managing complex risk trade-offs involves balancing safety objectives, such as pressure relief and

minimizing hydrogen loss, requiring human judgment based on specific conditions. Effective emergency response coordination necessitates human interaction with external responders, as AI systems cannot independently manage these interventions. Maintenance authority is also human-driven, as predictive algorithms suggest actions, but timing depends on operational schedules and regulations. Moreover, AI anomaly detection can produce false positives; human expertise is essential to verify real threats versus benign variations, as over-relying on automation could result in unnecessary shutdowns and financial impact.

Hydrogen Transportation

Transportation of Hydrogen, whether by pipeline, road tankers, rail, or maritime vessels, presents unique safety challenges arising from the need to maintain containment integrity while moving hydrogen through diverse environmental conditions and potentially populated areas.

- Safety in Hydrogen Transportation through Pipeline:** Hydrogen pipelines, efficient for transporting large volumes over moderate distances, encounter risks such as material degradation, leaks, and ruptures. AI-enabled solutions enhance pipeline integrity management. Wang et al. developed an AI-based model using convolutional neural networks for real-time gas leak detection along long pipelines, without additional hardware, and applicable across various sectors. Machine learning (ML) models predict pipe degradation by analyzing sensor data on pressure, flow rates, and more, enabling targeted inspections for hydrogen embrittlement and stress corrosion. Modern monitoring employs dense sensor networks, with AI algorithms that detect leaks with high spatial resolution, differentiate actual leaks from sensor errors, estimate leak rates, predict plume dispersion, and control valve operations to isolate affected sections automatically.
- Safety in Hydrogen Transportation by Road and Rail Networks:** Compressed or liquid hydrogen transport by road or rail involves risks from accidents and environmental factors. A GIS-based risk assessment in Yokohama city analyzed spatial aspects of hydrogen transport routes, evaluating accident frequency and consequences for improved route planning.¹⁵ AI systems optimize transport routes using real-time data on traffic conditions, weather forecasts and road construction to ensure a balance between efficiency and safety by avoiding high-risk areas. Vehicles equipped with AI monitoring continuously check hydrogen storage integrity, responding to any abnormalities in real-time via edge machine learning.¹⁶ Advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS) enhance collision avoidance for hydrogen transport vehicles, enabling emergency protocols like automatic valve closure and notifying responders if a collision occurs.¹⁷
- Safety in Hydrogen Transportation through Maritime:** Large-scale hydrogen trade is expected to rely on maritime transport via specialized carriers for liquid hydrogen, ammonia, or liquid organic hydrogen carriers (LOHCs).¹⁸ AI-optimized shipping enhances safety with weather routing that integrates safety measures by analyzing weather and ocean data to minimize sloshing and containment risks.¹⁹ Automated ballast and trim control ensures vessel stability during hydrogen operations to prevent cargo shifts. In port operations, AI assesses real-time terminal conditions, considering wind, tides, traffic, and population density to ensure safe loading and unloading. AI systems are aligned with cryogenic transfer lines, reducing human risk during critical operational phases.²⁰
- Safety in Hydrogen Refueling Station:** Hydrogen refueling stations are crucial for safety and public acceptance of hydrogen technologies. AI-powered sensor networks provide real-time hydrogen detection by monitoring dispensers, tanks, compressors, and transfer lines, reducing false alarms. Automatic emergency shutdowns isolate affected systems, activate ventilation, notify personnel, and adjust mitigation measures based on real-time data.

AI integration in hydrogen transportation offers compelling advantages; some of the comparative analyses between traditional methods and AI-enhanced methods have been mentioned in Table 2. Essential human roles in the safety of hydrogen in transportation involve multi-stakeholder coordination, where humans can manage the incident. Transportation of Hydrogen takes place in multiple environments, including urban areas, highways, tunnels, bridges, and near schools or hospitals. AI systems may detect a leak and recommend immediate emergency shutdown, but human operators must assess whether such action is appropriate given the specific location, time of day, and traffic conditions. Legal and regulatory compliance necessitates human interpretation of complex regulations and balancing safety obligations. Public communication and trust management are crucial during incidents; while AI can aid in information sharing, human empathy and understanding are vital to address community concerns and build trust effectively.

Table 2. Comparison of traditional and AI-enhanced safety in hydrogen transportation.

Safety Aspect	Traditional Approach	AI-Enhanced System
Leak detection	Periodic inspection, fixed sensors with manual interpretation	Continuous multi-sensor monitoring with automated pattern recognition
Route planning	Static routes based on historical data	Dynamic routing with real-time risk assessment and weather forecast integration
Emergency response	Manual approach initiated by human observation	Automated detection and response within seconds under human supervision
Incident prediction	Reactive maintenance after failures occur	Predictive maintenance preventing majority of failures before their occurrence
Risk communication	Manual reporting with potential delays	Real-time automated alerts to relevant stakeholders with AI-generated situation summaries

Hydrogen Safety in End-Use Applications

Hydrogen end-use applications include transportation (fuel cell vehicles), stationary power generation, industrial processes, and residential energy systems, each presenting distinct safety challenges that AI technologies can address.

- Fuel Cell Vehicle Safety:** Hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) need strict safety measures to enhance public acceptance. Onboard safety monitoring includes a real-time fuel cell health assessment using machine learning (ML) algorithms that continuously monitor fuel cell stack performance, analyzing parameters including voltage distribution across cells, temperature gradients, membrane resistance, and gas purity, initiating alerts for service when abnormalities arise.²¹ AI systems ensure the integrity of high-pressure hydrogen storage tanks by analyzing pressure decay rates, temperature fluctuations, and structural acoustic emissions, predicting remaining useful life (RUL) to prevent failures.²² AI evaluates the hydrogen system integrity in collisions, determines the need for emergency venting, calculates safe evacuation areas, and integrates with vehicle communication for automatic notification of emergency responders with hazard information.
- Hydrogen Refueling Infrastructure for Vehicles:** The hydrogen refueling infrastructure necessitates rigorous safety management. AI systems facilitate communication between vehicles and stations, optimizing refueling parameters to prevent issues like overfilling and pressure spikes. Additionally, AI-enabled automated safety verification ensures proper nozzle connections, seals, and pressure equalization are maintained, using computer vision to detect any human-missed abnormalities, enhancing overall safety during the refueling process.²³
- Stationary Fuel Cell Power Systems:** Stationary fuel cells for distributed power generation require continuous safety supervision. AI algorithms manage grid integration, ensuring stable operations and coordinating emergency shutdowns during grid disturbance procedures that protect both the fuel cell system and grid infrastructure.²⁴ ML models enhance fuel cell efficiency by matching output to demand within safety limits. AI manages hydrogen supply through monitoring, demand forecasting, and delivery scheduling, ensuring optimal safety, reliability, cost, and coordination between storage and production.
- Industrial Hydrogen Applications:** Industrial hydrogen applications span refineries, steel production, and chemical synthesis, utilizing large volumes at high pressures and temperatures. Integrated AI-based Safety Instrumented Systems enhance process safety management with rapid fault detection and adaptive responses. Machine learning supports by analyzing data to identify hazards, recommend safety measures, and assess risks. Worker safety is improved through AI-enabled wearable sensors that monitor hydrogen exposure and activate safety measures.²⁵

The integration of AI in hydrogen end-use applications enhances safety by enabling continuous health monitoring, predicting failures, and employing adaptive safety systems that adjust strategies according to conditions. Smart interfaces reduce user

mistakes, while extensive data gathering enables safety enhancements across the fleet. However, human supervision is essential to understand safety measures during emergencies. Recommendations for AI maintenance must be confirmed by skilled technicians to guarantee the quality and accuracy of repairs. Human responders need to evaluate emergencies and make choices, influenced by AI yet not limited by it. Risk assessment and safety design also require human involvement due to ethical considerations.

The Table 3 synthesizes hydrogen safety knowledge across the full value chain, with a particular focus on how emerging digital and artificial intelligence techniques are beginning to interact with long established engineering and procedural safeguards. For each stage, from integrated facilities and renewable powered electrolysis through storage, pipelines, refueling, mobile applications and governance, the table first identifies the dominant accident scenarios and root causes observed in practice, then summarizes the conventional controls that have proven effective in existing plants, codes and quantitative risk assessments. It then highlights concrete examples of AI and data driven approaches now being explored, such as anomaly detection, digital twins, predictive maintenance and data centric incident learning, while being explicit about their current limitations in terms of data quality, validation, certification and organizational capability. The entries reflect a critical synthesis of more than eighty peer reviewed articles, reports and incident databases, supported by both detailed manual review and structured, tool assisted literature analysis. The tabulated safety concerns and emerging possible and potential innovations underline a simple but important point: AI and other digital tools can significantly strengthen hydrogen safety, but only when they are built on sound engineering, high quality data, and rigorous validation, and when they are deployed as part of an integrated safety culture rather than as stand-alone technological fixes.

Table 3. Safety across the green hydrogen value chain: hazards, established safeguards, and emerging AI and digital innovations, with current limitations and readiness.

Hydrogen value-chain stage	Main safety concerns	Conventional safety practices and tools	Emerging AI & digital innovations for safety	Limitations, risks and open issues
Cross-cutting: integrated hydrogen facilities and infrastructure	Undetected leaks, equipment degradation, human error, complex multi-asset interactions across sites	Fixed gas detectors, SCADA/DCS monitoring, scheduled inspections, HAZOP/LOPA, paper- or spreadsheet-based incident tracking	Deployment of IoT sensor networks and cloud platforms that stream pressure, temperature, flow and gas-detection data into dashboards; AI-based anomaly detection models that learn normal operating patterns and flag deviations; real-time digital platforms that integrate alarms, maintenance logs and procedures for hydrogen facilities.	Data quality and interoperability issues between vendors; need for robust cybersecurity controls; challenges in validating and certifying AI models for safety-critical use; organizational capability gaps for interpreting analytics outputs.
Renewable-powered electrolysis plants (green hydrogen production)	Over-pressure, membrane failure, overheating, poor response to fluctuating renewables, undetected degradation of stacks and BoP	Process design to codes/standards, interlocks and shutdown systems, PID control, alarms, periodic maintenance and stack inspections, conventional FMEA/Fault-Tree risk analysis	Machine-learning models to optimize electrolyzer operating set-points (current density, temperature, pressure) under variable renewable input; model-predictive control combined with physics-informed neural networks for safe operating envelopes; digital twins of electrolyzers and plants co-simulated with wind/solar and markets; AI-based fault detection and diagnosis for stacks, power electronics and auxiliaries; predictive-maintenance models using sensor histories.	Need for high-quality, labeled plant data; model drift as hardware ages or is upgraded; limited standardization of validation metrics for AI controllers; integration with existing safety instrumented systems and certification regimes still evolving.
Above-ground storage (compressed, liquid and solid-state systems)	Loss of containment, over-pressure, boil-off, thermally induced failures, material degradation, unsafe	Design to pressure-vessel and cryogenic standards, relief systems, boil-off management, spacing rules,	AI-driven materials informatics for safer and more robust solid-state storage (metal hydrides, alloys, porous carbons, MOFs, zeolites) using high-throughput screening plus ML to predict thermodynamics, kinetics, cycling stability and failure-relevant properties;	Many ML models are trained on limited, heterogeneous datasets; transfer from lab-scale to full-scale systems is not yet fully demonstrated; safety and economic assessment of AI-optimized

	siting, complex behavior of advanced storage materials	routine inspection and NDT, conservative material screening and testing	ML-assisted optimization of storage-tank materials and designs; data-driven models to monitor pressure/temperature/purity profiles in tanks and flag abnormal trends.	materials and systems is still sparse; experimental validation remains essential.
Underground hydrogen storage (UHS) in salt caverns, aquifers, depleted fields	Leakage and migration, loss of integrity, unwanted geochemical reactions, uncertain injectivity and deliverability, interaction with co-stored gases and brine	Geological site screening, numerical reservoir simulation, conservative operating envelopes, monitoring wells, pressure surveillance and geomechanical modelling, conservative design factors	Supervised-learning models (e.g., gradient boosting, random forests, Gaussian processes, neural networks) trained on experimental and simulation data to predict hydrogen adsorption in kerogen, solubility in saline brines and interfacial tension; ML-based “intelligent agent” surrogates to rapidly evaluate multiple operating scenarios and support multi-objective optimization (recovery vs. containment vs. co-stored CO ₂); data-driven models for relative permeability and trapping behavior.	Applicability strongly depends on representativeness of training data for local geology; many studies still at conceptual or simulation-based stage; explicit integration of AI outputs into regulatory approvals and monitoring plans is only beginning; economic and safety co-optimization is not yet fully addressed.
Transmission pipelines and distribution networks	External and internal corrosion, embrittlement, third-party damage, leaks (including from blend networks), delayed detection in remote areas	Material selection and qualification, cathodic protection, in-line inspection tools, patrols, fixed leak-detection systems, SCADA pressure/flow monitoring and alarms	AI-assisted analysis of sensor and inspection data for anomaly detection (corrosion features, crack-like defects); drone-based multimodal sensing (e.g., infrared and optical cameras) with computer-vision algorithms to identify gas plumes and vegetation stress above pipelines; ML-based models for predicting heat-transfer and boiling behavior of cryogenic hydrogen in advanced pipeline and aviation concepts.	Dependence on environmental conditions (e.g., visibility, weather) for optical and drone methods; requirement for robust training data linking visual signatures to hydrogen leaks; integration with existing integrity-management workflows; regulatory acceptance and standardization still limited.
Refueling stations and distribution terminals	Dispenser and compressor failures, high-pressure leaks, ignition sources in public areas, storage over-pressure, inconsistent procedures	Design to HRS and NFPA/ISO standards, hazardous-area classification, gas detection and ventilation, interlocks and shutdowns, prescriptive maintenance intervals, operator training	AI-enabled optimization of hydrogen refueling station operation (storage-pressure management, compression sequences, dispenser scheduling) with explicit inclusion of safety constraints; IoT-enabled condition monitoring and ML-based predictive maintenance for compressors, valves and dispensers; digital-twin models of HRS integrating equipment behavior, demand patterns and safety margins.	Site-specific tuning and validation of models is needed; proprietary controllers and data access can limit transparency; responsibility for decisions made by optimization algorithms must be clearly allocated; current deployments are still limited in number and maturity.
Fuel-cell vehicles and mobile applications	On-board storage leaks, fuel-cell degradation, thermal runaway of balance-of-plant components, unsafe operating modes under dynamic driving, sensor failures	Redundant pressure relief, ECU safety logic, hardware interlocks, OBD diagnostics, conservative sizing and derating, type-approval testing and periodic inspections	AI-based energy-management and control strategies that coordinate fuel cell, battery and power electronics while observing safety constraints; ML models for prognostics and health management (PHM) that predict fuel-cell degradation and detect anomalies; reinforcement-learning-based strategies for safe power-split and thermal-management optimization under varying duty cycles.	Safety certification of learning-based controllers remains challenging; PHM models require extensive operational data and careful treatment of rare but critical failure modes; explainability and robustness are important for regulatory and OEM acceptance.

Facility-level leak detection and localization (indoor and semi-open environments)	Small leaks that escape fixed sensors, delayed localization of leak source, false alarms, limited coverage in complex geometries	Fixed point detectors, line-of-sight detectors, hand-held sniffers, soap-solution checks, color-change tapes inspected manually, conventional alarm-management	Smart hydrogen leak-detection systems that combine colorimetric tapes or other low-cost sensors with computer vision for automated color-change detection; edge devices (e.g., Raspberry Pi) running image-processing algorithms and sending structured alerts; integration of large language models to automatically generate human-readable email notifications explaining the event and recommended actions; classification of such systems as complementary safety layers within “Hydrogen 5.0” human-centric frameworks.	Current implementations are at low technology-readiness level and not certified as primary safety systems; dependence on lighting conditions, camera placement and network connectivity; legal analysis stresses need to treat these as supplementary layers and to clarify liability and validation requirements.
Data-driven safety assessment, incident learning and risk governance	Slow learning from incidents, fragmented reporting, difficulty in prioritizing barriers and design changes, emerging systemic and cyber-physical risks	Traditional QRA, bow-tie analysis, expert-based risk ranking, manual review of incident reports and near-misses, standards-based compliance audits	Use of structured incident and hazard databases together with statistical and ML tools to identify patterns and precursors across the hydrogen value chain; integration of AI-supported scenario analysis into comprehensive safety assessments; digital-twin and simulation-based environments used with AI to study the impact of different safety barriers and operating strategies; consideration of AI and digital-safety tools within legal and regulatory analyses for hydrogen projects.	Many published applications still use conventional statistics rather than full ML; availability and quality of incident data (including for near-misses) are limiting factors; governance of AI models, transparency, and alignment with evolving standards and AI regulations (e.g., the EU AI Act) are active open issues.
Policy, regulation, legal and compliance tooling for AI-enhanced hydrogen systems	Unclear allocation of liability for AI-supported decisions, lack of explicit treatment of hydrogen leaks as contaminants in some jurisdictions, uncertainty around acceptability of AI-based monitoring	Traditional legal frameworks for civil and environmental liability, prescriptive technical standards, case-by-case permitting, manual review of documentation and records	Legal analyses that explicitly consider Industry 4.0/5.0 smart monitoring systems for hydrogen leaks, including their interaction with environmental and AI-specific regulations; use of digital records, electronic signatures and trusted digital channels for environmental reporting; early discussion of how AI-enabled monitoring, digital twins and automated alerts can be recognized as “best available techniques” or complementary safety layers under environmental and AI law.	Current regulations only partially address hydrogen-specific emissions and AI-based safety tools; many smart systems are not yet certified and must be treated as supplementary; rapid evolution of AI law (e.g., EU AI Act) creates regulatory uncertainty; need for interdisciplinary collaboration between engineers, data scientists, lawyers and regulators.

Conclusion

This chapter highlights the transformative potential of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning technologies to enhance safety across the entire hydrogen value chain: from production through storage and transportation to end-use applications. AI and ML technologies offer substantial improvements over traditional safety approaches, including real-time leak detection, millisecond-level emergency response capabilities and comprehensive risk assessment integrating multiple data sources.

Despite technological advancements, the importance of human oversight is crucial, emphasizing that AI and ML should complement human roles in safety-critical hydrogen systems. Limitations of AI include its reliance on training data, opacity of models, need for constant validation, and its inability to handle entirely novel situation scenarios. Furthermore, humans are needed for ethical decision-making, contextual understanding, multi-stakeholder coordination, and supervision of system design and regulatory compliance. The future of hydrogen safety lies not in choosing between human expertise and artificial intelligence, but in thoughtfully integrating both to create systems that exceed what either could achieve alone.

As the hydrogen economy expands to meet global decarbonization objectives, the integration of AI and ML into safety systems offers extraordinary opportunities to enhance the protection of people, property, and the environment. However, the history of

complex technological systems teaches that over-reliance on automation without appropriate human oversight can create new vulnerabilities.

Hydrogen is a promising clean energy carrier but involves safety challenges that require advanced approaches. While AI and ML can significantly enhance safety, they must be designed as tools to support human decision-making rather than replace it.

The effective incorporation of these technologies into hydrogen systems relies on adopting a human-centric approach, ensuring that safety management focuses on protecting individuals and the environment while building public trust. Ultimately, realizing a secure hydrogen economy necessitates accountable engineering combined with human responsibilities and ethical considerations.

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THE HYDROGEN SAFETY IMPERATIVE

DRIVERS, RISKS & EMERGING INNOVATIONS

Hydrogen is moving fast from pilots to large industrial systems, and safety will decide whether this transition earns permits, insurance, and public trust. This chapter outlines the growth drivers behind hydrogen deployment, then explains the properties that make leaks, ignition, confined accumulation, and material degradation risks distinct from conventional fuels. Drawing on recent incident evidence, it highlights recurring human-factor and design weaknesses and the process-safety practices needed to prevent escalation. It closes with emerging innovations, including smarter sensing, AI-enabled analytics, and digital twins, that support predictive maintenance and confident operations.



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As governments and industries accelerate decarbonization efforts, hydrogen adoption in sectors from energy, transport to heavy industry is expanding exponentially. However, this scale-up cannot proceed without absolute public and operational confidence, making safety the defining challenge because hydrogen's unique physical behaviour and rapid deployment amplify risk exposure and public concern. This imperative directly links to the report's primary objective of achieving Intelligent Safety at Every Stage of the hydrogen value chain, ensuring that risk management is proactive, data-driven, and embedded in every technical and procedural design.

The current hydrogen landscape is marked by a pivotal shift from fossil fuel-derived "Grey" hydrogen, historically used in refining and fertilizer production, toward low-carbon pathways like "Blue" (natural gas with Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage, or CCUS) and "Green" (electrolysis powered by renewable energy). Centralized steam methane reforming with carbon capture remains common for blue hydrogen and carries high-pressure natural gas handling and CO₂ compression risks. Electrolysis-based green hydrogen features alkaline, proton exchange membrane, and solid oxide electrolyzers that introduce electrical, water purity, and high-pressure hydrogen containment concerns. Liquefaction and cryogenic storage enable long-distance transport but create thermal hazard, boil-off management, and brittle-fracture risks in materials. Compressed gaseous hydrogen in tube trailers and refuelling stations adds leak, valve, and dispenser integrity challenges plus rapid filling thermal effects. Ammonia carriers and synthetic fuels as hydrogen vectors introduce chemical toxicity and conversion hazards at conversion terminals. Blending hydrogen into natural gas networks and using hydrogen in fuel cells for mobility raise compatibility and material embrittlement issues across pipelines, compressors, and end-use appliances. These technology variants demand tailored safety controls for leak detection, materials selection, ventilation, pressure relief, emergency isolation, and human factors in operations, inspection, and maintenance to prevent escalation across the value chain.

The unique physical properties of hydrogen present distinct handling risks compared to hydrocarbon fuels. Hydrogen is colourless, odourless, and highly buoyant, dispersing quickly, which can be a safety advantage; however, it has an extremely wide flammability range in air (4-75% by volume) and a remarkably low minimum ignition energy (0.017 to 0.02 mJ) around **fifteen times less than natural gas**. This means it can ignite far more easily. Furthermore, hydrogen burns with a nearly **invisible flame** and low radiant heat, complicating detection and emergency response. Case studies confirm that hydrogen-related accidents rarely stem from a single catastrophic event. Instead, they are the result of combined failures: Most of the reported incidents are attributed to **organizational and human failures** (procedural lapses, ignoring warnings), while the remainder are often traced to **equipment failure and design flaws** (material incompatibility, aging infrastructure, or inadequate component sizing). It requires rethought detection, ventilation, and material choices. Incident analysis and process-safety reviews show a pattern of leak-and-ignition events, equipment failures, and human factor issues that have caused facility shutdowns and reputational impacts. Addressing these risks is essential to sustain permitting, insurer confidence, workforce safety, public trust and sustainable market growth; unresolved safety failures can halt projects, increase capital costs, and stall policy momentum for hydrogen transitions.

The shift to large-scale deployment is being enabled by emerging innovations in **intelligent monitoring** and data analytics, serving as a protective layer against the inherent risks. These digital enablers include advanced **sensor arrays** and **Artificial Intelligence (AI)** for data-driven risk management providing real-time detection, predictive maintenance, and integrated safety decision support. For instance, the deployment of **Ultrasonic Gas Leak Detection** systems allows for the detection of pressurized leaks through airborne sound waves, regardless of wind direction, and can incorporate **Artificial Neural Networks** to filter out background noise, enhancing reliability. Furthermore, miniature, **low-power semiconductor sensors** are being developed for **room temperature detection** of trace hydrogen, suitable for on-chip and IoT integration. These innovations are central to the "intelligent safety" goal, moving the industry from reactive compliance to proactive, predictive risk mitigation by providing real-time diagnostic intelligence.

International and regional codes and standards now cover hydrogen production, storage, transport, and end-use, including IEC, ISO, national fire codes, and industry guidance that address material selection, spacing, ventilation, and emergency planning. Globally, the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) TC 197 sets critical standards (e.g., ISO 19880 for fuelling stations and ISO 22734 for electrolyzers). In the U.S., the NFPA Hydrogen Technologies Code is a foundational document addressing the safe installation, storage, use, and handling of hydrogen across various applications. Remaining gaps and inconsistencies occur across jurisdictions in permissive blending limits, compressed-gas vehicle codes, and unified certification

for electrolyser and storage systems, complicating cross-border projects and supply chains. Ongoing harmonization efforts driven by standards bodies, safety panels, and multilateral working groups seek to close gaps, accelerate consensus based best practices, and incorporate digital-safety verification into compliance regimes.

The core theme of this discussion is the Hydrogen Safety Imperative, defining safety as an essential prerequisite for the global energy transition. This chapter sets the foundation for a detailed analysis structured around five key questions that follow. Subsequent sections will systematically explore: (1) the major drivers of hydrogen growth worldwide, (2) unique safety risks hydrogen carry compared to other fuels, (3) standards and public perception that shaping safety priorities, (4) lessons taught by recent hydrogen safety incidents, and (5) the innovations that transforming risk management followed by actionable insights into deploying "Intelligent Safety at Every Stage," concluding with a comprehensive outlook on future safety challenges.

Major Global Drivers for Hydrogen Growth

The worldwide surge in hydrogen development is propelled by a convergence of geopolitical, environmental, and economic factors, making it a critical strategic asset for national and global energy roadmaps.

Decarbonization Mandates and Net-Zero Targets: The primary driver is the urgent need to meet global climate goals, particularly the Paris Agreement's net-zero targets. Hydrogen is essential for decarbonizing "hard-to-abate" sectors where direct electrification is technically or economically challenging, such as steel production, cement manufacturing, heavy-duty trucking, and maritime shipping. Global scenarios predict that clean hydrogen could account for up to 10-12% of final energy consumption by 2050.^{1,2,3}

Energy Security and Resilience: Following global energy market volatility, many nations view clean hydrogen (especially green hydrogen produced domestically from renewables) as a path to greater energy independence and reduced reliance on imported fossil fuels.

Supportive Policy Frameworks and Investment: Government intervention is de-risking early-stage projects and driving massive investment.

- **United States Inflation Reduction Act (IRA):** Provides powerful production tax credits (Section 45V) up to \$3/kg for qualified clean hydrogen with well-to-gate emissions less than 0.45 kg CO₂e/kg H₂; actual credit ranges from \$0.60 - \$3.00/kg depending on carbon intensity 4 - 0.45 kg CO₂e/kg and wage requirements.^{4,5} The U.S. has established strategic deployment targets informed by sector-specific demand scenarios; 10 million metric tonnes (MMT) of clean hydrogen annually by 2030, 20 MMT annually by 2040, and 50 MMT annually by 2050.
- **EU's REPowerEU Plan:** Sets ambitious targets of 40 GW of domestic electrolyser capacity along with 10 million tonnes of domestic production and 10 million tonnes of imported renewable hydrogen by 2030.^{6,7}
- **India's National Green Hydrogen Mission (NGHM):** Aims for at least 5 MMT per annum capacity by 2030 to establish India as a global production hub.
- **Japan's Basic Hydrogen Strategy (BHS):** Targets 3 Mtpa of hydrogen consumption by 2030 and a total hydrogen supply of 20 Mt/year by 2050 and a reduced supply cost of JPY 30/Nm³ by 2030, and ultimately, around 20/Nm³ in the future.^{6,8}
- **China:** As a global leader in electrolyzer manufacturing (60-65% of global installed capacity), China is rapidly scaling up domestic production (100-200 kt green hydrogen production by 2025) and integration, driven by provincial-level targets and a focus on both industrial consumption and mobility.⁶

Technological Cost Reduction and Industrial Demand Falling costs for renewable electricity (solar and wind) and continuous advancements in electrolyzer technology are closing the price gap between Green Hydrogen and its fossil fuel-derived counterparts. This makes the switch economical for existing industrial consumers.

Unique Risks and Physical Properties

The safety challenges associated with hydrogen are unique because its physical properties differ fundamentally from conventional hydrocarbon fuels like natural gas (methane) and gasoline. These differences necessitate highly specialized design, materials, and operational protocols.

Hydrogen's unique physical properties pose distinct safety challenges compared to conventional fuels, demanding specialized handling and materials. Firstly, its Minimum Ignition Energy is extremely low, at just 0.017 to 0.02 mJ, making it around fifteen times easier to ignite than methane (~0.28 to 0.3 mJ). This sensitivity means static discharge, minor friction, or small sparks are sufficient for combustion. Secondly, hydrogen has a remarkably wide flammability range, spanning 4% to 75% concentration in air.^{9,10} These contrasts sharply with methane's narrow 5% to 15% range, dramatically increasing the likelihood that a leak will create an explosive air-fuel mixture. Furthermore, hydrogen poses a higher detonation risk (18.3% to 59% in air, but can extend to 9.4-76.9% under higher ignition energy) compared to methane.^{11,12,13,14,15} Thirdly, as the smallest molecule, hydrogen easily leaks through seals that contain other fuels. While its extreme buoyancy is an advantage in open spaces (rising and dispersing rapidly, about four times faster than methane), in confined areas, this rapid dispersion quickly leads to an immediate fire or explosion hazard. Finally, hydrogen causes embrittlement in many high-strength steels under pressure, compromising structural integrity over time, a risk absent with natural gas. Its combustion flame is also nearly invisible and emits low radiant heat, complicating visual detection and emergency response.

Table 1. Critical Physical Properties Influencing Hydrogen Safety Design.

Property	Hydrogen (H ₂)	Natural Gas (CH ₄)	Gasoline
Min. Ignition Energy	Extremely Low (~0.017 to 0.02 mJ)	Low (~0.28 to 0.3 mJ)	Low (~ 0.24 - 0.8 mJ)
Flammability Range	Very Wide (4% to 75% vol.)	Narrow (5% to 15% vol.)	Very Narrow (1.4% to 7.6% vol.)
Buoyancy/Dispersion	Extremely buoyant; rises rapidly and disperses	Buoyant; rises slowly	Vapours are heavy; pool at ground level
Molecular Size	Smallest. Requires specialized seals	Small	Large
Material Interaction	Causes Embrittlement in many steels	Inert to structural metals	Inert to structural metals
Flame Visibility	Nearly Invisible	Highly visible (yellow/orange)	Highly visible (yellow/orange, produces soot)

The Societal Influence

The widespread adoption of hydrogen technology, essential for decarbonization, is governed not only by engineering but by **regulatory frameworks, industry standards, and public perception**. Its unique safety characteristics, such as an extremely low minimum ignition energy and wide flammability range, necessitate robust review & attention.

Regulatory Frameworks and Industry Standards are foundational, translating scientific risk into mandatory practice. Standards from bodies like ISO, IEC, NFPA, EPA, OSHA develop codes and standards to provide clarity and certainty, advancing risk-based and performance-oriented frameworks which is essential for private investment. By mandating technical specifications, such as specialized seals or material compatibility, it directly channel investment into targeted R&D. Furthermore, modern risk-based regulations are critical; they prioritize safety spending where it yields the greatest reduction in harm, such as requiring advanced leak detection and ventilation in confined hydrogen facilities, guidance on HAZOP studies^{16,17}, Safety Integrity Level (SIL)^{18,19} rating requirement for safety instrumented system etc. Harmonization of these standards globally is key for market stability and cross-border infrastructure investment.

The Impact of Public Perception and Social Acceptance: Public perception, however, can override technical assurance. Low public knowledge is often dominated by historical fear, particularly the 1937 *Hindenburg* disaster.²⁰ Hydrogen's properties, like its nearly invisible flame, increase the perceived risk, even as actual technological risks decrease. Safety concerns about

infrastructure (e.g., Hydrogen Fuelling Stations) near residential areas directly impact policy and zoning, leading to significant permitting delays and stricter mandates. If social opposition is not proactively managed through transparent communication and community engagement, it can halt critical projects and put off necessary investment.²¹

Media Coverage and Community Concerns:

Crucially, media coverage often reinforces negative perceptions through sensationalized reporting of rare incidents, creating a skewed narrative that can force overly cautious regulations that unnecessarily burdens industry. Ultimately, public acceptance and trust in institutions are vital, de-risking investment by reducing political, geopolitical, and community opposition and ensuring national safety priorities are met.^{22,23}

Causes and Influence

Common Patterns and Root Cause: Recent hydrogen incidents^{24,25} across production, storage, and fuelling applications point to three highly related root cause areas;

- **Human Factors and Procedural Gaps:** The most frequent cause is Failure to Follow Procedure. This includes unauthorized component repair, bypassing safety systems, and incorrect Lockout/Tagout (LOTO)²⁶ application. Miscommunication and insufficient training on hydrogen's low ignition energy and lack of visual properties are critical factors.
- **Design and Engineering Flaws:** Accidents frequently involve inadequate ventilation, allowing the highly buoyant gas to accumulate in confined spaces (pits, trenches), leading to powerful explosions. Failure to address hydrogen embrittlement in high-pressure lines also causes unexpected material and equipment failures.²⁷ High temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA)²⁸ can result in cracking & other defects within steel. HTHA occurs in high stress areas within piping & vessel & it is more likely to occur at high process temperatures that are above 400° F (204.4°C). Besides HTHA and hydrogen embrittlement, engineers should be aware of other challenges too, for e.g. elastomer and gasketing material must be carefully selected for the operating pressure and temperature to ensure adequate sealing surface.

Patterns Over Surprises

Recent incident records show that hydrogen accidents are rarely “one-off” technical surprises and far more often the predictable outcome of small weaknesses lining up across people, equipment, and operating context. In the H2Tools²⁵ lessons-learned cases, repeated themes include incomplete purging and gas mixing errors (for example, tube trailer and lab incidents where hydrogen and oxygen or air were inadvertently combined), procedural non-compliance and unauthorized modifications, and breakdowns in basic verification such as wrong-cylinder connections or missed isolation steps, all reinforcing the need for disciplined operator training, clear permits-to-work, and two-person verification for high-risk line-ups and hot work. Design and engineering lessons recur around venting and pressure relief, including relief devices set or selected incorrectly, vent configurations that promote static or trap gas, and drains or vent stacks that create unintended paths for hydrogen into unclassified spaces, which is why inherent safety design now emphasizes outdoor discharge to safe locations, segregation of drains, robust hazardous-area classification, and emergency isolation that can be reached without entering the hazard zone. Material degradation is also a persistent contributor, ranging from galvanic corrosion and coating failure in buried hydrogen piping leading to major releases and explosions, to hydrogen embrittlement and loss of fracture toughness in high-strength stainless components such as springs, valve internals, and sensor diaphragms, which supports stricter material qualification, corrosion control, and lifecycle inspection intervals for both new-build and repurposed assets. Transportation and mobile storage events in HIAD 2.1²⁴ reinforce the same fundamentals at commercial scale: collisions, rollovers, vibration-loosened fittings, hose and connection failures during transfer, and pressure relief or burst disc activations during upset conditions can rapidly turn a manageable leak into a long-duration jet fire or emergency evacuation, so barrier-based design must include mechanical protection, breakaway and excess-flow protection, vibration-resistant assemblies, and rigorous pre-trip, pre-transfer, and post-maintenance checks. Finally, natural and external hazards show up as escalation multipliers rather than root causes, with cold weather, flooding or water ingress, and long standstill periods contributing to relief malfunction, freezing, seal shrinkage, loss of vacuum insulation in cryogenic systems, and delayed detection, underscoring why process safety management must explicitly address abnormal and low-utilization states through management of change, maintenance assurance, proof testing, and emergency preparedness that is practiced routinely rather than improvised during an incident.

- **Maintenance and Monitoring Failure:** The escalation of minor issues is often due to a failure to respond to leak detection alarms or the use of incompatible materials for critical components (seals and valves), which creates the leak in the first place.

Influence on Current Safety Practices: These recurring failures have driven a crucial shift in industry standards and safety protocols;

- **Process Safety Management:** Mandatory adoption of robust frameworks, particularly emphasizing rigorous Management of Change for all system modifications and new projects. Embracing a risk-based safety program to adopt various codes and standards which establish the minimum requirements to protect workers, the neighbouring public, and first responders.
- **Inherent Safety Design:** Prioritizing open-air installations and robust, active ventilation for enclosures to ensure rapid, harmless dissipation of any release. Follow HAZID/HAZOP/LOPA and select appropriate SIL rating of instruments critically to ensure inherent safe design.²⁹ Use intrinsically safe electrical devices, instruments in hazardous zone, appropriate material selection for piping and vessels considering risk of hydrogen embrittlement, selection of elastomer and gasketing material for the operating pressure and temperature to ensure adequate sealing surface.
- **Automated Controls:** Implementing systems for automatic isolation and shutdown that instantly activate when operational limits (e.g., oxygen levels in the H₂ stream or pressure) are exceeded.
- **Operational Excellence:** Requirement for continuous training and strong use of double-witness verification for high-risk maintenance and assembly tasks to mitigate human error.

Emerging Safety Innovations

The safe deployment of hydrogen as a clean energy carrier is being revolutionized by the convergence of advanced digital and sensing technologies, fundamentally shifting from reactive safety measures to a proactive, predictive, and holistic risk management approach driven by data. The core of this transformation lies in the integration of Industry 4.0 & 5.0 technologies;

- **AI-Powered Leak Detection and Predictive Analytics:** AI-driven systems improve hydrogen leak detection by integrating advanced sensing with machine learning, offering faster, more accurate detection than traditional methods.^{30,31} Acoustic sensors powered by AI analyse sound waves to differentiate leaks from background noise, achieving over 90% accuracy in some monitoring implementations.^{32,33} Thermal imaging combined with AI detects subtle temperature changes caused by leaks, optimizing sensitivity with environmental data integration.^{30,34,35} Honeywell's new hydrogen leak detector uses thermal conductivity detection to identify microscopic leaks as low as 50 ppm in real time, enabling early intervention before safety risks escalate.³⁶
- **Digital Twins:** Digital twins create virtual replicas of hydrogen systems for continuous monitoring, simulation, and optimization.^{37,38} They enable real-time risk evaluation, predictive maintenance, and scenario training, significantly enhancing safety oversight. Digital twins leverage AI and mathematical models to capture complex hydrogen dynamics and system behaviours, incorporating advanced sensors and even quantum computing to expand capabilities. These technologies allow stakeholders to identify and mitigate risks quickly and improve system reliability.
- **Smart Sensors and IoT:** Smart sensors for hydrogen detection are increasingly sophisticated, featuring wireless communication, high sensitivity, and robustness.³⁹ Innovations include wireless hydrogen sensors based on graphene and platinum materials that can detect hydrogen concentrations as low as 1 ppm and operate without batteries, allowing flexible deployment for extensive monitoring networks.^{40,41,42} Sensors are also designed to resist interference and self-clean to maintain long-term stability. These new generation of smart sensors, coupled with the Internet of Things (IoT) collect high-frequency, granular data that is then transmitted for real-time analysis by AI/ML algorithms.⁴³ This continuous data feed is the digital backbone that powers the digital twin and the predictive models.

Together, these tools make hydrogen safety management more efficient, predictive, and responsive. Traditional methods that relied on periodic checks or simple alarms are now complemented with continuous monitoring, AI-driven anomaly detection, virtual testing, and predictive maintenance significantly reducing risk and enhancing safety in the hydrogen economy.

Recap & Future Outlook

Hydrogen safety is emerging as a defining enabler of the global energy transition, demanding an approach where safety is designed into every stage of production, storage, transport, and use. Owing to hydrogen's unique physical properties its extremely low ignition energy, wide flammability range, susceptible to leak, invisible flame and tendency to cause material embrittlement traditional safety methods for hydrocarbons are inadequate. Achieving large-scale hydrogen deployment therefore require technological innovations, fundamentally different design philosophies, operational practices, and emergency responses compared to hydrocarbon fuels.

Recent trends indicate a decisive shift toward intelligent, data-driven safety management, integrating artificial intelligence, digital twins, and Internet of Things (IoT) sensors to enable predictive monitoring, leak detection, and automated shutdowns. Simultaneously, Standards from bodies like ISO, IEC, NFPA, ASME, OSHA, EPA develop codes and standards which are advancing risk-based and performance-oriented frameworks. Incident analysis reveals that most of the safety failures stem from human and procedural errors rather than technical faults, emphasizing the need for strong safety culture, continuous training, and robust management of change.

Emerging technologies like green and blue hydrogen introduce new challenges in electrolysis systems, cryogenic storage, and compression, necessitating material innovation and proactive hazard assessment. Public perception also remains a pivotal factor, with community opposition and media amplification of rare incidents influencing regulatory caution and project approvals.

Future progress depends on embedding “**Intelligent Safety at Every Stage**,” harmonizing international standards, investing in advanced sensing and AI-based diagnostics, and promoting transparent engagement with communities to build public confidence and ensure hydrogen's safe and sustainable growth.

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SAFE HYDROGEN PRODUCTION

HAZARDS, STANDARDS & INTELLIGENT MONITORING

This chapter explores how safety enables the transition of hydrogen production from small pilot facilities to large-scale industrial systems. It examines the distinct safety challenges associated with electrolysis, reforming, and gasification, using historical incident evidence to highlight recurring technical and operational failures. The chapter then discusses how intelligent production monitoring, including advanced sensing, automation, digital twins, and predictive analytics, can shift safety management from reactive control to early risk prevention. By linking incident lessons with evolving standards and operational practices, the chapter shows how data-driven safety systems support reliable, scalable, and commercially viable hydrogen production.



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Hydrogen has re-emerged as a central pillar in the global clean-energy transition, positioned as both a decarbonization vector and an industrial feedstock. By 2050, projections indicate hydrogen could account for 10-12% of total energy consumption, driving demand across transport, industry, and power sectors.^{1,2}

Hydrogen production safety is foundational for sustainable growth of the hydrogen economy. Hydrogen's high flammability, diffusivity, and low ignition energy demand rigorous safety protocols to prevent accidents and ensure operational integrity.^{3,4} This chapter underscores why embedding intelligent safety at every stage of hydrogen production, from feasibility to operation, is essential for safeguarding personnel, assets, and communities while enabling scalable deployment of hydrogen technologies within a decarbonizing global system.⁵ As hydrogen projects grow in scale and complexity, safety increasingly functions as a connective system within the hydrogen value chain; linking sensors, control logic, and human oversight into one continuous feedback loop that detects, interprets, and responds before harm occurs.^{6,7} Historically, hydrogen has been produced mainly via steam methane reforming (SMR), coal and petcoke gasification, or naphtha reforming. However, as decarbonization priorities rise, green hydrogen production through renewable powered water electrolysis is maturing into a commercially viable alternative to fossil-based hydrogen production pathways, including steam methane reforming and coal gasification (Calabrese et al., 2024).⁷ Technologies such as Proton Exchange Membrane (PEM), Alkaline Water Electrolysis (AWE), Anion Exchange Membrane (AEM), and the emerging Solid Oxide Electrolysis (SOE) offer diverse pathways for various scales and applications. Globally, large-scale demonstration projects are planned in regions such as NEOM (Saudi Arabia) and across Europe's RePowerEU initiative.⁵ As the waste-to-energy front matures, gasification routes for syngas production are also gaining momentum. Alternate hydrogen sources, from biomass, waste, or natural deposits-demand equally rigorous design, materials, and monitoring standards to ensure uniform safety assurance across technologies.⁴ Global policies and subsidies are accelerating deployment, but safety standards must evolve at comparable speed to manage emerging hydrogen production pathways and associated risks.⁷

Hydrogen's physicochemical profile, wide flammability range ($\sim 4\text{--}75\%$ v/v), high flame speed, very low minimum ignition energy (~ 0.02 mJ), and high diffusivity, differs markedly from hydrocarbons and shapes the way safety systems are designed.^{3,5} Hydrogen can permeate metals, causing embrittlement. Hydrogen sensor placement should be risk-based and informed by CFD analysis and standards (NFPA 2 Annex, DOE/NREL guidance), including ceiling zones and leak sources, not only ceiling-level detection..⁴ In addition to physical and chemical hazards, the psychological dimension of safety remains significant. To anchor these discussions in measurable data, the Joint Research Centre's Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (JRC HIAD 2.1, [version 2025-01-01])⁸ documents that hydrogen incidents span production, storage, compression, and end use. When filtered to the production phase, the database contains 133 recorded events. Many of these involve leaks or near misses that are effectively contained by engineering controls and operational safeguards, while explosions and fires represent only a subset of reported outcomes. Together, these patterns highlight hydrogen's distinct hazard profile while also reflecting increasing maturity in risk management practices across the industry.⁵ The "Hydrogen Pyramid" concept⁷ expands on earlier "Hydrogen Square" models by emphasizing that safety underpins all phases; production, transport, storage, and-uses, via timely information flow between subsystems, a requirement that grows increasingly critical as new pipelines, LH₂ carriers, and LOHC routes emerge. Despite two centuries of incident records, most hydrogen events are contained leaks or near misses, according to JRC HIAD 2.1. Yet, public perception, shaped by the Hindenburg disaster (1937) and nuclear-era imagery, continues to influence policy and project acceptance.³ This gap between perceived and actual risk underscores the importance of transparent communication and evidence-based safety management to build public trust.⁵

Today's hydrogen facilities are now designed as integrated safety ecosystems, where instrumentation, automation, and human supervision interact dynamically.⁶ Safety is not a static design but a continuous, adaptive capability as an intelligent control network that evolves alongside the technology it protects. Need of seamless interconnected safety network functions seamlessly across the hydrogen supply chain is critical as the industry transitions from pilot projects to gigawatt-scale production (Energies, 2024). The same detection and control systems that safeguard individual electrolyzers must eventually synchronize across multi-plant networks, enabling collective awareness and coordinated response (Patil et al., 2024; Sakib et al., 2025).^{5,6} In this context, hydrogen safety should be viewed not as a barrier to innovation but as its enabler: a disciplined system of sensors, standards, and skills that evolve with technology and learn from every recorded incident.^{7,8}

Mode-specific risks

Hydrogen’s intrinsic properties; colorless, odorless, with a wide flammability range (~4-75%), and low ignition energy (~0.02mJ), make leak detection and explosion prevention critical. Hydrogen can embrittle metals, requiring special alloys/lining for piping and storage. Incident trend data from JRC HIAD 2.1 shows that most recorded production-phase events originate in SMR and electrolysis units,⁸ Addressing these hazards (Table 1) is vital to protect lives, the environment, strengthen public trust, and facilitate a large-scale expansion of the hydrogen market.⁵ Risks such as diaphragm or membrane failure and uncontrollable hydrogen/oxygen crossover in electrolyzers can create detonable mixtures if not mitigated. Each electrolyzer installation needs a detailed safety study and HAZOP analysis covering both chemical reaction and electrical system variations.^{9,10} Field data confirms ignition geometry strongly influences ignition probability: in open or well-ventilated areas only ~1–10% of releases ignite, whereas confinement sharply raises risk.^{5,8} Electrolysis primarily involves electrical safety challenges coupled with hydrogen leak risks, necessitating rigorous electrical design and leak detection systems. SMR and gasification expose workers and facilities to extreme heat and pressure hazards and toxic gas handling complexities, demanding advanced thermal safeguards and gas monitoring.^{5,7} Gasification adds particulate and tar management hazards unique to feedstock variability. Emerging methods often introduce process-specific chemical risks needing specialised controls.⁴ Hazards differ by production pathway as shown in Table 1. Each method demands tailored safety management approaches that address these unique hazards to ensure safe hydrogen production, aligning with evolving intelligent safety strategies that encompass electrical, thermal, chemical, and mechanical safety dimensions.³

Table 1. Method-specific hazards associated with key hydrogen production technologies.

	Electrolysis (PEM, AWE, AEM, SOE): Electrical risks related to current, voltage, and harmonics along with AC/DC system-related safety, insulation needs; crossover and oxygen concentration in hydrogen; hydrogen leakage and explosion risk; material degradation (membranes, catalysts); membrane crossover; water feed variability hazards including temperature, pressure, and alkalinity. Control - Safety instrumented system (SIS) trip logic, leak detection, etc.^{7,10,31,32}
	Steam Methane Reforming (SMR): High-temperature (800-1000°C) and high-pressure-related risks; toxic syngas handling; explosion risks from flammable gas mixtures; catalyst poisoning and degradation hazards. Control - Thermal insulation, gas monitoring, etc.^{7,9,30}
	Gasification (biomass, coal): High-temperature and pressure-related thermal hazards; dust explosion risks and respiratory hazards; toxic tar and condensate management challenges; complex syngas impurities, toxicity and corrosion. Control - Filtration systems, respiratory PPE, etc.^{9,27,30}
	Other Pathways (pyrolysis, photolysis): Thermal runaway and uncontrolled reactions; chemical safety risks associated with catalysts and reagents; limited operational history requiring conservative risk management approaches.

Intelligent Production Monitoring

Advanced IoT sensors distributed across hydrogen production systems, continuously measure critical parameters such as hydrogen concentration, temperature, pressure, and flow rates in real time These sensors feed data into a Hydrogen Management System that analyses patterns, detects anomalies, and automates operations.⁶ At the project stage, monitoring design should begin early to ensure a digital-native system that optimizes performance and safety. For example, ultrasonic sensors combined

with machine learning algorithms can differentiate between normal operational fluctuations and hazardous leak signatures with high accuracy. Customised AI models analyse historical and real-time equipment data to predict the likelihood of component failures such as membrane degradation in electrolyzers or catalyst poisoning in reformers. Predictive insights enable proactive maintenance to reduce unplanned downtime. Forecasting electrolyzer degradation under variable operating scenarios; start/stop, ramp up/ramp down, temperature drift, and intermittent operation, supports timely interventions that preserve plant safety and performance.^{5,6,11,12} Smart safety frameworks also integrate automated emergency-shutdown systems triggered by rapid hydrogen release or overpressure events. Preventive design such as Inclusion of Battery system/Capacitors, etc. for integrated electrolyser plant can help minimize risk of system failure/degradation. Integrated systems can taper off the electrolyser operation and gradually shut down systems including hydrogen supply systems, and activate ventilation or suppression systems without delay.^{7,13}

Real-World Examples^{6,14,15,16,17,18,19}

- AI-enhanced remote monitoring detects early-stage membrane leaks, allowing for pre-emptive repairs and averting explosions.
- IoT sensors detect hydrogen leaks at parts-per-million concentrations with rapid response times, improving safety in pipelines and storage.

Intelligent safety evolves through three integrated phases: predictive design, adaptive control, and real-time optimization, as shown in Table 2. Across post-2000 HIAD entries, sites with automated detection and remote isolation recorded >40% fewer ignition outcomes than earlier decades, consistent with digital safeguard benefits.⁸ Digital twins tied to CFD/QRA allow dynamic plume prediction and automated ventilation/shutdown logic under changing weather and load states.^{5,7,20,21}

Table 2. Three-phase framework for intelligent production monitoring, illustrating how predictive design, adaptive control, and real-time optimization integrate to enhance hydrogen production safety and performance.^{7,13,14,22,23}

Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
Pre-feasibility / Feasibility	Feasibility / FEED	FEED / Operation
Digital twin and techno-economic modelling	Real-time measurement and control	Optimization and continuous learning
Levelized cost of hydrogen at delivery (LCOH-D) with digital twin analysis of plant, considering 8,760-h and 25-year lifecycle. Incorporates safety constraints, renewable variability, and maintenance intervals.	Digital-native operating model-measure, control, and safe operation. Embeds voltage, pH, temperature, gas composition, corrosion, and impedance sensors to enable predictive maintenance and safe operations.	Real-time, multi-period optimizer with continuous safety review. Applies AI-driven analytics and hybrid physics-informed models for leak localization, consequence prediction, and adaptive safety management.

Production Safety Standards

Hydrogen production safety is regulated under regional and international standards designed to ensure safe design, operation, and maintenance across the hydrogen value chain.⁷ As projects scale to the multi-megawatt level, these frameworks are evolving to address higher system pressures, increased automation, and digital integration.⁵

Globally, the key frameworks include:

- ISO 22734 for electrolyzer design and operation,
- NFPA 2 and NFPA 70 for hydrogen technologies and electrical safety,
- ASME BPVC/B31.12 for pressure systems,

- OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 for process safety management, and
- the European PED/ATEX directives for pressure and explosive atmospheres

Additional region-specific standards, such as UL 2264A, EN 17124:2022, AIAA G-095, and India's PESO/OISD Green Hydrogen Standards.

Recent harmonization efforts, including ISO 19880-8:2024 and EN 17124:2022, reflect the global move toward unified safety frameworks. Jurisdictions adopting these revisions report ~35% fewer recorded facility incidents compared with earlier reports.⁸

Materials qualification under cyclic H₂ remains an active R&D priority.⁴ Large-scale green hydrogen R&D projects, such as ISPT's "H₂-Safety" study project, are developing generic hazard scenarios for industrial electrolyzers to inform risk assessments and permit processes.²⁴ These efforts focus on scaling safety management practices while enabling cost-effective growth. Moreover, safety management systems are evolving to integrate digital monitoring, AI-based predictive maintenance, and automated emergency response procedures to meet increasing complexity and capacity demands.

Key gaps^{4,6,7,9} remain:

- Limited electrolyzer-specific safety guidance compared with hydrogen storage, transport, or fuelling codes.
- Incomplete international harmonization complicates compliance for multinational projects, suppliers, developers, and operators.
- New risks emerge from solid oxide electrolysis and integrated renewable-electrolyzer systems.
- Cybersecurity and digital safety integration require standardization and guidance.

Countries with emerging green hydrogen markets must align with international best practices and scaling requirements to accelerate the manufacturing industry and green hydrogen adoption.

Table 3. Overview of primary international and national codes regulating hydrogen production safety. Updates emphasize digital integration, process safety, and harmonization for megawatt-scale electrolyzer facilities.

Standard / Code	Description & Scope	Updates for Larger Facilities
ISO 22734-1:2019	specifies the construction, safety, and performance requirements for modular or factory-matched hydrogen generators that produce hydrogen by water electrolysis using aqueous or solid polymer ion transport media for industrial, commercial, and certain residential applications, while excluding reversible fuel cells and residential units supplying oxygen as a product.	The 2025 edition (ISO 22734-1:2025) expands applicability to large-scale, site-assembled hydrogen generation systems of 100 kg/h or greater, including containerised or skid-mounted plants and multi-manufacturer modular installations, with enhanced safety provisions for integration, hazardous area classification, and system-level risk management.
NFPA 2 (Hydrogen Technologies Code)	U.S. code governs hydrogen system design, installation, and operation, including production plants.	Expanded editions for bulk storage, risk analysis, and instrumentation requirements.
NFPA 70 (National Electrical Code)	Covers electrical safety, particularly in hazardous hydrogen environments.	Updated with standards on intrinsically safe electrical equipment for large-scale electrolyzers.
ASME BPVC, B31.3, B31.12	Design and construction codes for pressure vessels and piping in hydrogen plants.	Adjusted for accommodating higher pressures and cryogenic hydrogen storage.

OSHA 29 CFR 1910.119 (Process Safety Management)	Mandates process hazard analysis and management of change to reduce accident risks, handling large quantities of hazardous chemicals including hydrogen.	Increasing implementation emphasis in hydrogen production plants.
CSA/ANSI Standards (Canada/US)	Certification for electrolyzers and hydrogen storage systems.	Aligned with ISO standards, expanded scope for megawatt electrolyzers, and fuelling stations.
European Directives (PED, ATEX)	Regulate pressure equipment and explosive atmospheres safety in hydrogen plants.	Updated frameworks to address new large-scale risks, with revised risk classification.
UL 2264A	Outlines mechanical and electrical safety for water electrolysis hydrogen generators.	Complements ISO 22734 for equipment certification and interoperability.
EN 17124:2022	Sets fuel-quality standards for PEM vehicles across the hydrogen refuelling chain.	Strengthens end-use purity controls and measurement methods.
AIAA G-095	U.S. aerospace guideline for hydrogen system design and operation.	Expands guidance to ground-based industrial applications.
India PESO / OISD Standards	India's PESO Gas Cylinders Rules 2024 and MNRE/CEEW compendium provide current regulatory guidance for green hydrogen safety. ^{25,26}	For large-scale hydrogen production and storage, implementation relies on PESO approvals supplemented by MNRE guidance and evolving OISD safety practices, with increasing emphasis on harmonization with international standards for industrial-scale facilities.

Incident Analysis

While aggregate incident statistics show that most hydrogen events are minor and contained, deeper examination of severe production incidents reveals consistent failure modes that cut across technologies. These cases expose not *whether* hydrogen systems fail, but *how* design integration, operational control, and maintenance execution break down under stress. Root-cause analysis across incidents shows four dominant contributors: equipment or material degradation, management/procedural gaps, human error, and design-integration flaws.^{4,7,9}

Iconic incidents^{27,28,29,30} include:

- 1. Muskingum Power Plant Hydrogen Explosion (2007):** hydrogen accumulation during maintenance caused a pressure-wave explosion.
- 2. Santa Clara, U.S. (2019) and Kjørbo, Norway (2019):** compression-system leaks followed by delayed ignition.
- 3. Sinopec Kuqa, China (2021) and Suiso Frontier, Japan (2022):** vent-management and relief-valve design deficiencies under transient loading.

Actionable Lessons:

- Design for failsafe configuration from concept phase.
- Apply rigorous operation training, clear procedures, and stop-work authority.
- Emphasize high-quality equipment selection, installation, and redundant safety instrumentation.
- Conduct detailed HAZOPs focusing on sensor placement, ventilation, isolation, and safe access.
- Implement predictive maintenance tools supported by digital tools to pre-empt degradation.

- Foster collaboration among suppliers, contractors, and operators for consistent safety culture.

These lessons confirm that integrating organizational, technological, and procedural controls reduce incidents in hydrogen production. As hydrogen systems scale in size, complexity, and diversity, the limiting factor increasingly becomes the availability of high-quality operational evidence rather than the absence of safety frameworks. Modern hydrogen production systems, therefore, need deeper analysis and dedicated incident recording. Government and global safety bodies must develop key evidence on degradation, accelerated failure analysis, and real operational incident reviews.

Scaling Safety Challenges

Scaling hydrogen projects safely and economically requires balancing stringent safety standards and cost-effective production methods amid increasing capacity demands. While modern safety systems have reduced incident severity, trend data from JRC HIAD 2.1⁸ indicate that storage-related events rose alongside larger installations (1990s → 2010s: 17 → 61), even as injuries per event fell by over 60%, consistent with improved containment and control. Companies are deploying smart automated shutdown and leak detection with SIL levels are determined by IEC 61511 lifecycle (LOPA/QRA), typically SIL 1-3, based on risk analysis.

Design and Engineering Strategies

- Apply risk-based design and quantitative safety assessments (QRA, LOPA, SIL targeting) to prioritize focused investment on high-consequence areas.
- Adopt modular plant architecture with isolated electrolyzer skids and independent safety systems to minimize domino effects and simplify maintenance.
- Research into advanced coatings (Al_2O_3 , TiAlN) for hydrogen embrittlement mitigation is ongoing; alloy selection and microstructure control remain primary strategies.⁵

Operational and Digital Safeguards.

Large-scale facilities employ real-time leak detection, predictive maintenance, and automated shutdown via Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS, SIL 2/3).^{31,32} Digital twins enable continuous optimization under safety constraints, verifying integrity across multiple operating states (Energies, 2024).^{6,21,23}

Layered Risk Controls

Hydrogen production plants, whether based on reforming, gasification, electrolysis, or hybrid routes, are safest when they are built as layered, fail-safe systems that assume leaks, mis-operations, and abnormal transients will eventually happen and must be detected, isolated, and made harmless quickly. Because hydrogen is highly diffusive, has a wide flammability range, ignites with very low energy, and can be hard to detect visually due to its non-luminous or nearly invisible flame, facilities should prioritize continuous leak detection, strong ventilation, ignition source control, and well-rehearsed emergency isolation logic rather than relying on operator reaction time. Materials and mechanical integrity deserve the same attention: hydrogen embrittlement and corrosion risks mean equipment needs hydrogen-qualified materials, validated joints, disciplined torque and assembly practices, and inspection regimes that focus on the leak-prone points seen repeatedly in incident histories. Operational safety should be locked in through formal hazard studies and risk assessment methods, robust chemical safety management (including hazard identification, SDS management, and real-time monitoring), and strict controls on purging, ventilation, and hot work so hydrogen-air mixtures never form. Worker competency and safety culture matter just as much as hardware: all personnel need hydrogen-specific training covering material properties, equipment sequencing, emergency procedures, and the authority to stop when conditions feel unsafe, with competency assessments ensuring technicians understand what they are doing before independent deployment. For natural disasters, set the facility design basis using the region's recorded history of floods, cyclones, lightning, earthquakes, wildfire, and heatwaves. Then apply an explicit safety margin beyond that historical envelope to account for compounding events and climate-driven extremes. Digital tools now make this easier to sustain: networked sensors feeding centralized dashboards, AI-supported predictive analytics, and digital-twin simulations flag early degradation, reduce false alarms, and stress-test emergency scenarios before they occur. Finally, keep compliance language accurate by aligning with regulations and standards that govern production and associated equipment (pressure systems, hazardous-area electricals, and process safety), using technology-specific production standards where applicable, such as ISO 16110-1 for fuel-processing hydrogen generators, ISO/TS 19883 for PSA purification systems, and ISO 22734 when the production route is water electrolysis.

Organizational Practices

Comprehensive training, competency management, and cross-operator standardization are essential as global deployment expands. Collaborative initiatives including ISPT's²⁴ H₂-Safety support harmonized hazard scenarios and knowledge-sharing.

Table 4. Key strategies for scaling hydrogen production safety, integrating design, operational, and organizational measures to maintain safety performance as capacity and system complexity increase.

Phase	Approach	Description	Benefits
Phase 1	Risk-Based Design & Safety Management	Use quantitative risk assessment (QRA, LOPA) and layered safeguards to focus resources on highest risks.	Optimizes capital expenditure by targeting critical failure modes.
Phase 1	Modular Plant Design	Design independent electrolyzer modules with isolation and separate safety systems.	Enables safer operation with limited domino effects and faster maintenance.
Phase 1	Standardization & Best Practice Sharing	Adoption of emerging standards (e.g., H ₂ -Safety project recommendations) and industry collaboration.	Facilitates safety assurance across suppliers and operators.
Phase 2	Advanced Sensor & Control Integration	Employ real-time leak detection, temperature and pressure monitoring, and automated shutdown systems.	Enhances early risk detection and minimizes accident consequences.
Phase 2 / 3	Robust Operation & Maintenance Procedures	Regular safety audits, employee training, emergency drills, and preventive maintenance.	Reduces human-error risks and maintains safety system integrity.
Phase 1 / 2	Flexible Operating Strategies	Develop load management strategies to minimize harmful cycling and stress on systems. This can be initiated with asset-optimization studies during feasibility.	Extends equipment life and reduces shutdown-related degradation.
Phase 2 / 3	Use of Integrated Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS)	Install SIL-rated safety systems to automate hazard mitigation without manual intervention.	Provides reliable active protection, improving overall performance.
Phase 3	Use Optimizer meeting requirements of all safety constraints	Develop the digital twin for the project at concept/ actual design with all the safety constraints built up.	Optimization with all key safety constraints in-built.

Ultimately, scaling hydrogen safely demands systems that evolve in intelligence alongside capacity; embedding design, automation, and human expertise into one adaptive safety architecture that anticipates, rather than reacts to, operational risk.

Conclusions and Future Outlook

This chapter outlined the critical role of safety as the foundation for hydrogen production at scale. From method-specific hazards to intelligent monitoring, production standards, incident analysis, and scaling challenges, the evidence demonstrates that safety maturity is evolving from compliance-based design to intelligent, adaptive management.

Findings from JRC HIAD 2.1 and recent literature highlight that facilities adopting automated detection, remote isolation, and predictive analytics experience fewer and less severe incidents. Emerging digital tools; AI, digital twins, and physics-informed models, enable real-time hazard forecasting and scenario-based response planning.

Future research must address cyber-physical safety, AI transparency, and material integrity under cyclic hydrogen exposure. New technologies such as solid oxide electrolysis, ammonia cracking, and hydrogen blending will require harmonized international standards and continuous incident data exchange to close knowledge gaps.

For industry, the path forward lies in integrating design, automation, and human oversight into one predictive safety ecosystem; a system that learns, adapts, and evolves alongside technology. Through this alignment of innovation and responsibility, the hydrogen sector can confidently deliver on its promise of Bringing Decarbonization to Life®.

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HYDROGEN TRANSPORT

MODES, RISKS, AND SAFETY TRANSFORMATION

This chapter explores hydrogen transport safety across different modes of transportation, examining distinct challenges and mode-specific engineering solutions. Drawing on decades of real incidents, the chapter shows how failures directly shaped current standards that now prevent recurrence. Emerging digital sensors, artificial intelligence, and real-time monitoring offer transformative capabilities for the future. Yet fragmented international regulations across jurisdictions remain a significant barrier. Systematic analysis of past incidents reveals which safety improvements unlock commercial advantages: better insurance access, faster regulatory approval, and customer confidence, ultimately enabling the scale of hydrogen transport infrastructure the global energy transition requires.



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Hydrogen transportation is critical to realizing the hydrogen economy connecting production facilities to industrial users, refuelling stations, export terminals, and other end users. Unlike traditional fossil fuels with established infrastructure spanning centuries, hydrogen presents unique physicochemical properties that demand innovative transportation solutions. Hydrogen behaves very differently from traditional fuels. It's extremely light molecular weight, high combustibility, low volumetric energy density, and tendency to cause metal embrittlement make transportation far more complex than conventional fuels. Because it requires either very high compression or cryogenic temperatures to move safely, and because it has a wide flammability range, very low ignition energy, and can ignite easily from even small leaks, transporting hydrogen presents unique and significant challenges.¹ The challenge of transporting hydrogen goes beyond engineering. It requires aligned regulations, major infrastructure investment, consistent safety standards, and strong coordination between public and private players across borders. As production increasingly occurs far from where hydrogen is consumed, whether through renewable-powered electrolysis in coastal regions or reforming natural gas in industrial clusters, safe and efficient transport becomes the critical link connecting supply to demand.

Transporting hydrogen safely across long distances requires matching the transport mode with volume, distance, economics, and safety performance. Today, hydrogen is moved as compressed gas in tube trailers for short-range delivery, as liquid hydrogen by road and rail, through dedicated and blended pipelines for regional supply, and increasingly by maritime carriers for international trade. Containerized and intermodal systems are also emerging as flexible options, using ISO-standard containers that allow seamless transfer between truck, rail, and ship without reloading, and supporting distributed transport for remote sites, ports, industrial clusters, and mobile refuelling applications. Although these technologies are technically proven, global-scale infrastructure remains in an early stage. Existing dedicated hydrogen pipelines currently total about 2,575 km along the U.S. Gulf Coast and roughly 1,500 km across Europe, serving refining and chemical industries.² Ambitious initiatives such as the European Hydrogen Backbone plan to expand to nearly 40,000 - 53,000 km by 2040, largely through repurposed natural gas networks, signaling the fundamental shift from legacy industrial hydrogen corridors toward coordinated energy transition infrastructure.³ Maritime transport is also advancing, demonstrated by the Suiso Frontier's first liquid hydrogen voyage between Australia and Japan, proving long-distance shipping feasibility.⁴ Based on distance economics, tube trailers are most effective for short deliveries, pipelines for regional distribution, containerized multimodal systems for flexible mid-scale logistics, and chemical carriers and liquid hydrogen for intercontinental movement within emerging global trade routes.

Past hydrogen transport incidents revealed material vulnerabilities, aging equipment, inadequate leak detection, fatigue failures, and human-factor challenges that shaped today's engineering standards.⁵ Events involving tube-trailer explosions, pipeline ruptures from hydrogen embrittlement, and cryogenic flame acceleration during liquid hydrogen handling demonstrated how rapidly small failures can escalate, especially with hydrogen's invisible flames, wide flammability range, and extremely low ignition energy.^{5,6} These lessons drove adoption of improved materials, high-precision structural health monitoring, automated emergency shutdown systems, and international safety standards. However, most current facilities still depend on schedule-based inspections, manual checks, and threshold alarm systems, which respond only after abnormal conditions develop. The next step forward involves real-time digital monitoring, sensor fusion, container-tracking telemetry, and predictive analytics that detect anomalies early, optimize operations continuously, and enable automated responses. This evolution will be essential as hydrogen scales from industrial clusters to a global clean-energy network. With worldwide hydrogen demand projected to rise from about 95 million tonnes per year today to around 500-700 million tonnes by 2050, and with pipeline networks expected to exceed 100,000 km globally, safe transportation will become the backbone of international hydrogen trade.^{7,8,9,10} Nations such as the United States, Europe, Japan, China, and India are already investing heavily in export corridors, pipeline repurposing, and port-based hydrogen hubs.

The path to safe hydrogen transport lies in integrating several elements that the following sections explore in detail. Each transport mode faces specific risks requiring tailored engineering solutions. Digital monitoring technologies, artificial intelligence, and advanced sensors offer new capabilities for continuous oversight and rapid response. Fragmented regulations across jurisdictions create unnecessary barriers, but growing harmonization efforts show that unified standards are achievable. Innovations in automation and decision support systems reduce reliance on human judgment at critical moments. Most importantly, systematic analysis of past incidents reveals which safety improvements unlock competitive advantages, enabling operators to access better insurance terms, faster regulatory approval, and customer confidence. Building the hydrogen transport

networks that the global energy transition requires depends on operators who combine smart technology, sound engineering, clear regulations, and genuine commitment to learning from operational experience. The following sections show how each of these elements works in practice.

Mode-specific risks

Hydrogen transportation safety challenges differ fundamentally across transport modes because of how hydrogen's unique properties interact with different operational environments, pressure regimes, materials, and infrastructure designs. Each transport method presents distinct safety concerns requiring tailored engineering solutions.

Pipeline Transportation: Pipelines represent the most cost-effective and efficient method for moving large volumes of hydrogen over long distances, yet they introduce material compatibility challenges fundamentally different from natural gas service. Hydrogen embrittlement ranks as the primary integrity concern. Hydrogen atoms penetrate deep into steel crystal lattices, progressively degrading ductility and fracture toughness over decades of operation. Early hydrogen pipeline systems showed visible cracking after 15 to 20 years. A German pipeline operating continuously since 1939 in the Ruhr region provides reassurance that proper engineering prevents this problem.¹¹ Material selection proves critical: low-carbon steels with specific metallurgical compositions, composite liners, and specialized welding techniques effectively resist embrittlement.¹² Regular inspection using electromagnetic acoustic transducers and other non-destructive testing methods detect degradation before ruptures occur. Hydrogen's physical properties create operational challenges distinct from natural gas. Its low molecular weight means approximately three times higher volumetric flow velocity than natural gas at equivalent mass flow rates.¹³ This increased velocity potentially reaching 60 meters per second compared to natural gas speeds below 20 meters per second consumes 10 to 15 percent of transported energy for compression. More frequent compression stations become necessary roughly every 200 to 300 km compared to 300 to 400 km for conventional gas pipelines.^{13,14} Material compatibility extends beyond steel pipe to every component (Fig 1). Seals, gaskets, and valve components all require hydrogen-specific materials. Copper tubing becomes brittle in hydrogen environments and is unsuitable; proven alternative materials must be rigorously tested and specified. Erosion from small particles carried in flowing hydrogen poses another risk, requiring careful pipeline design and operation.




Figure 1. A few failure modes in hydrogen pipeline.

The global hydrogen pipeline infrastructure currently totals approximately 5,000 km.¹⁰ The United States operates roughly 1,600 km primarily along the Gulf Coast serving refineries and chemical plants. Europe has built approximately 1,600 km concentrated in Germany's Ruhr Valley and other industrial regions. China is rapidly expanding its network estimated at 400 km with aggressive expansion plans. This existing infrastructure has achieved excellent safety records through decades of operational experience and maintenance protocols. Europe's most ambitious hydrogen infrastructure initiative, the European Hydrogen Backbone, envisions a pan-European network of almost 53,000 km by 2040, requiring an estimated total investment of €80–143 billion based on 60% repurposed natural gas pipelines and 40% newly constructed stretches. Transporting hydrogen over 1,000 km along the proposed onshore backbone would cost on average €0.11–0.21 per kg, making it the most cost-effective option for large-scale hydrogen transport, with subsea routes costing €0.17–0.32 per kg per 1,000 km.¹⁵ This strategy significantly reduces overall costs while accelerating deployment by leveraging established rights-of-way and infrastructure.

Tube Trailer Road Transport: Compressed hydrogen tube trailers operating at 200 to 500 bar pressure with typical capacity of 300 to 1,100 kilograms provide flexible distribution for shorter distances, yet face fundamental economic constraints.¹⁶ The poor hydrogen-to-vehicle weight ratio directly restricts economic viability to approximately 200 to 300 km distances.^{17,18} Operational data reveals that tube trailer hydrogen delivery costs escalate steeply with distance, rendering transport uneconomical beyond approximately 200 km.^{19,20} Beyond this range, pipelines or liquid hydrogen become more economically attractive. Safety risks in tube trailer systems (Fig. 2) fall into distinct categories requiring specific mitigation



Figure 2. Representation of a hydrogen tanker fire.

strategies. Collision and rollover incidents can rupture multiple cylinders simultaneously, releasing hydrogen rapidly. The Belgium motorway incident in 2013 exemplified this risk when a trailer rolled over, multiple isolation valves ruptured, hydrogen released as high-velocity jets, and pavement melted due to fire.⁵ Modern protective valve cages and reinforced trailer structural designs mitigate collision consequences. Vibration-induced failures plagued early tube trailer systems. Vent valves opened due to road vibration and connection lines cracked from fatigue. Modern design incorporates vibration analysis to ensure component resistance across the full spectrum of highway vibrations encountered during transport. Connection and coupling errors represent a third significant risk. The Sweden 1983 incident occurred when trucks lacked individual cylinder shut-off valves; when connections failed during transfer, hydrogen rushed out uncontrolled.⁵ Current standards require pneumatic interlocks preventing valve opening until proper purging procedures are completed, color-coded connection systems preventing cross-contamination, and one-way check valves preventing backflow when disconnecting. Germany operates one of the world's largest tube trailer networks, with companies like Linde and Air Liquide maintaining extensive fleets serving industrial customers. Standardized logistics protocols, mandatory driver certification, and integration with railway networks for longer distances demonstrate that tube trailer operations achieve safety at scale through mature procedures and consistent implementation.

Cryogenic Liquid Hydrogen Transport: Liquid hydrogen transport at minus 253 degrees Celsius offers higher volumetric density of 70.8 kilograms per cubic meter compared to compressed gas, enabling greater payload per delivery.²¹ Typical cryogenic tanker capacity ranges from 3,000 to 5,000 kilograms per truck. However, this mode presents distinct cryogenic handling challenges. The major challenge is boil-off: hydrogen vaporization despite super-insulation. Despite vacuum-jacketed tanks, boil-off rates of 0.3 to 0.5 percent daily occur routinely.^{22,23} Over a three-day transport journey, 1 to 1.5 percent of cargo is lost to vaporization. The liquefaction process itself consumes 30 to 40 percent of hydrogen's energy content, making liquid transport economical only for long distances of 300 to 1,000 km or longer, or for specialized applications where costs are justified. Infrastructure requirements are substantial. Liquefaction plants cost hundreds of millions of euros. Specialized cryogenic tankers cost millions of euros each. Terminal loading and unloading equipment requires expensive cryogenic infrastructure and specialized operator training. These capital barriers restrict liquid hydrogen development to regions with sufficient sustained demand to amortize infrastructure investment. Japan's Kobe terminal, the world's first commercial liquid

hydrogen receiving terminal, provided valuable operational lessons on boil-off management during extended storage and weather-related challenges during loading operations. These experiences refined safety protocols now adopted globally. The Suiso Frontier's maiden voyage from December 2021 to February 2022 demonstrated that intercontinental liquid hydrogen shipping is technically feasible and operationally viable.^{21,24} This 1,250 cubic meter vessel with vacuum-insulated double-shell cargo tanks transported some 75 tonnes of hydrogen from Australia to Japan. Future commercial-scale vessels targeting 10,000 to 40,000 cubic meters capacity will require significant port terminal infrastructure development estimated at 100 to 500 million euros per major facility.²⁵

Maritime Ammonia and Alternative Carriers: While direct liquid hydrogen shipping requires specialized infrastructure, ammonia represents a more practical hydrogen carrier alternative. Ammonia is much safer compared to hydrogen; it can be relatively easily liquefied and stored at ambient temperature and relatively low pressure (~10 bar) or cooled to minus 33 degrees Celsius at atmospheric pressure, substantially reducing both safety risks and infrastructure complexity.²⁶ In addition to superior safety, ammonia delivers competitive energy performance: its 4.3 kWh per liter energy density exceeds liquid hydrogen's 2.5 kWh per liter and is almost three times higher than compressed hydrogen's 1.55 kWh per liter at 700 bar.²⁷ Critically, the global ammonia transport network is already mature: over 120 ammonia-capable ports and 150+ ammonia ships/carriers (5,000-55,000 tonne capacity) operate worldwide, leveraging established infrastructure and operational expertise.^{28,29} This mature maritime infrastructure can be immediately deployed for hydrogen transport. Safety protocols are well-established through a century of ammonia trade serving the fertilizer industry. Conversion requirements at the utilization point include direct combustion, fuel cell operation, or ammonia cracking to recover hydrogen. Liquid organic hydrogen carriers represent an emerging alternative still in pilot demonstration phase. Organic compounds chemically bind hydrogen at ambient temperature and pressure through hydrogenation at the source. Dehydrogenation at the destination releases hydrogen while the carrier liquid returns for reuse. Advantages include ambient storage eliminating boil-off losses and use of existing fuel tanker infrastructure. Energy-intensive conversion processes and reverse logistics requirements currently limit commercial deployment, though pilot projects in Germany and Japan are demonstrating technical viability.

Rail and Containerized Systems: Rail transport offers substantial bulk hydrogen delivery capacity of 10,000 to 50,000 kilograms per cryogenic rail car over medium to long distances.²⁹ Advantages include higher capacity per delivery compared to trucks, lower emissions per unit transported especially for electric railways, predictable scheduling, and ability to serve remote industrial sites with rail access.³⁰ Challenges include limited routing flexibility, coordination requirements with railway operators, and loading-unloading infrastructure needs at rail terminals. Containerized and intermodal systems using ISO-standard 20-foot or 40-foot containers enable seamless transfer between truck (Fig. 2), rail



Figure 3. Representation of a hydrogen transport by rail.

(Fig. 3), and ship (Fig. 4) without reloading hydrogen itself. Container capacity ranges from 600 to 4,000 kilograms depending on technology and size. Advantages include standardized handling procedures, reduced transfer time, enhanced security and tracking, and scalable deployment without dedicated fixed infrastructure. India's growing containerized freight infrastructure enables coastal-to-inland hydrogen distribution networks serving remote regions without requiring pipeline construction.



Figure 4. Representation of a hydrogen transport by ship.

Temporary mobile refuelling systems using containerized hydrogen serve construction sites, mining operations, and event applications.

Each transport mode incorporates proven engineering solutions addressing mode-specific risks. Pipelines require hydrogen-resistant materials, enhanced inspection protocols, and leak detection systems. Tube trailers require collision protection, vibration resistance, and standardized coupling systems. Cryogenic systems require thermal insulation, boil-off management, and specialized facilities. Rail requires operational procedures for mixed freight coordination. Maritime shipping requires either specialized vessel design for liquid hydrogen or chemical conversion infrastructure for ammonia carriers. Containerized systems require robust design standards and tracking systems. None is inherently unsafe. Each presents distinct challenges requiring different solutions tailored to the mode's operational context, distance, volume requirements, and infrastructure availability. Safe hydrogen transportation depends on matching the right technology to each specific application (refer Table 1).

Table 1: Critical Hydrogen Transport/distribution Incidents: Root Causes and Lessons Learned

Incident ⁵	Error Types and Key Root Causes	Safety Lessons & Corrective Actions	Few Applicable Standards & Safety Codes
Highway collision involving hydrogen trailer	Vehicle rollover; lack of protective barriers; inadequate collision protection design	Design protective valve cages for trailer equipment; require secondary containment for isolation valve clusters; enhance driver training on load handling	UNECE Regulation No. 134 (collision protection); ISO 19880-3 (valve design & testing); SAE J2600 (refuelling connection devices); EN ISO 21011 (valve design & reliability), ADR 2025 (ECE/TRANS/352/Vol.1 & Vol.2) (International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road); UN Orange Book Rev. 24 (Regulations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods); ISO 11120 and EN 12245 (Tube/cylinder design and integrity); ISO 11114-1 and ISO 11114-4 (material compatibility); CGA G-5.5 and API Standard 521 (Pressure-relief/venting engineering); NFPA 70 (NEC) and NFPA 51B (Ignition and ignition-source control and worker safety)
2003, Italy			
Fire; <i>Minor damage</i>			
<i>System design error and Human factors</i>			
Fire incident in chemicals plant	Piping corrosion from inadequate inspection; material degradation not detected during maintenance	Establish regular non-destructive testing schedule; use hydrogen-compatible materials only; implement corrosion monitoring in exposed sections; upgrade maintenance interval protocols	ASME B31.12 (piping code); ISO 11114 Parts 1-4 (material compatibility & hydrogen embrittlement); EN 13480 (industrial metallic piping); EN ISO 15848 (fugitive emissions); CGA H-5 (bulk hydrogen supply installation); AIGA 087 (piping system criteria, cleaning, installation, system startup, maintenance and repair); EN 1127-1 and IEC/EN 60079-10-1 (explosion prevention and area classification); EIGA Doc 15/21 (gaseous hydrogen installations)
2004, Finland			
Fire; <i>No injuries</i>			
<i>Material/manufacturing error and Management factors</i>			
Tube trailer lost control off road	Vehicle instability during cornering; insufficient load stability design; operator error in vehicle control	Improve trailer stability through weight distribution analysis; implement vibration-resistant valve locking mechanisms; strengthen operator competency in emergency procedures	ADR 2025 (ECE/TRANS/352/Vol.1 & Vol.2) (International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road); ISO 12619 (vehicle-specific requirements); ISO 22138 (Vehicle stability); UNECE Regulation No. 134 (vehicle storage & collision protection); SAE J2600 (design and testing); ISO 19880-3 (high-pressure components); ISO 19881:2025 (Gaseous hydrogen - Land vehicle fuel containers); SAE J2579 (fuel system safety); EN ISO 16111 (transportable containers, structural design); ISO 11114-1 and ISO 11114-4 (material compatibility); ISO 11120 (Refillable seamless steel tubes); EIGA Doc 15/21 (gaseous hydrogen installations)
2004, Italy			
Leak/No ignition; <i>Release managed</i>			
<i>Human factors/System Design Error</i>			
Fire from compressed gas trailer	Pressure relief device (PRD) rupture; inadequate vent system design; improper material selection for PRD	Qualify materials for hydrogen service (eliminate susceptible alloys); anchor vent lines to withstand full discharge pressure; conduct proof testing on all PRD systems before deployment	ISO 19880-3 (pressure relief device testing - 500+ cycles); API 607 (fire resistance testing); 49 CFR § 173.301, § 173.301b, and CGA S-1.1 (PRD selection and performance); CGA G-5.5, NFPA 55, and NFPA 2 (vent stack and discharge design); ISO 11114-4:2017 and ASME BPVC Section VIII, Division 3, Article KD-10 (PRDs, valves, tube bundle); ISO 11114 (material susceptibility to hydrogen embrittlement); CGA S-1.1-1.3 (PRD design); EN ISO 21011 (cryogenic valve standards); CGA H-5 and CGA P-1 (Bulk hydrogen site, supply, and operations)
2009, United States			
Explosion; <i>1 injured</i>			
<i>System design/ Material/manufacturing error</i>			

Hydrogen explosion during power plant delivery	Relief device failure; inadequate venting procedures; lack of emergency response coordination	Implement emergency response drills; establish mandatory equipment inspection protocols before each operation; upgrade vent line anchoring design to prevent failure under pressure discharge	49 CFR §173.301, 49 CFR §178.345-10, 49 CFR §180.205, and 49 CFR §180.209 (Transport, cylinders, requalification); CGA H-5, NFPA 55, CGA G-5.5, and ASME B31.12 (Bulk supply, filling, venting, piping); CGA S-1.1 and API Standard 521 (PRDs and pressure-relief engineering); ISO 19880-3 (mandatory component inspection & testing); NFPA 2 (hydrogen systems code - venting, zoning, fire protection); ASME BPVC Section VIII (pressure vessel safety); CGA P-28 (risk management for liquid hydrogen); ISO/TR 15916 (hazard identification & risk assessment); OSHA 29 CFR §1910.103, NFPA 70, and NFPA 51B (Ignition control and worker safety)
2007, United States			
Explosion; 9 injured, 1 fatality			
Material/manufacturing/Installation error and Management factors			

Smart Transport Monitoring

Digital tools and smart technologies are enhancing hydrogen transport safety by layering new capabilities onto established practices. The integration of Internet of Things (IoT) sensors, fiber-optic monitoring, artificial intelligence (AI)-driven routing



Figure 5. Representation of smart monitoring of hydrogen

algorithms, and digital tracking systems (Fig. 5) aims to reshape hydrogen transport safety by providing comprehensive, continuous oversight and rapid response capabilities across all transport modes. Rather than discovering problems during scheduled inspections, modern systems may now pick up early warning signals and enable intervention before failures cascade. The landscape includes time-tested conventional methods, emerging technologies in pilot phases, and innovations still validated primarily in simulation. Understanding this progression is essential for realistic assessment of what operators can deploy today versus what requires further development.

Hydrogen transport has relied for decades on pressure relief valves, fixed threshold alarms, and scheduled manual inspections supported by trained personnel. These conventional approaches remain the backbone of hydrogen safety. SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems integrated with pressure, temperature, and flow sensors provide real-time monitoring to control centres. For road and rail transport, standard practice includes pre-departure inspections, pressure gauges, and pressure relief devices. Maritime carriers use conventional tank instrumentation and operational procedures. This traditional approach has delivered a generally strong safety record and will remain the foundation. However, the opportunity over the next decade is to layer intelligence on top of that foundation, creating what might be called "surveillance-plus-prediction." Rather than waiting for the next inspection round, operators may access continuous streams of data that reveal precursor patterns invisible to human observers and conventional alarms.

A second tier of technologies has moved beyond simulation. Along pipelines, pressure, temperature, and flow sensors are typically spaced over tens of kilometres and integrated with SCADA systems providing continuous real-time visibility.^{31,32} Fiber-optic cables installed alongside pipes add another layer, transforming a single cable into thousands of virtual sensors through evanescent-wave absorption (substance's concentration), distributed acoustic sensing (DAS), which detects acoustic signals from leaks, and distributed temperature sensing (DTS), which identifies temperature changes at specific locations.^{33,34} This method offers continuous monitoring over long distances without the need for multiple localized sensors, thus reducing maintenance and installation complexity in challenging environments while providing leak localization to meter-level precision across entire pipeline routes. Early implementations demonstrate capability, though widespread adoption remains limited by cost and integration challenges with existing infrastructure. IoT sensor networks with wireless telemetry are being deployed on hydrogen truck fleets and some rail systems in pilot projects. These provide real-time pressure, temperature, GPS, and accelerometer data.^{35,36,37} By transmitting data in real time to centralized monitoring centres, operators gain immediate visibility

into transport conditions, allowing swift corrective actions before minor issues escalate into hazardous incidents. The deployment strategy is tailored to each transport mode. For road transport, trailers are equipped with on-board pressure transducers, GPS tracking, and accelerometers that detect collision loads or rollover risks, triggering automatic isolation and alert protocols if acceleration thresholds are exceeded.³⁸ In rail transport, comparable sensor sets monitor tank car pressure, temperature, and structural loads, with automated coupling and decoupling reducing operator error during connections.^{39,40,41} Maritime liquid hydrogen carriers use cargo tank pressure and temperature sensors combined with boil-off gas composition analysers and weather-linked loading protocols that prevent transfers when forecasts show deteriorating conditions, effectively preventing hydrogen loss and safety risks during unfavourable sea states. IoT monitoring enhances leak detection by using networks of highly sensitive chemical and physical sensors that can pinpoint abnormal hydrogen concentrations down to minute levels. This real-time visibility is critical given hydrogen's high leakage potential and wide flammability range. However, practical deployment requires addressing challenges such as sensor calibration, environmental interference, communication reliability, and cybersecurity. Computer vision systems integrating hydrogen detection with image analysis are being evaluated.³⁶ Thermal imaging systems for anomaly detection on pressurised containers, drone-enabled gas leak detection, optical flow analysis are being trialled as supplementary monitoring layers. Laboratory studies show detection capability, though researchers explicitly classify these as complementary safety layers rather than primary detection systems, requiring full certification before industrial deployment.

A third tier comprises technologies validated through simulation and laboratory experiments with limited field operational data. These show considerable promise but require substantial additional work before widespread field deployment. AI-driven forecasting, real-time anomaly detection, and multimodal coordination can significantly enhance the efficiency, safety, and seamless synchronization of hydrogen transport across pipelines, road systems, and maritime networks.⁴² Machine learning models have demonstrated leak-detection accuracy near 99% and leak-intensity predictions around 97% at millisecond response times in controlled simulation environments. However, these models are trained predominantly on synthetic datasets rather than real-world operational data, limiting field-applicable conclusions. Techniques such as Random Forest and least-squares support vector machines have also been applied to forecast hydrogen behaviour during leak scenarios in pipelines and porous media with similarly high accuracy, although most of these models have been trained on synthetic datasets rather than real-world operational data.^{36,42,43,44,45,46,47} Hybrid deep learning approaches combining wavelet denoising, k-nearest neighbour, and convolutional neural network (CNN) models have demonstrated over 99 percent accuracy in refuelling station simulations.^{36,42,43,48} However, researchers consistently acknowledge that these results derive from artificially generated abnormal condition data rather than actual incident records. Physics-informed neural networks (PNNs) embedding physical laws have shown improved performance compared to traditional approaches in simulation, though laboratory validation on real hydrogen systems remains limited and field deployment has not been reported.^{42,49} Digital twin-based safety models using CNNs have analyzed operational parameters at hydrogen refuelling stations in simulation, achieving high accuracy for risk classification with processing times suitable for real-time decision support.^{42,43,50} However, these models currently rely on synthetically generated abnormal condition data, highlighting a gap in field-validated real-world applicability.

A fourth tier comprises technologies still in early development stages. For broader hydrogen transport logistics, AI-enabled routing and digital tracking systems may optimize delivery routes, accounting for real-time traffic, weather, and road conditions to enhance safety and efficiency.^{42,51,52,53,54} Route optimization algorithms may dynamically adapt to disruptions such as accidents or adverse weather like snowfall and heat waves, ensuring consistent and timely hydrogen supply while minimizing exposure to risk areas. Digital tracking systems use GPS and blockchain technologies to provide transparent, immutable records of hydrogen transport movements, enabling traceability, regulatory compliance, and rapid incident response. Combined with AI analytics, these tools may identify risk hotspots along routes and facilitate predictive maintenance scheduling for transport vehicles and infrastructure. Digital twin applications span two phases: (1) pre-commissioning, where engineers validate designs and test emergency protocols before asset deployment; (2) operational, where real-time sensor feeds enable leak simulation, 3D gas-dispersion visualization, and AI-assisted risk assessment. However, prediction reliability depends entirely on underlying physical model fidelity and input data quality, highlighting the current need for expanded validation. Further, edge computing presents a promising opportunity for enabling real-time autonomous ANN-based decision-making at hydrogen transport checkpoints, though field-scale implementation and validation in operational hydrogen infrastructure remain a focused area for future research and development.^{36,55,56,57}

Deploying smart monitoring technologies at scale requires real operational data validation, field-proven reliability, cybersecurity safeguards, and standardized integration with existing SCADA systems. A practical way forward is to layer these new tools onto established conventional controls such as pressure relief valves, fixed-threshold alarms, and trained operators, keeping them as the safety foundation while adding fiber-optic sensing, IoT networks, and analytics platforms as validated complements through pilot programs. Accumulating actual transport and incident data from diverse hydrogen systems is critical for testing hybrid AI-physics models rigorously and ensuring regulatory frameworks evolve alongside the technology. Once these systems are validated and standardized, they will improve detection speed and operational insight, working as additional safeguards rather than replacing the conventional mechanisms that already keep hydrogen transport reliable in the broader energy transition.

Transport regulations

Hydrogen transport faces a complex patchwork of regulations that differs sharply across regions and transport modes, reflecting both technical challenges and lessons learned from real-world incidents over decades. Unlike conventional fuels with well-established regulatory frameworks, hydrogen's unique physicochemical characteristics (its wide flammability range of 4-75 percent in air, low ignition energy, rapid diffusivity, and tendency to cause metal embrittlement) demand specialized transport regulations that go beyond adapting natural gas or gasoline codes. Yet within this complexity lies clear evidence of how incident learning directly shapes safer systems. Major transport incidents over the past four decades have directly informed safety requirements now embedded in international codes and standards: the 1983 Sweden tube trailer explosion injured 16 people due to missing individual shut-off valves, the January 2007 U.S. coal-fired power plant explosion killed one person and injured ten others because of premature failure of a pressure relief device rupture disk that had been repaired by the vendor only six months prior, the 2013 Belgium motorway tanker rollover resulted in a fatality and extended road closure, and the 2022 U.S. pipeline weld failure involved hydrogen-induced cracking in the heat-affected zone.⁵ These are just a few documented examples among many others that have shaped current regulatory frameworks, with each incident contributing specific lessons on valve protection, maintenance oversight, emergency response, material compatibility, and welding procedures in hydrogen service. Such real-world experience, rather than theory alone, continues to drive the evolution of codes such as IEC 60079, CGA standards, ASME B31.12, and AWS guidelines.^{58,59,60,61,62,63}

The Multi-Modal Challenge: Hydrogen reaches its destinations through several pathways, each governed by distinctly different rules that vary significantly across nations and regions. A tube trailer certified for European roads, for example, may require additional approvals and modifications for U.S. deployment, adding months to project timelines and significant costs during a critical phase when hydrogen must compete economically with established fuels, thus illustrating how this modal and jurisdictional diversity creates unnecessary barriers to the large-scale deployment needed for climate targets. This regulatory fragmentation creates a significant practical challenge for global hydrogen deployment, as manufacturers cannot cost-effectively produce multiple product variants to satisfy inconsistent regional standards across different jurisdictions and transport modes.

The United States regulates hydrogen as a Class 2.1 Flammable Gas under 49 CFR hazardous materials regulations, with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration overseeing approximately 1,600 miles of dedicated hydrogen pipelines in industrial zones, while the engineering standard ASME B31.12 addresses material selection, joint design, welding, inspection, and integrity management to counter hydrogen's unique challenges such as embrittlement in certain steels and the need for specific post-weld heat treatment procedures to prevent cracking in affected zones.⁶⁴

The European Union takes a distinctly different approach, relying on CEN and CENELEC harmonized standards aligned with ISO and IEC frameworks, implementing the European Agreement on Dangerous Goods by Road (ADR) and by Rail (RID) to govern hydrogen classification, packaging, marking, and transport operations, while the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation mandates that member states space public hydrogen refuelling stations no more than 200 km apart along major transport corridors, supported by standards such as EN ISO 19880-1 for fueling infrastructure, EN ISO 16111 for transportable storage, and EN 13480 for industrial metallic piping.⁶⁵

Maritime transport, still in its infancy, illustrates how emerging technologies force regulatory innovation: the International Maritime Organization has only recently finalized interim guidelines for hydrogen as ship fuel with full amendments to the IGC/IGF Codes scheduled for 2028, drawing on operational experience from Japan's Suiso Frontier, the world's first liquid hydrogen carrier, which successfully transported 75 tonnes of hydrogen from Australia to Japan in 2022, providing critical data that continues to inform these evolving protocols.^{66,67}

China responded rapidly to these global developments by releasing unified technical specifications for hydrogen road transport in September 2025 through its Ministry of Transport, covering equipment requirements, enterprise qualifications, and emergency procedures, complemented by GB standards such as GB 4962 for gaseous hydrogen safety, GB/T 31139 for mobile refuelling facilities, and GB/T 34584 for hydrogen fueling stations, demonstrating increasing alignment with ISO and IEC frameworks even as each jurisdiction maintains distinct requirements.^{63,68,69}

Across these diverse regulatory landscapes, a common pattern emerges: each region has developed transport standards reflecting its own industrial infrastructure, safety priorities, and energy goals, yet none of these frameworks exist in isolation. As hydrogen deployment scales globally, the technical incompatibilities and compliance costs arising from this patchwork of rules become increasingly problematic, particularly for equipment manufacturers and logistics operators seeking to serve multiple markets simultaneously. Understanding how these different regulatory systems came into being, and where critical gaps remain, is essential for developing the coordinated international approach that hydrogen's role in decarbonization demands.

Standards Harmonization and Remaining Challenges/ Why Standards Matter, and How They Conflict: The technical incompatibilities embedded within regional frameworks for gaseous hydrogen land vehicle refuelling connection devices illustrate both the challenges and the collaborative progress underway in hydrogen standardization. For example, ISO 17268, developed by ISO/TC 197 in collaboration with CEN/TC 268 under the Vienna Agreement, provides an international basis for nozzle and receptacle design, while China has developed GB/T 26779-2021 (refuelling receptacles) and GB/T 34425-2017 (refuelling nozzles) as national standards, and North America's SAE J2600 defines separate specifications, with many other jurisdictions similarly developing or adapting comparable standards rather than adopting a single unified specification. Notably, SAE J2600 is now being harmonized with ISO 17268 for the next edition to include heavy-duty nozzle geometry, demonstrating active efforts toward convergence.⁷⁰ Yet despite this collaborative progress toward alignment, the reality remains that existing regulatory frameworks and entrenched infrastructure still require manufacturers and operators to navigate dual certification pathways or system modifications that add considerable cost and complexity to hydrogen infrastructure deployment, particularly as different jurisdictions continue to recognize different standards, though prioritizing harmonization of codes relevant to cross-border operations and international jurisdictions would significantly accelerate the transition toward unified requirements and reduce deployment barriers globally.

Recognizing these challenges, significant international harmonization efforts have gained momentum in recent years. For example, the United Nations Global Technical Regulation for hydrogen-fuelled vehicles, developed through UNECE Working Party 29, sets performance-based requirements that multiple jurisdictions can adopt without creating duplicative testing regimes, while the Vienna Agreement between ISO and CEN and the Frankfurt Agreement between IEC and CENELEC promote cross-recognition of standards to reduce redundant development work and support mutual acceptance of certified equipment across European and international markets.^{59,71,72} Together, these coordination mechanisms mark substantial progress in easing regulatory barriers, particularly for vehicle technologies where global supply chains and cross-border operations make alignment commercially and operationally essential.

Nevertheless, several gaps persist that require sustained attention as hydrogen deployment scales. Ammonia, increasingly considered as a hydrogen carrier for maritime export, is generally subject to less stringent transport regulations than compressed or liquefied hydrogen despite comparable hazard profiles related to toxicity and flammability, which can create incentives to favour ammonia pathways even where direct hydrogen transport might be technically preferable. In many developing economies, hydrogen transport regulations are adapted directly from natural gas codes without fully accounting for hydrogen-specific material compatibility issues such as embrittlement, its markedly different leak and dispersion behaviour, or the difficulty of detecting invisible flames, creating potential safety vulnerabilities that may only become apparent at higher deployment levels, making continued international cooperation, knowledge sharing, and technical dialogue among standards

bodies essential to building a robust, globally coherent regulatory foundation for safe and economically viable hydrogen transport.

The Path Toward Unified Standards: Building on these initiatives, moving closer to a common framework for hydrogen transport would deliver tangible benefits for industry. A more unified set of pressure equipment rules, refuelling interface standards, and inspection and integrity management protocols can reduce duplication in testing and certification, support larger production runs of key components, and simplify cross border project development while maintaining rigorous safety outcomes. Hydrogen is competing with fuels that already operate under mature, widely accepted regulatory regimes, so reducing avoidable regulatory friction has a direct influence on project timelines, financing, and overall cost competitiveness. Delivering this kind of alignment will require coordinated action by governments, standards bodies, operators, and financial institutions, not only technical agreement among specialists. Regional initiatives such as the European Hydrogen Backbone, where multiple gas infrastructure operators plan interconnected hydrogen pipelines across several countries, show that regulatory and infrastructure coordination is achievable when there is a shared long-term vision. At the same time, decades of operational experience and systematically documented incidents now provide a solid empirical basis for refining requirements in line with demonstrated risks rather than precaution alone. Using this evidence to gradually align transport standards, while keeping room for justified regional specifics, offers a practical path toward safer and more economical hydrogen transport at the scale required to support global decarbonization goals.

Response Innovation: Which Innovations Reduce Human Error?

Hydrogen transport operates in unforgiving environments where pressure, cryogenic temperatures, and flammability converge to amplify consequences of human mistakes. Rather than expecting operators to achieve perfect performance, modern transport systems acknowledge that errors are inevitable and design multiple protective barriers to contain them before they escalate into incidents.

Automation at Critical Decision Points: The most effective safety innovations remove human discretion from the most vulnerable moments. SCADA systems continuously monitor pipeline parameters and automatically isolate compromised sections within milliseconds of detecting anomalies, without waiting for operator recognition or response. Collision detection systems on hydrogen transport trailers trigger emergency pressure relief valves faster than conscious awareness can register. Boil-off gas management on liquid hydrogen carriers operates autonomously, maintaining cryogenic temperatures and pressures around the clock. These systems embody a principle proven in aviation: if a safety-critical action must occur, make it physically impossible to proceed without completing it first. The Canada 2004 liquid hydrogen transfer incident illustrates this principle in reverse.^{5,73} A hydrogen-cooled generator required a seven-step purging procedure before pressurisation could begin, yet an operator could choose to skip it. Automation would have made skipping the purge impossible. Similarly, interlocked purge sequences now prevent oxygen from mixing with hydrogen in generator cooling loops and tube trailers, where inadequate manual purging or improvised adapters previously led to violent internal explosions.

Design for Incompatibility and Containment: Error-tolerant hardware design removes incorrect operation as an option. Color-coded and keyed connection systems for hydrogen and inert gas lines prevent cross-contamination during coupling and decoupling by making wrong connections physically impossible. One-way check valves automatically prevent backflow when connectors separate, addressing failures like the 1999 incident (*May 11, Failure of an Argon Check Valve; Hydrogen Tools Portal*) where a defective argon check valve allowed hydrogen to escape into an argon supply line simply because the selected valve had insufficient cracking pressure and inadequate back-pressure design.⁶ Double isolation using two check valves in series now appears in specifications where hydrogen must remain segregated from other gases. Sealed drain systems on certified hydrogen processing skids close off pathways that previously allowed hydrogen accumulation in electrical enclosures. These principles, refined over decades in aviation and nuclear industries, now protect hydrogen transport infrastructure from cascading failures triggered by single mistakes.

Maintenance as Continuous Error Detection: Systematic inspection programs discover emerging failures before operators encounter them. Scheduled maintenance identifies corrosion in buried pipes, vibration damage at connection points, and seal degradation before pressurisation forces catastrophic rupture. When multiple facilities reported similar compression fitting

failures caused by missing ferrules during installation, systematic documentation revealed a procedural gap. Corrective training prevented recurrence. Periodic valve packing replacement addresses age-related seals that would otherwise leak undetected until hydrogen sensors trigger alarms, as happened at a fueling station in 2007 (*May 1, Leakage from Packing of Flow Control Valve, Hydrogen Tools Portal*) when packing aged four years without replacement.⁶

Training that Translates to Competency: Many hydrogen-transport incidents trace back to gaps in understanding, not recklessness, with cases involving over-tightened valves, incorrect valve line-ups, or mismatched gaskets during maintenance even when staff believed they were following the right procedures. Incident analyses from HIAD 2.0 and hydrogen safety case histories highlight that human and organisational factors account for a large share of events, and repeatedly recommend targeted training as a primary control measure.^{5,74} In response, specialised hydrogen transport programs now go beyond generic gas-handling courses to cover hydrogen's specific properties, the correct sequencing of valve and equipment operations, and scenario-based emergency actions for road, pipeline, and refuelling environments.^{6,75} Dangerous goods and HAZMAT-style certifications provide a baseline, but hydrogen-specific modules and refreshers are increasingly seen as essential to reducing human-factor incidents across fleets and facilities.

Hardware and System Design - Engineered Safeguards Against Human Error: Clear labelling and standardized colour coding (for example, ISO 32) make it easier for operators and drivers to distinguish hydrogen cylinders from inert or other gases during handling and transport. At the point of use, gas-specific valve outlet designs such as those defined in ISO 5145 prevent regulators and equipment for one gas from being connected to a cylinder intended for another gas, adding a physical barrier against mix-ups during hook-up. Torque-limiting cylinder valve tools, recommended in industrial gas safety guidance, control the maximum force applied to handwheels so operators cannot unknowingly over-tighten and damage internal valve components. In multi-step pressurisation sequences, electronic interlocks that only permit opening key valves when upstream conditions or sensor checks are satisfied reduce reliance on operator judgement in hydrogen systems. Analyses of the HIAD 2.0 database and H2Tools incident examples show that such engineered safeguards directly address common human-factor failures that appear in a large share of hydrogen incidents.^{5,6}

Hydrogen transport experience shows that small faults can align into major accidents, so safety thinking has shifted from expecting perfect people to expecting layered defences. Modern practice treats human error as inevitable and focuses on designing systems that absorb mistakes through redundancy, clear interfaces, and automatic safeguards so that individual slips stay contained instead of escalating into catastrophic failures.

Commercial Transition: Safety as Commercial Catalyst

Scaling hydrogen transport from demonstration projects to functioning commercial networks requires far more than solving technical problems. Past incidents over 50-60 years reveal a fundamental reality: operators moving from pilot operations to full-scale networks must tackle three interconnected challenges simultaneously. They need to prevent major failures, build organizational systems that persist beyond initial startup phases, and convince insurers and customers that their operations are genuinely safe.

The Economics of Preventing Catastrophic Failures: Analysis of past incidents shows that fire and explosion incidents, which represent only about one-third of all transport accidents, concentrate the vast majority of serious consequences including fatalities and operational disruption. A small number of fire and explosion events account for approximately 90 percent of total property losses. This pattern matters enormously for commercial viability because preventing even one major incident like a significant pipeline fire eliminates extended operational shutdowns and provides financial returns far exceeding the cost of safety improvements. Companies implementing proven safety changes translate this insight into competitive advantage. Spring-locked vent valves eliminate vibration-related accidental releases during normal transport. Hydrogen-compatible pressure relief materials prevent stress corrosion cracking failures. Protective mechanical barriers shield equipment from collision damage. Routine vacuum integrity testing stops thermal insulation degradation in cryogenic systems. Each of these measures addresses specific failure modes that appeared repeatedly in the historical record, indicating strong prevention potential.^{6,74} Operators who implement these measures report lower maintenance costs, less equipment downtime, and more reliable customer service. The cumulative cost savings typically generate payback periods measured in just a few years.

Why the Same Problems Persist Across Decades: The move from pilot projects to commercial scale does not eliminate historical failure modes; it amplifies them because there are more transfers, longer maintenance intervals, and more personnel involved in daily operations. In the 1961-1977 incident database compiled for the U.S. Department of Energy, the dominant initiating factors were undetected hydrogen-air mixtures resulting from external and internal leaks, inadequate purging and ventilation, vessel or pipe ruptures, and venting problems; operator negligence also appears as a primary cause across the dataset.⁷⁶ Modern incident records from the HIAD 2.0 database and H2Tools case histories still show the same themes recurring in different forms: incomplete purging before hot work, vent and offloading valve failures, and operator actions that inadvertently worsen a leak or release.^{5,6} This continuity across 50+ years underscores why scaling safely depends not simply on newer equipment but on engineered barriers, disciplined operating procedures, and organisational systems designed to tolerate, and contain, inevitable human error. The basic physics of hydrogen and the ergonomics of transport have not changed; what changes is whether operators have the tools, training, and accountability to manage them reliably.

Building Operational Maturity and Earning Customer Confidence: Scaling demands organizational capabilities that extend beyond equipment design. Field maintenance cannot remain specialized emergency response activity; it must become routine practice integrated into normal operations. Personnel naturally move on, so sustained safety requires continuous training that maintains technical knowledge and safety culture across years, not just initial months on the job. Emergency response capacity must be distributed across all geographic regions where hydrogen transport operates, not concentrated in distant headquarters. These organizational elements only develop through accumulated years of operational experience, particularly in regions where hydrogen infrastructure is newly established and supply chains for specialized equipment and services remain underdeveloped. Large industrial consumers including major refineries and fuel cell manufacturers will not commit to long-term hydrogen supply agreements without evidence of genuine operational maturity. Unlike commodity natural gas markets where price signals from dispersed buyers guide infrastructure investment, hydrogen's concentrated industrial demand means that forward contracts with specific large-volume customers become essential prerequisites for infrastructure investment. When operators document safety records with zero incidents over three-year periods while maintaining certified safety systems, major customers accept modest price premiums on hydrogen delivery. These premiums generate revenue streams sufficient to justify infrastructure investment while also protecting customers against supply interruptions.

From Incident Intelligence to Market Advantage: Past incidents transformed into specific safety improvements unlock commercial opportunities. The thermal insulation failures in historical rail tanker incidents led directly to mandatory vacuum integrity testing now incorporated into global transport regulations, enabling liquid hydrogen access to new markets. Tube trailer valve shielding requirements derived from collision incident analysis opened urban delivery opportunities previously considered too risky. Material qualification changes eliminating hydrogen-embrittling alloys enabled reusable equipment rather than single-use disposable systems, cutting operational costs substantially. Safety transforms from a historical record into competitive advantage, allowing early-adopting operators to capture growing market share. Insurance markets currently struggle to price hydrogen transport due to limited operational data. As comprehensive incident databases emerge and operators implement proven safety measures supported by harmonised standards and industry certification, underwriting practices are expected to shift from case-by-case assessment toward systematic risk classification, enabling fairer pricing and wider coverage availability.⁷⁷ Operators with proven safety records and transparent incident documentation will increasingly access better financing terms and premium differentiation based on demonstrated practices rather than theoretical assumptions. This access to better insurance rates and capital becomes a substantial commercial advantage, reducing costs for fleet expansion and removing a major barrier to infrastructure scaling.^{78,79} Incident documentation accelerates regulatory harmonization across jurisdictions that currently maintain fragmented requirements. When multiple regulatory bodies cite the same incidents as technical justification for specific requirements, manufacturers can design equipment to single global standards rather than maintaining parallel designs for different markets. This harmonization reduces manufacturing costs, shortens approval timelines for new infrastructure projects, and enables global supply chains in hydrogen transport equipment and services. Safety intelligence enables clear progression through commercialization milestones.^{80,81,82,83} Early-stage projects establish baseline safety performance through comprehensive incident documentation.⁸⁴ Growth-stage operations implement proven preventive measures identified through incident analysis. Mature operations achieve premium customer pricing for demonstrated zero-incident performance records. Market-leading operators become preferred suppliers for large-volume customers seeking to minimize supply chain risk, accessing long-term contracts that provide revenue certainty. The competitive advantage

compounds: operators with superior safety records attract better talent, secure better financing, win larger customer contracts, and generate returns justifying expanded infrastructure investment.

The historical record of hydrogen transport incidents, analyzed systematically, becomes a roadmap for competitive advantage rather than a record of failures. Operators that systematically analyze incident data, implement corrective measures from root cause analysis, and transparently communicate safety achievement establish market differentiation and operational superiority. Those implementing safety intelligence early gain advantages through better insurance access, faster regulatory approval, customer preference, and improved financing. Safety excellence removes current barriers to hydrogen transport infrastructure deployment while simultaneously delivering superior operational and financial performance.

Conclusions & Future Outlook

Overall, hydrogen can be transported through pipelines, road/rail tanks, or maritime carriers like ammonia, but each method faces challenges related to infrastructure compatibility, cost, efficiency, and complex handling systems, requiring advances in materials, technology, and supportive policies. Each transport method faces its own unique challenges, and decades of operational experience show us that the right engineering choices prevent problems before they start. Hydrogen transport infrastructure will only succeed if we build intelligent safety into every step of the journey, from pipelines carrying hydrogen across continents to trucks delivering it to regional customers. Modern design innovations like protective valve systems and fail-safe couplings have proven they can handle the real-world stresses of highway transport and industrial operations. As regulations become more consistent across different countries and regulatory bodies learn from past incidents, operators gain clearer guidance on what actually works. The operators who invest in continuous monitoring technologies, thorough training, and genuine safety culture will outcompete those who treat safety as a checkbox exercise. Financial markets and large industrial customers increasingly reward this commitment, making safety excellence not just the right thing to do but the most profitable path forward. Building a functioning hydrogen transport network at the scale we need will require operators who combine smart technology, proper engineering, clear regulations, and an unwavering commitment to learning from experience rather than repeating mistakes.

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HYDROGEN STORAGE, TRANSPORTATION & SAFETY

A TECHNOLOGICAL STATUS

The biggest challenge for hydrogen energy development worldwide is storage and transportation. Finding safe, economical, efficient and feasible storage and transportation methods is the key to full life cycle application of hydrogen energy. Hydrogen storage and transportation include storage of hydrogen gas as well as transportation of hydrogen energy. This chapter discusses storage and transportation technologies that cannot be assessed in isolation from safety performance, as risk management directly influences system reliability, economic viability, and public acceptance.



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Hydrogen has emerged as a reliable and sustainable energy vector with significant potential to address escalating global energy demands and decarbonization goals. Its dual role as a fuel and energy carrier highlights its potential in future industrial and energy frameworks. Its key advantages are nearly zero carbon emissions at the point of use, high gravimetric energy density, and production flexibility from a wide spectrum of feedstocks, rendering it a highly promising alternative to conventional fossil fuels.¹ Hydrogen can be produced from biomass, fossil fuels, industrial waste streams, and renewable energy sources such as solar and wind power, thereby enabling both transitional and fully renewable energy pathways.²

The anticipated large-scale deployment of hydrogen technologies raises concerns about storage availability, safety, and efficiency, particularly for short- and long-term applications.³ The choice of storage technology depends on factors such as duration, capacity, energy density, and end-use applications.⁴ Storage technologies are classified into physical, chemical, and hybrid methods, with high-pressure gaseous storage remaining the most widely implemented method due to its technological maturity and relative simplicity.⁵

Physical storage methods involve compressed gas, cryogenic liquid storage, and underground storage, while chemical methods include metal hydrides and liquid organic carriers. High-pressure and cryogenic storage options are typically suited for short-term storage, whereas salt caverns, gas blending, and chemical storage methods enable long-duration storage.⁶ Hydrogen storage technologies constitute the critical infrastructural foundation for the transition toward a hydrogen-based economy, supporting applications that range from automotive fuel cell systems and industrial energy supply to grid-scale energy storage and aerospace propulsion. Consequently, hydrogen storage systems demand sophisticated engineering solutions capable of balancing competing requirements such as safety, energy efficiency, material compatibility, cost, and scalability. Recent advancements incorporate AI and machine learning into hydrogen storage, transitioning to intelligent systems that optimize safety and efficiency through real-time data and predictive analytics.

This chapter presents a comprehensive and critical assessment of recent innovations in hydrogen storage technologies, with a particular focus on safety enhancement strategies, sustainability considerations, and the integration of smart monitoring and control systems. By synthesizing advancements across materials science, system engineering, and digital intelligence, this work aims to provide a holistic perspective on the challenges and opportunities shaping next-generation hydrogen storage solutions.

Hydrogen Storage and Delivery Technologies

Hydrogen storage and delivery technologies are vital for utilizing hydrogen as a low-carbon energy carrier. Despite its high gravimetric energy density, hydrogen's low volumetric density poses storage and transportation challenges, making the development of safe and efficient storage solutions essential. Hydrogen storage systems are primarily categorized into stationary and mobile applications. Stationary systems focus on energy storage, grid balancing, and power generation, utilizing surplus renewable energy converted into hydrogen via electrolysis. This stored hydrogen can later be reconverted into electricity during high demand. Such systems enhance grid stability and support renewable energy integration while providing off-grid solutions.⁷




Figure1. Hydrogen storage applications based on stationary and mobile⁸

Mobile hydrogen storage systems, mainly for transportation, include hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (FCVs), which convert stored hydrogen into electricity, offering benefits like zero emissions and high efficiency.⁹ Storage in mobile applications typically involves high-pressure tanks or cryogenic solutions for quick refueling.¹⁰ Both system types are crucial for hydrogen technology adoption; stationary systems enhance energy flexibility, while mobile systems facilitate zero-emission transport. Continued research into advanced materials and delivery infrastructure is necessary to overcome technical and economic hurdles, which will support hydrogen's role in a sustainable, decarbonized energy future.¹¹ Fig.1 shows the hydrogen storage applications based on stationary and mobile.

Hydrogen Economy and Storage Types

Hydrogen plays a crucial role in powering vehicles, generating electricity, and supporting various industrial processes such as methanol and ammonia synthesis, steel manufacturing, fertilizer production, and metal treatment.^{12,13} These include gravimetric and volumetric efficiency, favorable temperature and pressure conditions, rapid kinetics, and minimal heat generation during storage and release. Table 1 compares hydrogen's applications, emphasizing its role in clean energy and emission reduction, alongside challenges like cost, infrastructure, and storage.^{14,15}

Table 1. Overview of hydrogen applications, highlighting its role in clean energy and emission reduction, alongside key challenges such as cost, infrastructure, and storage limitations.

Application of Hydrogen Energy	Description	Advantages	Challenges
Transportation	Used in fuel cell vehicles (FCVs) for cars, buses, trains, and trucks. Explored as a fuel for rockets and aircraft.	Zero emissions, fast refueling, high energy efficiency.	Storage challenges, high production costs, limited refueling infrastructure.
Industrial Processes	Utilized in refining, ammonia production, methanol synthesis, steel manufacturing, and fertilizer production.	Reduces carbon footprint in industries, essential for chemical production.	Dependency on fossil fuels for grey hydrogen, high energy requirements.
Energy Storage	Stores excess renewable energy as hydrogen via electrolysis.	Enables long-term storage, balances grid intermittency.	Low round-trip efficiency, high costs for electrolyzers and storage systems.
Heating	Blended with natural gas for residential and commercial heating.	Reduces carbon emissions in heating systems.	Infrastructure modifications needed.
Power Generation	Used in gas turbines or fuel cells for electricity generation.	Clean energy production, compatible with existing infrastructure.	High costs, requires pure hydrogen to avoid emissions.

The hydrogen economy infrastructure consists of production, storage, transportation, and utilization as illustrated in **Figure 2**. Hydrogen storage systems face significant challenges that limit the progression of hydrogen-based energy solutions due to the need for compact, reliable, and safe methods to store large volumes of hydrogen, addressing the energy supply-demand gap.¹⁶ Hydrogen's high flammability, low molecular and volumetric energy density (9.8 kJ/L), high diffusivity, and reactivity complicate safe and efficient storage methods.¹⁷

As a critical aspect of the hydrogen energy sector, effective storage solutions are essential for the distribution and application of hydrogen in various industries. Key objectives include developing lightweight, economic, and secure storage methods that meet 2030 goals set by the U.S. Department of Energy, particularly for gravimetric and volumetric hydrogen capacities.¹⁸ Various storage methods are available, including compressed and liquefied hydrogen storage, cryo-compressed methods, and solid-state storage through physisorption or chemisorption, each with specific challenges and advantages.^{19,20} Ideal storage solutions should be economically feasible, safe, highly volumetric, integrate seamlessly with renewable energy, and have long operational lifespans. Although research is ongoing to discover efficient and viable storage materials and technologies, many studies focus narrowly on individual storage types without comprehensive comparisons of their benefits, challenges, and potential advancements.²




Figure 2. Main elements of the hydrogen economy infrastructure

Figure 3 illustrates hydrogen storage methods. It can be stored as a gas in high-pressure tanks (350–700 bar) or as a liquid at cryogenic temperatures (-252.8°C). Additionally, hydrogen can be stored on or within solids through adsorption or absorption.²¹




Figure 3. Types of hydrogen storage

Physical-Based Hydrogen Storage

- **Compressed Hydrogen Storage:** Compressed hydrogen storage is the most established and utilized method, applicable in both stationary and mobile systems due to its operational simplicity and rapid refueling capabilities. It provides a volumetric

energy density of about 4.5 MJ/L, with a volumetric capacity of 10–15 g/L and a gravimetric capacity of 1–2%. Storage costs range between USD 500 and 1000 per kilogram of hydrogen.²² This technology utilizes engineered pressure vessels that can withstand high pressures while remaining lightweight and resistant to hydrogen diffusion and embrittlement.^{23,24} Despite its advantages, high-pressure operations pose safety risks and consume a significant portion of hydrogen's energy value, reducing cost-effectiveness. Generally, storage vessels are made of steel, aluminum, or composite materials, with pressures between 15 and 70 MPa. Steel tanks achieve only ~1.5 wt% gravimetric density and volumetric densities of 10–12 kg/m³, highlighting the limitations of compressed hydrogen storage even at pressures up to 70 MPa.²⁵ The rapid refueling process can lead to temperature spikes, affecting tank integrity and reducing hydrogen density, thereby lowering the stored mass. Compressed hydrogen storage vessels are categorized into five types, with Type IV vessels favored for their low mass and high gravimetric capacity, often employed in hydrogen fuel cell vehicles like the Toyota Mirai and Hyundai Nexo.²⁶

- Liquefied Hydrogen:** Liquefaction is an advanced method for hydrogen storage whereby hydrogen is cooled to –253 °C, requiring significant energy and time due to extended cooling processes, resulting in around 40% energy losses, in contrast to 10% for compressed hydrogen. However, it allows for higher density and better storage efficiency.²⁷ Liquid hydrogen storage systems necessitate excellent thermal insulation, typically utilizing an inner pressure vessel within an outer protective jacket, with multilayer aluminum foils or perlite coatings to limit heat transfer. This method is mainly used for medium to large-scale storage and transportation, including road, rail, and future intercontinental shipping. Conventional cryogenic tankers can carry 2100–4200 kg of hydrogen, vastly surpassing the capacity of compressed gas tube trailers, while rail transport configurations can accommodate up to 8000 kg per single wagon. Despite its higher energy losses, liquefaction remains economically viable for high-demand applications, though it has a notable environmental impact.²⁸
- Cold /Cryo Compressed Hydrogen:** This storage concept was first proposed by Aceves^{29,30}, which addresses issues with conventional compressed hydrogen, such as large storage volumes, high operating pressures, and boil-off losses in cryogenic systems. This technique stores hydrogen as a supercritical cryogenic gas, avoiding liquefaction by compressing it to about 300 bar at –233 °C. The cryo-compression aims to reduce boil-off while achieving high energy density, resulting in improved storage density, rapid refueling, and enhanced safety due to a vacuum-insulated enclosure.^{31,32} The specially designed storage vessel maintains thermal insulation and structural integrity for cryogenic temperatures and high pressures. This method achieves a volumetric capacity of approximately 70 g/L at 1 bar and 87 g/L at 240 bar, extending dormancy and minimizing boil-off losses.³³
- Geological hydrogen storage (GHS) - salt caverns:** Geological hydrogen storage (GHS) is primarily feasible in depleted hydrocarbon reservoirs (DHR), saline aquifers (SA), and salt caverns (SC)^{34,35}, with salt caverns being the preferred choice due to superior confinement, operational conditions, and minimal hydrogen losses. Salt caverns, created through solution mining of salt deposits³⁶, are advantageous for their high withdrawal capacity, cost-effectiveness, efficient space utilization, reduced cushion gas requirements, and enhanced safety. They provide stable conditions ideal for future hydrogen storage and are exemplified by the HYPOS (Hydrogen Power Storage & Solutions) project in Germany, focusing on short-term hydrogen storage from renewable sources.³⁴ Initial salt caverns were built in the UK (1971/72) and Texas (1980s, 2000s), which confirms their technical feasibility. However, four key uncertainties - H₂ permeation in rock salt, wellbore integrity, microbial activity, and cavern mechanical stability- must be addressed to overcome challenges in large-scale deployment of these storage solutions.³⁷

Hydrogen losses from microbial activity, uncertainties in long-term cavern stability under cyclic loading, and material compatibility risks present challenges for hydrogen storage. Additionally, regulatory and safety frameworks are less developed than those for natural gas, leading to uncertainties. Environmental and social concerns, especially brine management during cavern construction, also pose barriers. Salt caverns, created via solution mining, offer substantial storage volumes and predictable geomechanical behavior, but require caprock integrity assessments to prevent leakage. Their advantages include near impermeability, chemical inertness, and high ductility, though geological heterogeneities can impact efficiency.

Material & Chemical-Based Methods

- **Material-based Storage:** Material-based hydrogen storage methods are classified into adsorption and absorption. Adsorption involves the weak van der Waals bonds between hydrogen and porous solids, enabling reversible hydrogen storage at low temperatures and high pressures, which vary by adsorbent and purpose. Heat management is critical, with liquid nitrogen commonly used as a refrigerant. Several adsorbents have been proposed, including:
 - a. Metal Organic Frameworks (MOFs):** These porous materials made from metal ions and organic linkers offer high surface area but are mainly effective at very low temperatures, potentially limiting their practical application.³⁸
 - b. Nanomaterials:** Including carbon nanotubes and graphene, these materials possess high surface areas for enhanced hydrogen storage capacity. However, their complex and costly manufacturing processes raise safety concerns.³⁹
 - c. High-temperature metal hydrides:** Capable of absorbing and desorbing hydrogen at high temperatures, these materials provide high storage density, suitable for stationary storage applications, but are not ideal for fuel cell vehicles due to high desorption temperatures.⁴⁰
 - d. Complex hydrides:** Composed of lighter metal hydrides complexed with aluminum or boron, these materials can store large amounts of hydrogen but also require high temperatures for desorption and exhibit slow absorption/desorption kinetics.⁴¹
- **Chemical-based storage:** Chemical hydrogen storage involves integrating hydrogen into various compounds via reversible chemical reactions, allowing for hydrogen release when necessary. Key methods include metal hydrides, complex hydrides, and chemical hydrides, each based on unique chemical principles.⁸ Metal hydrides operate through a reversible reaction where a metal (M) absorbs hydrogen to form a metal hydride (MH_x). This reaction is exothermic, releasing heat during hydrogen absorption and requiring heat to release hydrogen. The choice of metal significantly affects reaction conditions, hydrogen capacity, and safety. Complex hydrides, made from lightweight elements like lithium, sodium, boron, and aluminum, have a higher hydrogen storage capacity than metal hydrides, with lithium borohydride (LiBH₄) achieving up to 18.4 wt% hydrogen, although they often demand high temperatures for hydrogen release.^{42,43}

Chemical hydrides, including ammonia borane (NH₃BH₃), utilize covalent bonds for hydrogen storage, providing high gravimetric capacities. The hydrogen release mechanism generates additional products, posing challenges for the efficient regeneration of the spent material. Although these chemical methods can surpass physical storage capacities, they face challenges related to reaction reversibility, control of hydrogen release rates, and the recycling of spent materials, alongside safety considerations.²

Practical examples of hydrogen storage methodologies include **liquid-organic hydrogen carriers (LOHCs)** that store hydrogen through reversible catalytic hydrogenation and dehydrogenation reactions. LOHCs facilitate hydrogenation at high H₂ pressures to yield hydrogen-rich liquids, and dehydrogenation at elevated temperatures releases high-purity H₂. Recent studies focus on optimizing cyclic LOHCs with mesoporous catalytic systems to enhance heat and mass transfer, thus improving kinetics and reducing energy loss. However, LOHCs like N-ethylcarbazole and methylcyclohexane require substantial heat for dehydrogenation, impacting energy efficiency and reactor design.⁴⁴

Hydrogen storage in metal hydrides is a well-established solid-state method, offering high volumetric density and safety through low pressures. It consists of varied hydride types categorized by distinct thermodynamic and kinetic profiles. For instance, complex hydrides like alanates and borohydrides display high gravimetric capacities but may have high desorption temperatures. Research into intermetallic hydrides and light metals aims to enhance kinetics and reduce operational temperatures. Innovations like nanostructuring and catalytic doping tackle limitations, advancing practical applications in hydrogen storage.⁴³

Chemical hydrogen systems also include power fuels, where renewable electricity generates hydrogen via electrolysis, which is chemically fixed into stable carriers like ammonia and methanol. These carriers facilitate dense and safe hydrogen storage, aligning with existing fuel infrastructure. Despite efficiency challenges from conversion processes, these systems

are pivotal for integrating variable renewables into sectors such as shipping and industrial heat. Ongoing research focuses on enhancing performance and integrating power-fuel-based systems.⁴⁴

Hydrogen Storage Innovations

Hydrogen storage technologies are crucial for stationary power systems, portable energy devices, and transportation, necessitating the development of high-energy-density and economically viable storage solutions. Research focuses on next-generation storage concepts like explosion-resistant, self-venting Type IV composite pressure vessels, designed to reduce thermal runaway risks during hydrogen transport. Advances in materials science have led to innovative solid-state storage media, including multi-binding-site architectures in covalent organic frameworks and high-entropy alloys, enabling reversible hydrogen adsorption at near-ambient conditions.

Density functional theory (DFT) simulations are employed to optimize light-metal-functionalized boron monolayers, predicting binding energies and capacities. Large-scale underground hydrogen storage is becoming important for grid balancing and seasonal storage, with countries like the UK, USA, and Sweden developing various cavern concepts, including Uniper's pilot project in a German salt cavern initiated in 2024 and Sweden's hard-rock cavern deployment.

Worldwide Hydrogen Storage Projects by Type (2026)

As of 2026, hydrogen storage projects are categorized into Physical-Based (storing pure hydrogen as gas or liquid) and Material-Based (using carriers or chemical bonding). Global large-scale storage is increasingly moving toward underground geological solutions to support massive green hydrogen production hubs. Key Storage Technologies and Trends for 2026 are;

- **Geological Dominance:** Salt caverns remain the primary choice for large-scale, long-term storage due to their high stability and impervious walls. Projects like Spirit of Scotia (Canada) have secured 130,000 acres of salt rights for future cavern development.
- **System Integration:** 2026 marks a shift toward "system integration," coupling hydrogen storage with long-duration battery storage (BESS) to stabilize renewable grids.
- **Liquid Organic Hydrogen Carriers (LOHC):** Emerging as a safer alternative for long-distance transport and storage at ambient conditions, though still scaling for high-demand industrial use.
- **Strategic Export Hubs: Massive hubs in Oman (Green Energy Oman):** Australia (Western Green Energy Hub), and Mauritania (AMAN) are focusing on storing hydrogen as ammonia or methanol for shipping to international markets in Europe and Asia.

Key Trends in 2025–2026

- **Repurposing Infrastructure:** Many projects are focusing on converting existing natural gas storage facilities (salt caverns and depleted fields) to hold hydrogen, especially in Europe.
- **High-Pressure Focus:** Type IV tanks (700 bar) dominate for mobility and refueling infrastructure to reduce footprint.
- **Salt Cavern Dominance:** Salt caverns are preferred for large-scale, long-duration storage due to their stability and low contamination risks.

Table 2. List of recent and planned major Hydrogen Storage Projects worldwide

Storage Type	Primary Method	Project Examples & Status (2026)	Capacity/Key Feature
Geological (Salt Caverns)	Compressed Gaseous	Hydrogen City (USA): Active/Expanding hub in Texas using salt caverns.	Up to 24,000 tonnes capacity.
Geological (Salt Caverns)	Compressed Gaseous	H2CAST Etzel (Germany): Converted natural gas salt caverns to H ₂ storage in 2024-2025.	Bulk industrial storage.
Geological (Porous Media)	Depleted Gas Fields	Underground Sun Storage 2030 (Austria): Ongoing demonstration for pure H ₂ storage.	Seasonal bulk storage.

Geological (Hard Rock)	Lined Rock Cavern	Hybrit (Sweden): Demonstration facility operated through 2024; model for future rock storage.	High-pressure gaseous storage.
Liquid Hydrogen (LH₂)	Cryogenic Tanks	NEOM Green Hydrogen (Saudi Arabia): Operational by Dec 2026; stores H ₂ as liquid/ammonia for export.	600 tons daily production/storage.
Chemical Carrier	Ammonia (NH ₃)	Hyrasia One (Kazakhstan): Under development for large-scale ammonia storage and export.	Target: 11 million tons NH ₃ per year.
Material-Based	Metal Hydrides	ATOM H2 (Spain): Modular solid-state storage systems deployed for off-grid use.	Ambient temp/pressure storage.
Port/Stationary	High-Pressure Tanks	Kandla Port (India): First port-sector green hydrogen plant commissioned in 2025.	Integrated port infrastructure.

Hydrogen Transportation and Economics

Hydrogen transportation is influenced by its storage state and involves road, pipeline, and maritime methods. Road transport utilizes compressed gaseous hydrogen (CGH₂) and liquid hydrogen (LH₂), with CGH₂ trailers catering to decentralized demands and transporting approximately 200–1000 kg over short distances (100–200 km). However, this method is constrained by low gravimetric and volumetric efficiency limits.⁴⁵ LH₂ trailers, with higher storage density, are better suited for medium distances (over 130 km), although they incur cryogenic losses, requiring a portion of the hydrogen to remain in the tank.⁴⁶

Pipeline transport is the most cost-effective for large-scale hydrogen delivery, particularly in industrial regions, owing to lower pressure drops and enabling long-distance transmission at around 2–3 MPa.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, establishing dedicated hydrogen pipelines incurs high costs, prompting the use of existing natural gas infrastructure. Key challenges include material degradation and maintaining hydrogen purity, necessitating purification technologies for sensitive uses, exemplified by the European Hydrogen Backbone initiative proposing a 53,000 km network by 2040, with projected transport costs of 0.11–0.32 € kg⁻¹ per 1000 km.⁴⁸

Maritime shipping is crucial for international hydrogen trade, allowing transport of LH₂, CGH₂, ammonia, and liquid organic hydrogen carriers (LOHCs). It offers flexibility against geopolitical risks and economic advantages for longer distances. Transport costs vary significantly based on distance and scale, with pipelines being most economical. Overall, life-cycle cost assessments predict hydrogen prices of 30.23–52.9 USD kg⁻¹ for 2030–2050, underscoring the need for advancements in transport and storage technologies for the commercialization of renewable hydrogen systems.⁴⁹

Hydrogen Safety Considerations

Hydrogen has emerged over the past decade as a strategically important energy carrier, owing to its potential to mitigate climate change, reduce air pollution, and enhance long-term energy security. According to the World Energy Transition Outlook, green hydrogen is projected to account for approximately 12% of global final energy consumption by 2050. However, the large-scale adoption of hydrogen technology, aimed at replacing fossil-based fuel systems, hinges on the economic feasibility of production, storage, transport, and safety. Despite its environmental benefits, challenges in technology, economics, and safety hinder the adoption of green hydrogen.⁵⁰

The global hydrogen industry is currently undergoing rapid expansion, driven by national decarbonization strategies and industrial efforts to transition toward low-carbon energy systems. In 2023, the global hydrogen generation and utilization market was valued at approximately USD 158.8 billion and is projected to reach USD 257 billion by 2028, corresponding to a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 10.2%.⁵¹ This growth trajectory reflects increasing investments, technological innovation, and policy support worldwide.

Several key developments characterize the current evolution of the hydrogen sector. First, the hydrogen economy is gaining momentum as numerous countries have announced ambitious roadmaps for hydrogen deployment, encompassing its

production, distribution, and utilization in transportation, industrial processes, and power generation. Second, significant technological advancements have been achieved in hydrogen production pathways, including alkaline and proton exchange membrane (PEM) electrolysis, steam methane reforming (SMR) integrated with carbon capture and storage (CCS), biomass gasification, and, more recently, large-scale green hydrogen production using renewable electricity. Third, infrastructure development remains a central challenge, particularly the establishment of safe and cost-effective systems for hydrogen production, transport, storage, and distribution, such as dedicated pipelines, large-scale storage facilities, and hydrogen refueling stations.

Alongside these developments, safety-related challenges represent a critical barrier to widespread hydrogen adoption. Hydrogen's high flammability and wide ignition range necessitate stringent handling, storage, and operational protocols to prevent leaks and minimize accident risks. Additionally, hydrogen-induced embrittlement of metals poses significant concerns for the long-term integrity and reliability of pipelines, storage vessels, and other infrastructure components. Transporting hydrogen over long distances further complicates safety management due to its low volumetric energy density and the requirement for specialized containment systems. Equally important is public awareness and workforce training, as comprehensive education and safety culture are essential to preventing incidents and ensuring responsible hydrogen use.

Safety across the complete hydrogen value chain is a complex challenge that extends from initial production to end-use applications, requiring a focus on both advanced hardware and rigorous organizational culture. Throughout the supply chain, ranging from the unintentional production of hydrogen in non-dedicated systems to its use in refineries and power plants, risks are frequently driven by material degradation (such as corrosion in "dead-end" piping) and human mistakes, particularly when operators make unsafe assumptions about system status. To effectively mitigate these risks, the sources emphasize prioritizing automated controls and additional safety measures instead of depending on manual operations, alongside the implementation of robust Management of Change (MOC) protocols to evaluate new hazards during any facility changes.

In the transport and storage segments of the chain, safety is heavily influenced by the physical environment, where factors like road vibrations can loosen manual valves and increase the risk of release. Although modern hydrogen transport trailers feature crashworthy tank designs that preserve structural integrity during impacts, approximately 71% of transport-related releases do not ignite because outdoor locations facilitate rapid gas dispersion. Maintaining safety across the entire chain further necessitates the use of hydrogen-resistant alloys to prevent material failure and the provision of specialized training for first responders to ensure they understand hydrogen-specific behaviors, such as the direction of pressure relief discharges.

To address these risks, the development and enforcement of robust regulatory frameworks, codes, and standards for hydrogen safety are indispensable. Harmonized regulations are required to ensure consistent safety practices across the hydrogen value chain and to facilitate international deployment. Furthermore, sustained research and development efforts remain crucial to advancing safer materials, improved system designs, and more reliable technologies for hydrogen production, storage, transport, and end use.

Overall, hydrogen represents a highly promising pathway toward a sustainable and low-carbon energy future. Nevertheless, the long-term success and public acceptance of hydrogen technologies depend fundamentally on the industry's ability to manage safety risks effectively. Close collaboration among governments, industry stakeholders, and research institutions is essential to overcoming these challenges and unlocking hydrogen's full potential.

The accelerating penetration of hydrogen across energy and transport sectors underscores the urgent need for a continuous and uncompromising commitment to operational safety. Safety considerations play a decisive role in shaping public confidence and social acceptance of hydrogen technologies. Accordingly, this review examines the diverse landscape of hydrogen applications, with particular emphasis on storage, transmission, and safety. Key objectives include the identification and prediction of potential hazard scenarios, the establishment of appropriate safety standards and exclusion zones, and the development of reliable equipment and operational guidelines to ensure safe deployment.

Within this context, computational fluid dynamics (CFD) has emerged as a powerful and indispensable tool for safety analysis in hydrogen systems. CFD-based simulations enable detailed prediction of leak dispersion, ignition, and explosion scenarios, thereby supporting risk assessment, design optimization, and the refinement of existing safety standards in hydrogen applications.

Summary and Conclusions

Hydrogen has firmly established itself as a cornerstone of future low-carbon energy systems, offering unmatched versatility as both a fuel and an energy carrier. Its high gravimetric energy density, zero emissions at the point of use, and compatibility with diverse production pathways, from fossil fuels with carbon capture to fully renewable electrolysis, position hydrogen as a critical enabler of global decarbonization. However, the successful realization of a hydrogen economy is fundamentally constrained not by production alone, but by the availability of safe, efficient, scalable, and economically viable storage and delivery solutions.

This chapter demonstrates safety considerations from the foundational basis for the deployment of hydrogen technologies across the entire value chain, from production and storage to transportation and end use. The intrinsic properties of hydrogen, such as high flammability, wide ignition range, low volumetric density, and material interaction risks, necessitate a safety-first approach in the design, operation, and regulation of hydrogen systems. Consequently, storage and transportation technologies cannot be assessed in isolation from safety performance, as risk management directly influences system reliability, economic viability, and public acceptance.

This chapter also presents a consolidated technological status of hydrogen storage and transportation solutions, evaluated through the lens of safety, scalability, and operational maturity. It outlines how different storage pathways, physical, material-based, chemical, and geological, address distinct energy system requirements while introducing specific safety challenges related to pressure, temperature, material degradation, and containment integrity. The assessment further reflects the growing role of digital tools, advanced materials, and automated monitoring in enhancing risk detection and mitigation across hydrogen infrastructure.

The analysis also captures global deployment trends, indicating a transition toward large-scale storage systems, repurposed infrastructure, and international hydrogen trade routes. Within this evolving landscape, transportation modes and storage configurations are increasingly shaped by safety regulations, engineering standards, and lifecycle risk assessments. Overall, the chapter highlights that safe and efficient hydrogen storage and transport are inseparable from the broader objective of establishing a resilient and sustainable hydrogen economy.

The technological readiness of hydrogen storage and transportation has advanced significantly; however, safety remains the central enabling condition for widespread adoption. Across the hydrogen value chain, risks associated with leakage, ignition, material compatibility, and human interaction continue to shape technology choices and infrastructure design. Addressing these risks requires an integrated approach that combines robust engineering solutions, advanced materials, automated safety systems, and harmonized regulatory frameworks. The findings indicate that future hydrogen systems will rely on a diversified portfolio of storage and transport technologies, selected based on application-specific safety, scale, and performance requirements. Large-scale geological storage and chemically bound hydrogen carriers are expected to play a critical role in system-level resilience, while mobility and decentralized applications will continue to depend on high-integrity containment systems and strict operational controls.

Ultimately, the transition to a hydrogen-based energy system will be governed not only by technological capability but by the industry's ability to demonstrate consistent, predictable, and transparent safety performance. Strengthening safety culture, investing in predictive risk assessment tools, and aligning international standards will be decisive in ensuring that hydrogen storage and transportation systems can support long-term decarbonization objectives with public and stakeholder confidence.

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END-USE SAFETY

SMART CONTROLS IN HYDROGEN APPLICATIONS

This section examines safety in hydrogen's diverse applications, industrial processes, power generation, fuel cell mobility and heating in our homes. It looks at case studies where leaks, explosion, fire or equipment failures can occur, and shows how smart control systems are keeping users safe. The section also discusses the importance of hands-on training, public education and stakeholder engagement in building trust.



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Smart Controls to Protect People and Assets

Safety is of paramount importance in the hydrogen value chain: from production through distribution and storage to the end-user applications. For end user applications involving gaseous hydrogen, the hazards range from high pressure to the explosive potential of hydrogen. Other storage modes, such as liquid hydrogen and conversion to ammonia introduce cryogenic and toxic hazards.

Nobody should get hurt, and assets must be protected through the energy transition. In addition to industrial applications, the introduction of hydrogen into passenger vehicles and homes must be managed with due regard to public concerns and scientific principles. Smart controls must be built into hydrogen application equipment. Safety must be engineered in from the outset.¹

Production to Application in Energy Systems

Hydrogen – roots in industry and now entering public life: Hydrogen has been used for decades in industrial applications, as shown in Figure 1. It is a key ingredient of ammonia and fertilizers. Low-sulphur liquid fuels for cars, buses and aviation are produced using hydrogen. Flat glass, semiconductors and vegetable oils require hydrogen in sophisticated manufacturing processes.

The need to mitigate climate change is driving defossilisation of energy systems. This is making hydrogen relevant for domestic and commercial applications where it has not been used before. It is breaking out of industrial applications to uses where the general public will come into contact with this potentially hazardous chemical.




Figure 1. Hydrogen value chains showing end use applications

The safety Imperative in end-user applications: Roadside refuelling stations for gasoline and CNG are common. Electric charging points are also becoming prevalent. Alongside these, hydrogen refuelling stations for heavy trucks and passenger cars are being implemented. These are not staffed with technical experts who have had years of safety training and they are used by professional haulage drivers and members of the public. Safety must be designed into these facilities without relying on hydrogen safety expertise of the user.

The concept of blending hydrogen into natural gas distribution pipelines has been raised, with several pilot projects from Gail India and others to explore the issues that may arise.² This mixture of hydrogen and methane might be used in homes for heating boilers, or cooking on a stove. There are precedents for using flammable gases such as natural gas, town gas and bottled LPG in domestic and commercial buildings. Despite this, the introduction of hydrogen represents a change and smart control systems are required to ensure public safety.

Emerging Innovations & Digital Enablers: Digitalisation of safety monitoring networks has been achieved in refineries and power generation assets in the energy sector. Cabled and wireless communications link multiple sensors to control systems which can invoke mitigation such as closing valves to shut-off the supply of flammable gases.

Robust standards are in place to ensure the integrity of these functional safety systems. For use in industrial settings with hydrogen, they can be rated to safety integrity level 1, 2, or 3. The highest SIL, level 4, is generally used in nuclear power plants and aircraft. A higher SIL rating refers to a lower risk of a functional safety measure failing, when it is required. However, there is a high price to pay for the high-level SILs.

Domestic systems and cars must work at the intersection of safety and affordability. Mass production of sensors and other safety system components used in high-volume production of cars and heating boilers will enable this. But, the transition of hydrogen from the chemical industry to applications where the general public are involved requires a shift in the technologies used and the mindset of the teams designing these safety systems.

Regulatory & Standards Landscape: The industrial gases sector, led by international companies such as Air Liquide, INOX Air Products, and Linde Gas, has been at the forefront of handling hydrogen in industrial settings. Experts from these companies have united in their efforts to maintain rigorous safety standards to protect employees, industrial hydrogen users and the public. Their collective expertise has been consolidated by EIGA³ into various documents.

The physical properties of hydrogen differ from other gaseous energy vectors that are in common use. Whilst all of these gases are flammable, the explosion, ignition and flame hazards of hydrogen are unique. Equipment that has been deployed to mitigate the risk of using natural gas will not be appropriate for hydrogen.

Application risk profiles, smart controls built into end-user systems, training and public engagement related to hydrogen use-cases raise key questions for the future deployment of hydrogen at scale.

The next sections explore these issues in detail, offering practical insights and actionable guidance for industry, regulators, and technology providers.

Application risk profiles

a) Industrial and chemical processes

The use of hydrogen in industry is common. Standard engineering practices and reliable equipment exist to mitigate the two risks of hydrogen gas: pressure and flammability.

Over-pressure in equipment can lead to catastrophic failure and a massive release of hydrogen. Powerful explosions and intense fires can be the result. Avoiding over-pressure is achieved using mechanical relief valves which vent hydrogen to prevent mechanical damage. In the vent header, hydrogen must not be allowed to mix with air or other oxidant gases before it is released to the atmosphere either directly or through a flare or gas scrubber.

If hydrogen does leak from a high-pressure source, it can be detected rapidly using various techniques. Fixed gas detectors use sensors to identify the presence of a flammable gas and are located close to likely leak points such as valves and pipe flanges. However, the gas detector relies on the leaked hydrogen gas passing over the sensor. Wind direction changes can suppress the signal meaning potentially explosive hydrogen gas leaks are not detected.

To support gas detection, flame detectors can be installed. They are immune to wind direction changes, but are only activated after a leak has been ignited. Hydrogen burns with an inorganic flame; no CO₂ is present. Furthermore, the unburned hydrogen is also an inorganic molecule. This means that conventional flame detectors which rely in the Infra-Red (IR) signatures of

methane and CO₂ molecules are not suitable for hydrogen. Innovative flame detection equipment operating in other IR and ultraviolet (UV) wavelengths is required for hydrogen flames.

b) Hydrogen pipelines

Moving hydrogen from an industrial production location to end user application locations can be achieved in many ways. The most cost-effective mode for high volumes of hydrogen is to use a pipeline network. The same concept is true for natural gas transmission and distribution.

Hydrogen is a tiny molecule and has the ability to attack and embrittle steel in ways that methane cannot. The grade of steel, pressure of the pipeline and the operational regime of the pipeline pressurisation and depressurisation are all governed by this property of hydrogen to embrittle steel.⁴

Safety precautions begin with the selection of an appropriate grade of steel, or by coating the internal walls of the pipeline to avoid direct contact of hydrogen with the pipeline material. Additionally, mechanically activated overflow protection valves are used. These automatically close if a pipeline is ruptured to minimise the amount of flammable gas that will be released.

In addition to good engineering practices and mechanical devices, smart controls are also used. High-tech sensors can detect sudden pressure drops and send signals through digital control systems to close valves in the pipeline network.

c) Hydrogen mobility

Pressure is the major risk in hydrogen mobility applications. To ensure there is sufficient fuel storage capacity on a fuel cell electric vehicle hydrogen is stored at 700 bar on board cars and trucks in custom-engineered carbon-fibre tanks.

In the event of a fire on the fuel-cell-electric vehicle (FCEV), the pressure in the storage tank will increase as it heats up. If it explodes due to overpressure, it will seriously injure, or kill the occupants of the car or the haulage vehicle cab.⁵ To prevent this, the hydrogen storage tanks are fitted with a thermal pressure relief device (TPRD) which vents hydrogen in a safe direction away from the vehicle occupants in the event of a fire near the fuel tank. This smart control TPRD operates in a similar way to water sprinklers in a hotel or commercial building.




Figure 2. Joule-Thomson expansion of hydrogen and other gases

To decant hydrogen into FCEV's tank, hydrogen is stored at the refuelling station (HRS) at up to 1,000 bar. A release of hydrogen from this pressure can heat the gas instantaneously to above its auto-ignition temperature due to combination of adiabatic expansion, friction and the Joule-Thomson effect. This heating can result in a flame or explosion. Joule-Thomson expansion of natural gas and air are used to liquefy these gases. As shown in Figure 2, when hydrogen is released from a very high pressure to the atmosphere it heats up, rather than cooling down. Therefore, there is no cooling effect to counteract the other heating mechanisms.

d) Fuel cells for onsite heat and power

Fuel cells, as shown in Figure 3, are commonly used in Japan and South Korea to convert natural gas to heat and power. They are typically used in blocks of residential flats, hotels, and offices. In the future, the same concept will be used with hydrogen as the fuel to replace natural gas and de-fossilise this energy system.

Modern data-centres which enable the internet, cloud computing and AI are also keen to decarbonise their operational footprint. Some are looking to use large hydrogen-fed fuel cells for this purpose.




Figure 3. Fuel cell process layout

Hydrogen can be delivered to these end-user locations by truck. These trucks store up to 1 tonne of high-pressure hydrogen. It is common for the hydrogen trailer to be de-coupled from the tractor unit and be connected to the end user site by a high-pressure hose. When the trailer is empty, a full trailer of hydrogen is delivered and the truck tows away the empty one for refilling.

The consequences of towing a hydrogen trailer away whilst it is still connected to the data centre would be catastrophic. To mitigate this, there is an electronic cable attached to the gas hose. If the trailer is erroneously towed away whilst it is still connected to the data centre, the electrical cable is broken. The loss of this electrical connection drives smart control systems to close valves on the truck and the end-user site to minimise the amount of flammable hydrogen that can leak.

Safety training

Training is essential for mechanical, electrical, instrumentation, process and civil engineers involved in designing hydrogen systems. They must understand the unique properties of hydrogen such as its very high flame speed, low ignition energy, and low density to design appropriate installations and equipment.

Blast walls must be built with appropriate civil engineering standards to contain the energy of an explosion. Electrical equipment must be spark free to avoid introducing an ignition source. Processes and operations must be designed to minimise the amount of hydrogen stored at a location.

Experts from the oil and gas sector, chemicals plants and power generation will have a good basic foundation in safe engineering practices. However, they must be trained in the specific hazards and mitigation techniques related to hydrogen.

Multiple standards exist in this area, such as the ISO 22734-1:2025 which covers ‘Hydrogen generators using water electrolysis’.⁶ This standard makes recommendations about parameters to measure and the corresponding smart controls and safety measures that can be invoked.




Figure 4. Gaseous and liquid hydrogen refuelling station architecture

By focusing on training for the experts who design hydrogen systems and smart controls around them, it will be possible to build emerging hydrogen infrastructure such as hydrogen refuelling stations, as shown in Figure 4, and end-user equipment such as fuel cell electric vehicles in a robust way. This will eliminate the need for complex training for end users, who will often be members of the public without any knowledge of the hazards associated with hydrogen.

Public acceptance

The hazards of electricity in the home are severe, yet it is common for children to use electrical devices such as computers and radios. When drivers fill their motorcycle at the gas station, there is always a risk that flammable vapours will ignite. Despite this known hazard, some drivers use their mobile phones whilst refilling with gasoline.

In these established cases, people have been de-sensitised to the risk through frequent exposure. In the past, nothing happened... so the assumption is that everything will be OK today.

Hydrogen is a new energy vector for the public. Fear of the unknown is a key psychological factor to address. Honesty, empathy and smart controls to reduce the likelihood of incidents are the keys to ensuring public acceptance.

In the early days of the hydrogen economy, communication is the main tool to garner public acceptance. As more prolonged safe exposure takes place, the perception of hydrogen will align with gasoline, natural gas and electricity – energy vectors that we handle with very little concern on a daily basis.

Next-gen safety trends for end-use safety

Early hydrogen leak detection on board the buses, trucks, trains and cars will mitigate the hazard of using hydrogen as a fuel. To achieve this, a specification for an on-board hydrogen sensor has been proposed which specifies that the sensor react to the leak within seconds.⁷ Sensors to achieve this ultra-fast response are being developed.⁸ A smart control system incorporating such a device can respond to a leak and automatically close valves on the hydrogen storage tanks to minimise the amount of gas that has leaked.

Many leak detection systems rely on chemical reactions in sensors to identify a leak. However, many different gases can trigger a response. For example, a catalytic bead sensor will detect many flammable gases including methane, carbon monoxide and hydrogen. In some use-cases, such as an industrial steam methane reformer, or a domestic boiler running on a blend of natural gas and hydrogen, these three gases can present at the same location.

A limitation of the commonly used, and cost-effective catalytic bead sensor is that it requires a reaction between the fuel gas (hydrogen) and oxygen (from air). To detect a hydrogen leak in an inert background gas such as nitrogen, sonic leak detection or a different type of sensor technology must be used.

Sonic hydrogen leak detection listens for the characteristic signature of a gas as it rapidly flows from high to low pressure.⁹ These devices are increasingly being integrated into smart control systems alongside chemical gas detectors and flame detectors.

Speciation of the hydrogen leak, separate to the other flammable gases is complex. A new generation of MEMS-based sensors is being developed precisely of this purpose to enable a higher degree of granularity in smart control systems.¹⁰

Conclusions & Future Outlook

Hydrogen has been around for decades, and will be here for centuries in chemical and industrial applications. Questions remain regarding the range of emerging use cases in which hydrogen can cost-effectively be deployed.

Safety equipment, procedures and smart controls exist. When these are properly implemented by people with appropriate training, each economically viable hydrogen application can be implemented without concern.

Thankfully, economics can drive the selection of the most appropriate end-user applications without the complication of needing to ask additional questions about the readiness of safety systems.

However there remains the challenge of aligning public perception with the scientific basis for declaring hydrogen systems as 'safe'.

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MOBILE HYDROGEN REFUELING STATION DESIGN, INFRASTRUCTURE, & MATERIALS

Mobile hydrogen refueling stations (MHRS) will increasingly serve urban and semi-urban deployments, so designers must understand hydrogen release, dispersion, and the conditions under which confined accumulation can create an explosion hazard. Hydrogen's relevant properties include buoyancy and rapid diffusion, wide flammability range in air, and low minimum ignition energy, which together place leakage control and separation distance design at the forefront of safety engineering. This chapter consolidates design and operational considerations for MHRS, emphasizing sensing and mitigation, hydrogen-compatible materials, predictive modeling (including AI/ML where appropriate), cybersecurity, and practical pathways for aligning design choices with codes and standards.



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Mobile hydrogen refueling stations (HRS) are likely to become a familiar element of urban energy infrastructure. Their safe deployment requires designers to understand hydrogen leak dispersion, confinement effects in enclosures, and the associated potential for fire and explosion under unfavorable conditions. Hydrogen's low molar mass, rapid buoyant rise, wide flammability range in air (about 4–74%), and very low minimum ignition energy (about 0.02 mJ) place leak prevention, early detection, and ventilation-centered design at the forefront of safe production, distribution, and end use.

The station environment is also well suited to advanced digital tools. Intelligent monitoring can combine high-sensitivity sensors with IoT connectivity and AI-based analytics, deployed at the edge or in the cloud, to support real-time concentration estimation, anomaly detection, alarms, and maintenance planning. These same data streams can be leveraged, with appropriate separation from safety functions, to forecast renewable intermittency impacts on hydrogen production and to inform operational planning and pricing expectations.

Materials integrity remains a defining safety issue. Hydrogen can degrade susceptible alloys, and hydrogen embrittlement may reduce ductility and fracture toughness and accelerate fatigue crack growth, increasing the risk of failure in pressure-containing components. Material selection in HRS therefore favors proven hydrogen-compatible choices for the specific service conditions; austenitic stainless steels and aluminum alloys are common in many applications, while some high-strength ferritic and martensitic steels and certain cast irons are often avoided where embrittlement sensitivity is a concern. For liquid-hydrogen service, austenitic stainless steels and aluminum alloys are widely used, subject to qualified design and testing. Fire scenarios also influence detailing: soldered or brazed copper joints should be avoided where credible fire exposure exists, and aluminum alloys can lose strength rapidly under severe jet-fire heat flux, requiring appropriate layout, shielding, and protection strategies.




Figure 1. Non-exhaustive diagram highlighting stages with high leakage risk along value chain not including hydrogen carriers (Graphic adapted and modified by the technical team of the author)¹

Context

The design of a mobile hydrogen refueling station must explicitly address hydrogen leak dispersion and the determination of minimum safety distances for credible fire and explosion overpressure scenarios. Designers can use predictive models, including modern multivariate or multi-modal machine learning approaches, by comparing real-time equipment data with model outputs to inform equipment monitoring and control strategies. Full-scale 3D simulations are also valuable for evaluating

¹ Lacy, C. Insight- Reducing the cost impact of hydrogen leakage: four ways to address fugitive emissions. PA Knowledge Limited. <https://www.paconsulting.com/insights/reducing-the-cost-impact-of-hydrogen-leakage-four-ways-to-address-fugitive-emissions>

hydrogen accumulation patterns and ventilation performance in realistic station geometries. Artificial intelligence, machine learning, computer vision, and sensor-driven methods can support improved leak detection, risk assessment, safety procedures, and cybersecurity practices across varied operating environments.

From an infrastructure perspective, the design review should cover the materials and interfaces used in dispensers, storage cylinders, compressors, separators, and pressure control devices, as well as tube trailers used for hydrogen delivery. The station may use modular, scalable dispenser systems for compressed gaseous hydrogen (CGH₂) vehicle fueling, including single-, double-, and dual-hose configurations. Modern dispensers may integrate Coriolis mass flow meters to achieve high measurement accuracy, and the dispenser cabinet and supporting structure must be treated as safety-relevant equipment because it is located within the fueling area. Dispensers are commonly configured for 35 MPa (H35) or 70 MPa (H70) service, with other pressure (such as 20 MPa) classes used for smaller applications such as fuel cell electric bikes, and layouts may be single- or dual-sided with one or two hoses per side and lane- or island-oriented footprints. User-interface features such as EMV-ready payment and displays may be integrated, but they should not compromise safety functions such as breakaway protection and emergency shutdown behavior. Typical refueling targets may include minute-scale fills with hydrogen pre-cooling to approximately -40°C , and nominal delivered mass per fill for light-duty vehicles is often in the 1-10 kg range, subject to protocol, vehicle storage, and station design basis.

Industry & Technology Background

At hydrogen refueling stations, sensing is fundamental to both hydrogen leak detection and hydrogen quality control. Active mitigation commonly combines a network of sensors for flammable gas detection with engineered responses such as ventilation activation and, where applicable, spray systems, with the objective of reducing the likelihood of ignition by diluting the mixture below flammability limits or by applying inertization in specific controlled volumes. The immediate measurement objective is to quantify hydrogen concentration, either in the vicinity of a leak or within a process gas stream. Where hydrogen quality affects downstream fuel cell performance, catalyst poisoning is typically associated with adsorption of impurities on the anode platinum electrocatalyst.

For piping and high-pressure storage systems, the original discussion points to the potential use of active detonation-arresting concepts that integrate pressure sensing, shock-wave detection, and optical flame sensing, including wavelength-based flame detection, to support localization and estimation of flame-front propagation. The same concept set may include an extinguishing response using water spray or flame-retardant spray and a fast-actuating gate valve intended to close ahead of the shock wave to limit downstream propagation.

Safety Imperative

Predictive modeling plays an essential role in safe operation. For example, equipment operating temperature can be estimated using a model, and the associated control strategy can be specified so that the equipment remains within defined safe temperature limits. In a mobile HRS, simulations can be used to evaluate how container ventilation configurations and external wind speed and wind direction influence hydrogen dispersion volume and diffusion distance, including predicted hydrogen concentrations at ceiling locations such as the four three-way corners of a truck container.

However, important challenges remain, including limited high-quality data, model tuning and optimization, and integration into existing infrastructure and operational workflows. Designers should work toward standardized datasets and validated AI algorithms developed within an interdisciplinary environment. In principle, these methods can be applied to estimate explosion overpressure and support determination of minimum safety distances for different damage criteria, while recognizing that hydrogen leak detection technologies may still be constrained by sensitivity, reliability, and response time, which can delay identification and mitigation.

The credibility and validity of model results should be demonstrated through appropriate verification and validation against independent data, rather than relying on any single algorithm as proof of accuracy. Semi-empirical approaches can also be used to estimate overpressure and impulse from vapor cloud explosions while accounting for congestion effects, and these approaches can be combined with data-driven methods to support minimum safety distance assessments across damage

thresholds. The same tools can be applied to practical station scenarios, including the influence of door openings, window configurations, and the number of exhaust fans in a mobile HRS container.

Cascading Failures and Jet Fire Modeling

In hydrogen storage and dispensing systems, cascading failures refer to accidental releases that may ignite and then cause additional damage and secondary leaks in nearby components. Modeling cascading leak sequences is valuable for preventing future accidents, yet there remains a practical shortage of quantitative methods that can be applied directly to hydrogen systems to demonstrate how an initiating leak can trigger subsequent leaks, including escalation pathways where a jet fire or an explosion originating from the initial release results in a secondary leak in another component. Jet fire modeling is one important example. A jet fire occurs when a flammable substance, either gas or liquid under pressure, is released from a containment system such as piping or a vessel and ignites, producing a sustained flame driven by the continuing release. An explosion, in contrast, is an overpressure event associated with delayed ignition of an accumulated flammable mixture, and it can generate damaging pressure loads and flame effects that propagate away from the release region. An initiating leak that produces a jet fire can cause a secondary leak if the impinging flame heats an adjacent component beyond the temperature limit of vulnerable elements such as an O-ring, leading to loss of sealing. Jet fire characteristics depend on fuel composition, release conditions and rate, geometry and orientation of the release, and surrounding wind conditions, and the associated heat flux can drive structural damage or failure of vessels and pipework, resulting in escalation. Heat flux is the rate of heat transfer per unit area, evaluated at a surface or at a fluid to solid boundary, and it quantifies the directional thermal loading imposed on exposed components. Different qualitative damage levels can also be described using overpressure-based criteria, and practical assessments commonly consider jet fire temperature and explosion overpressure alongside scenario frequency and individual risk measures.

Emerging Innovations & Digital Enablers

Hydrogen safety sensor technologies include electrochemical sensors (amperometric and potentiometric), chemiresistive sensors, optical sensors, thermal sensors, piezoelectric sensors, acoustic sensors, catalytic sensors, and mechanical sensors. Smart hydrogen sensors integrated with IoT platforms can enable remote monitoring, real-time data logging, and predictive maintenance by linking multiple sensor nodes to a centralized dashboard.

Smart sensors, multi-sensor arrays, electronic noses, and machine learning for hydrogen sensing can be integrated with Internet of Things architectures, including for indoor air-quality monitoring in homes, hospitals, farms, and industrial environments, where interfering gases can distort the intended response of air-quality sensors. Such systems may rely on sensing mechanisms including electrochemical, chemiresistive, photoionization, infrared, optical, catalytic bead, thermal conductivity, and piezoelectric or pyroelectric principles. Multi-sensor arrays, sometimes referred to as electronic noses, combine multiple sensing mechanisms to generate multidimensional signals that can help distinguish hydrogen from interfering gases. When multiple gas species must be quantified simultaneously, or when cross-interference between sensed species is significant, sensor arrays are commonly used. In this context, an electronic nose refers to combining multiple sensors to produce a multidimensional response to complex chemical mixtures.

Eye-readable sensors aim to provide intuitive readouts to support safe use and broad accessibility of hydrogen-based technology, including concepts such as portable implementations, odorant-related approaches intended to enhance human perception, and polymeric coatings aimed at reducing embrittlement in steel pipelines. Fixed cameras can be installed in situ to infer concentration from gasochromic responses. These approaches include gasochromic tungsten oxide films and switchable metal hydrides and are being explored as user-friendly technologies suitable for use in potentially explosive atmospheres while providing intuitive outputs that can be retrofitted in older facilities. Visual alerts such as color change are compatible with broad implementation because they do not require advanced user training. Complementarily, sensing performance should be matched to expected leak profiles. The design of eye-readable sensor systems under these constraints requires both appropriate sensor characteristics and sensor placement that increases the probability of detecting low hydrogen concentrations independent of leak direction.

Regulatory & Standards Landscape

Globally, relevant bodies and frameworks include the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), notably ISO/TC 197 for hydrogen technologies, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the Compressed Gas Association (CGA), ATEX (Atmosphères Explosibles) requirements for equipment and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres, SAE International (formerly the Society of Automotive Engineers), and the International Energy Agency (IEA) hydrogen standards related activities and guidance.

In Europe, the ecosystem referenced includes the European Clean Hydrogen Alliance (European Commission, 2020), the Clean Hydrogen Partnership (European Commission, 2022), Hydrogen Europe, the European Industrial Gases Association (EIGA), and the NIS2 Directive addressing cybersecurity requirements and directives. In India, the key institution highlighted is the Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD). In the USA and Canada, the cited organizations include the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the American Petroleum Institute (API), the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), CSA Group (Canadian Standards Association, CSA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and Sandia National Laboratories.

Enabling near-term hydrogen fueling stations in urban settings requires equipment and generic design concepts that can support informed design discussions among stakeholders, particularly in dense areas where hydrogen demand is growing, heavy-duty fuel cell vehicle deployment is increasing, and space for fueling stations is constrained. In parallel, practical footprint-reduction approaches should be considered, while still meeting current fire code requirements and anticipating how future code updates may affect hazards and risk. This includes evaluating the implications of hydrogen delivery options, assessing the benefits and drawbacks of rooftop versus underground arrangements, and characterizing station footprint under current code requirements, as well as the footprint that may be feasible through delivery innovations or alternative approaches to demonstrating code compliance.

From the dispenser interface standpoint, key elements span both the fuel cell vehicle high-pressure hydrogen system and the station-side dispensing system. On the vehicle, the interface includes the receptacle and the compressed hydrogen storage system (CHSS), including sensors and pressure relief devices, and CHSS typically includes thermally activated pressure relief devices intended to protect against overpressure exposure during fire conditions. On the station side, the dispenser includes an automated dispensing control system to execute fueling, fault-detection functions, and overpressure protection devices such as pressure relief devices. The fueling nozzle may include a communications receiver and the vehicle may include a communications transmitter, and an Infrared Data Association (IrDA) link can be used under SAE J2799 to transmit measured CHSS temperature and pressure to the dispenser so the dispensing control system can manage the fueling process. To achieve the target maximum operating pressure (MOP), component pressure ratings should be selected consistent with the applicable hydrogen service level (HSL) and pressure class defined for refueling connection devices in ISO 17268, while also meeting the dispensing system maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP).

For pipelines and piping, U.S. regulation 49 CFR Part 192 prescribes minimum safety requirements for pipeline facilities and the transportation of gas. Under 49 CFR 192.625, odorization is generally required for combustible gas in distribution lines, but hydrogen intended for use as a feedstock in a manufacturing process is explicitly listed as an exemption. If future design cases involve hydrogen distribution for applications such as electricity production, odorization requirements may need to be reassessed for the specific service and regulatory context. For engineering guidance, ASME B31.12 is the dedicated code for hydrogen piping and pipelines, and ASME B31.8 is widely used for gas transmission and distribution piping systems, particularly as a baseline when considering existing infrastructure and location class concepts. Sound design also requires accounting for hydrogen density and compressibility effects using appropriate equations of state, applying one-dimensional or three-dimensional gas-flow modeling as needed, and evaluating transient flow, friction losses, and leakage characteristics to reflect the practical complexity of hydrogen pipeline transportation and natural gas pipeline repurposing, with particular attention to materials.

Cybersecurity for Hydrogen Safety

Risk-management measures should include regular training for management and employees to identify cyber risks, evaluate cybersecurity risk-management practices, and understand how these practices affect continuity of the services delivered by the entity, consistent with NIS2 (Network and Information Security 2)-aligned risk assessment expectations. The risk assessment should continuously monitor the security of the networks and systems used for operations, with the objective of reducing the likelihood and operational impact of incidents. Cyber intrusions often begin with basic phishing or social-engineering attempts that enable reconnaissance and credential theft, while more sophisticated campaigns may be conducted by well-resourced or state-sponsored adversaries. It is also important to use consistent definitions for terms such as near miss, large-scale cybersecurity incident, significant cyber threat, and internet exchange point, so that reporting and escalation are unambiguous. The digital transformation of energy systems, including smart grids and smart meters, delivers operational and decarbonization benefits but also increases the cyberattack surface. A systematic approach therefore requires identifying vulnerabilities across layers, including the physical layer, the sensing layer, and the control layer.

Protecting station operations requires safeguarding auxiliary systems against scenarios that can render the system unresponsive to the operator, including ransomware, data breaches, insider actions, physical attack or sabotage, and equipment failures. One example is unauthorized local access to transformer monitoring systems and manipulation of monitored data, which can drive incorrect condition assessment and maintenance decisions. Similar attention is required for the compression system by controlling and monitoring remote access pathways to the control and monitoring system and preventing malicious shutdown of the compression unit. Storage-system cybersecurity should address the risk of unauthorized local or remote access to the storage control unit and malicious changes to temperature or pressure setpoints for the hydrogen storage tank. Electrolyzer cybersecurity should include protections against interception of inadequately encrypted communications between the electrolyzer and the central control system that could expose sensitive information. Fuel cell system cybersecurity should address the possibility of unauthorized local or remote access to the fuel cell control unit that could alter hydrogen and oxygen flows within the stack. Chiller cybersecurity should consider local access leading to malicious changes in temperature setpoint, capacity setpoint, or chilled-water flow settings, as well as denial-of-service conditions, malware, and insider threats. Dispenser cybersecurity should include protection against firmware or component-level manipulation that could modify behavior and enable unauthorized control.

Safety should remain the primary driver of decisions in the rapidly evolving field of hydrogen fueling technology, including the detailed configuration of hydrogen dispensers, robust leak-detection systems, and the performance of emergency shutdown and fire-suppression measures. In Japan and the USA, leakage associated with fractures of primary equipment bodies and piping has often been linked to design deficiencies, including inadequately addressed fatigue. In Japan, leakage from flanges, valves, and seals is frequently associated with threaded or bolted joint issues. Human error remains another significant contributor to leakage risk, particularly as self-service hydrogen fueling concepts expand. Accordingly, key design drivers include realistic assumptions about delivery trucks or the potential elimination of delivery trucks through on-site hydrogen production, appropriate setback distances for bulk gaseous or liquid hydrogen storage, and practical site-layout constraints such as convenience-store integration, parking, and traffic flow, all of which influence required lot size. Incorporating gasoline dispensers typically increases site area requirements, while underground or rooftop storage can reduce footprint but may be cost-prohibitive. Material selection for high-pressure and temperature service, advanced leak-detection technologies, emergency shutdown mechanisms, and fire-suppression techniques therefore remain central considerations, informed by incident experience involving stations, pressure relief devices, laboratories, hydrogen cylinders, piping, liquid hydrogen systems, instruments, industrial trucks, compressors, system designs, and operator and maintenance factors. For pipelines transporting large quantities of gaseous hydrogen, operating pressure can reach on the order of 100 bar. Managing hydrogen compression and minimizing leakage requires specialized equipment and materials capable of maintaining integrity under harsh operating environments. Hydrogen gas-flow behavior must be understood in system design, and pressurization stations may be needed to maintain target pipeline pressure. Pipeline pressure monitoring supports detection of major leaks and can also provide indications relevant to coating defects and corrosion management. With respect to policy leadership, the EU is often positioned to take a leading role in hydrogen safety policy development.




Figure 2. Diagram of the publicly available HRSAM and HDRSAM models (*Graphic adapted and modified by the technical team of the author*)²

Insights on Diesel: Hydrogen Safety Design Differences

Looking ahead, relevant safety insights include, among others, high-pressure under-expanded releases and dispersion behavior, the possibility of spontaneous ignition following sudden hydrogen release to air, and combustion outcomes ranging from deflagration to detonation under appropriate conditions. These topics connect directly to ongoing work on leak formation, dispersion, and ignition, as well as failure scenarios such as compressed-hydrogen container rupture following pressure relief device malfunction, hydrogen cylinder design, fast fueling at 70 MPa for compressed hydrogen, and liquefied-hydrogen storage systems.

For **fuel storage and tank design**, diesel typically uses standard liquid-fuel tanks that are generally less leak-tight than hydrogen containment systems. Because hydrogen presents distinct challenges related to flammability, high diffusivity, thermochemical behavior, and service conditions that may involve very low temperatures or very high pressures, hydrogen tanks rely on different materials and are designed to withstand a broader range of impact and operating scenarios.

Regarding **battery type**, diesel vehicles commonly use lead-acid batteries (for example, flooded or absorbed glass mat types) that are generally less prone to fire and explosion than lithium-ion batteries, often configured as 12 V units and sometimes connected to provide 12 to 24 V. By contrast, hydrogen fuel cell vehicles typically incorporate higher-voltage lithium-ion battery systems, which require careful electrical isolation and integration because higher stored energy and voltage can increase

² Argonne National Laboratory, Energy Systems. <https://hdsam.es.anl.gov/index.php?content=hdsam>

electric-shock risk and introduce failure modes such as thermal runaway, battery fire, heating of the hydrogen tank, activation of a thermally activated pressure relief device (TPRD), and escalation toward release and explosion hazards.

For **fire prevention and suppression**, heavy-duty diesel trucks are generally required to carry a manually operated fire extinguisher, whereas hydrogen systems rely more heavily on engineered safety functions such as sensors, automatic shutoff valves, and pressure relief devices to detect abnormal conditions, isolate inventory, and reduce the likelihood of leaks and fires.

For **fuel venting**, diesel tanks include vents that, while not primarily a safety feature, allow air to enter and exit the tank during fuel consumption and refueling, supporting refueling and engine operation. In hydrogen systems, relief venting through a TPRD or a rupture disc, together with a vent stack designed for safe dispersion of released hydrogen, is critical, and tank relief venting is a key safeguard intended to prevent tank rupture under abnormal thermal or pressure exposure.

For **fueling**, diesel is pumped through a dispensing line and nozzle into the tank. Hydrogen fueling uses specialized nozzles and connector systems because of the high pressures involved, and connections must be leak-tight in accordance with SAE or comparable standards while temperature and pressure are monitored to prevent overheating and over-pressurization; for liquid hydrogen, nozzles can ice over and disconnection can be difficult.

For **defueling**, diesel tanks are not typically emptied during maintenance, whereas hydrogen vehicles may require dedicated connectors to enable defueling for certain non-routine maintenance activities.

For **crash safety**, diesel vehicles must meet NHTSA Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, whereas hydrogen vehicles must also satisfy additional crash safety requirements intended to ensure tank integrity and leak prevention, including strict limits on allowable hydrogen leakage, electrical integrity of the fuel cell system, and verification of tank integrity post-crash, consistent with the safety level expected for other vehicle types such as diesel.

Compatible Materials

On-vehicle applications include light-duty and heavy-duty vehicles, rail, shipping, and aerospace, with checks against EC-79 certification requirements and the nominal pressure class (H35 or H70) for use at working pressures above 30 bar. This includes verification of corrosion resistance, endurance, hydraulic pressure-cycle performance, and external leakage performance. Products should be tested and certified to the maximum allowable working pressure.

For electrolyzer gaskets, the technical requirement is a sealing system with very high tightness using fluoropolymer materials such as polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE), with clean, non-toxic characteristics, suitability for common flange types, and compatibility with wide temperature ranges and high-purity service. Practical expectations include ease of handling and installation, removal without residue, electrical non-conductivity, electrical stability over a wide frequency range, and high dielectric strength. Chemical resistance to potassium hydroxide (KOH) is also important, noting that PTFE is chemically inert to many substances, including strong acids and alkaline solutions, except molten alkali metals and elemental fluorine at elevated temperature and pressure. Mechanically, the material should remain stable with minimal relaxation, high resistance to creep and stress relaxation, and limited aging or weathering.

Hydrogen-compatible materials can support leak mitigation without shutdown or welding, and can be paired with insulation where non-fire-resistant components require it. Sealing and connection elements for low-temperature service include O-rings made from high-performance fluorocarbon elastomers (FKM) for temperatures down to about -57°C, valve-seat materials such as cross-linked modified polyether ether ketone (PEEK) selected for creep performance, and related components such as structural parts, pressure fittings, hoses, valves, and pressure gauges. Elastomers, thermoplastic composites, and O-rings should be rechecked to keep fugitive emissions low, and stem seals made from low-permeability, high-purity modified PTFE can help reduce leakage at low temperature (around -40°C) and high pressure (up to about 700 bar). Additional measures include explosive decompression resistant seals, rapid gas decompression (RGD) resistant seals, and spring-energized lip seals intended for extreme temperatures from cryogenic conditions up to about 288°C and under pressure. Sealing performance should also be assessed for hydrogen embrittlement and low-temperature limitations because many elastomers are not suitable for cryogenic service, and polymers are inferior to metals with respect to hydrogen permeation.

Different HRS Design Configurations

Different demand (arrival) profiles may be represented as routine, random, mixed (for example, with peaks), or flat distributions. H35 and H70 nozzles are addressed in SAE J2601, which includes recommended maximum filling rates of 3.6 kg/min and 7.2 kg/min, respectively. To estimate waiting times, one may apply queueing theory assuming first-come, first-served service priority, Poisson-distributed arrivals, and exponentially distributed service times at each dispenser, with dispensers treated as identical and without imposing a finite limit on queue length. The time between two consecutive fueling events is commonly termed the lingering time, and a short lingering time effectively corresponds to back-to-back filling. This filling condition directly influences the required hydrogen compression throughput and the refrigeration system heat-exchange capacity.

Understanding Cascade Leak Risk

The contribution of a cascading leak to overall risk depends, first, on whether cascading actually occurs. The size and orientation of the initiating leak, together with its ignition probability, are therefore critical determinants of escalation. As successive cascading leaks occur, their incremental contribution to overall risk generally becomes smaller, particularly relative to the initiating leak. Beyond wear associated with normal operation, it is important to consider additional leak mechanisms and the potentially higher consequences associated with multiple simultaneous leaks, which supports more accurate risk assessment in hydrogen systems and promotes preventive system design. For example, a jet fire originating from an initial leak can induce a secondary leak in another component, with plausible mechanisms including thermal degradation of an O-ring exposed to the jet-fire heat flux and storage-cylinder damage driven by explosion overpressure. Accordingly, cascading-leak modeling should be considered for hydrogen storage and dispensing systems, including development of a framework to estimate overall risk to an exposed individual and to express scenario risk as fatality frequency per year for each leak case.

Policy leadership

In a mobile hydrogen refueling station (MHRS) setting, policy leadership is reflected in how jurisdictions translate hydrogen hazards into permitting expectations, safety engineering practices, and standards-based requirements covering hydrogen generation, storage, transfer, and dispensing for both compressed gas (GH2) and cryogenic liquid (LH2) systems. In the European Union, this enabling environment is reinforced by major public programmes and instruments referenced in the source text, including the Innovation Fund, the European Green Deal Call, Horizon Europe, the Clean Hydrogen Alliance, InnovFin Energy Demonstration Projects, the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), InvestEU, and NextGenerationEU, with the European Commission describing the Innovation Fund as one of the world's largest funding programmes for demonstrating innovative low-carbon technologies. EU safety governance is also supported by the European Hydrogen Safety Panel's hydrogen safety engineering guidance, which surveys regulations, codes, and standards and identifies key organizations and frameworks used to structure safety practice. In the United States, a widely used technical foundation is NFPA 2, which states that its purpose is to provide fundamental safeguards for the generation, installation, storage, piping, use, and handling of hydrogen in GH2 or LH2 form across stationary, portable, and vehicular applications. In Japan, the High-Pressure Gas Safety Act defines its purpose as preventing disasters caused by high pressure gases by regulating production, storage, sale, transportation, and other matters related to handling and consumption, including containers and related activities. In Australia, standards-based implementation is reflected in sector guidance on hydrogen refueling stations and in Standards Australia's AS ISO 19880.1:2023 (ISO 19880-1:2020, MOD), described as specifying minimum requirements spanning design, installation, commissioning, operation, inspection, and maintenance for gaseous hydrogen fueling stations dispensing to light-duty road vehicles.

Standards harmonization

International alignment of hydrogen safety requirements is being advanced through ISO technical work, IEA-led coordination, and bilateral cooperation, with the practical goal of converging on interoperable requirements that can be applied consistently across the hydrogen value chain, including refuelling infrastructure. In practice, organisations typically implement harmonisation by pairing recognised codes and standards with formal risk studies (for example HAZID, HAZOP, and documented risk assessments) so that design and operations for MHRS-relevant assets can be permitted and assured under different jurisdictions.

Electrolysers: For electrolysers and packaged electrolysis-based hydrogen generators, a defensible baseline is to apply ISO 22734 for safety requirements and to verify hydrogen product quality against ISO 14687, supported by a documented Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment.

Compressors and expanders (turbomachinery): For compressors and related turbomachinery used in hydrogen compression and delivery, the chapter's intent can be expressed more precisely by referencing compressor-focused API standards (API 618 and API 617) and applying API 692 specifically where dry gas sealing systems are used, with HAZOP and HAZID studies providing the systematic risk controls expected in safety cases.

Hydrogen storage: For high-pressure hydrogen storage vessels, ASME BPVC Section VIII, Division 3 includes Article KD-10, which sets special requirements for vessels in gaseous hydrogen transport and storage service, and this can be complemented by cylinder standards such as ISO 9809-1 (seamless steel gas cylinders) and ISO 7866 (refillable seamless aluminium-alloy gas cylinders) where cylinders are part of the storage concept. For siting and separation distances, NFPA 2 provides hydrogen-specific safeguards and NFPA 55 provides broader requirements for compressed gases and cryogenic fluids, and these are commonly used where adopted by the authority having jurisdiction. For reversible metal-hydride storage systems, ISO 16111 is the relevant ISO reference, and the same risk-based approach applies, namely documented hazard identification and separation-distance evaluation consistent with the applicable code basis used for the facility.

GHRS: For gaseous hydrogen refuelling stations, ISO 19880-1 sets minimum requirements for station design through maintenance for gaseous fuelling stations dispensing to light-duty road vehicles, while SAE J2601 establishes the protocol and process limits for light-duty gaseous hydrogen fuelling, and these can be paired with a separation-distance analysis consistent with the adopted code basis.

LHRS: For liquid hydrogen refuelling, ISO 13984 addresses the LH2 fuelling and dispensing systems interface between station and vehicle and ISO 13985 addresses refillable LH2 fuel tanks for land vehicles, so these should be treated as interface and vehicle-storage requirements rather than as a complete station standard. As with GH2 systems, this category should be supported by a documented Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment and by a separation-distance analysis consistent with the codes adopted for the project.

Tube trailer transfers: For tube-trailer transfer operations, the technically correct framing is to require a documented Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, to apply separation-distance analysis consistent with the adopted code basis, and to comply with applicable transport regulations for the jurisdiction and mode of transport.

Hydrogen pipeline and piping: For hydrogen piping and pipelines, ASME B31.12 is an explicit hydrogen code that contains requirements for piping in gaseous and liquid hydrogen service and for pipelines in gaseous hydrogen service, and it is commonly used as the governing engineering code for hydrogen piping design and compliance. The chapter also cites EIGA Doc 121 for pipeline systems, and this citation should be verified against the latest EIGA publication and edition title during final editing to ensure the reference is exact.

Hydrogen generation from fuel: For hydrogen generation via fuel processing, ISO 16110-1 provides safety requirements for stationary hydrogen generators using fuel-processing technologies and ISO 16110-2 provides test methods for performance, and hydrogen quality should still be managed against ISO 14687 where the end use requires fuel-grade specifications.

Hydrogen fuel cells: For stationary fuel cell systems, IEC 62282-3-100 addresses safety and IEC 62282-3-300 addresses installation, and these can be integrated with the broader piping and installation expectations referenced in the chapter, including use of ASME B31.12 where hydrogen piping and pipelines fall within scope and ISO 15649 where industrial piping systems are part of the installation basis.

Hydrogen safety: At the system level, ISO/TR 15916 provides basic considerations for hydrogen safety, ISO 26142 addresses hydrogen detection apparatus for stationary applications, and NFPA 2 and NFPA 55 are commonly used code references (where adopted) to structure facility safeguards for hydrogen and other compressed or cryogenic gases.

Policy tools

Digital tools that support policy enforcement in hydrogen systems, including MHRS deployments, typically combine continuous monitoring with data-driven decision support and auditable compliance records. In practice, IoT-enabled sensing networks track hydrogen leak indicators and operational parameters such as pressure and related safety-critical signals, enabling earlier detection of abnormal conditions and supporting implementation of the safety protocols required by permits, codes, and internal procedures. AI-integrated analytics can extend this capability by performing dynamic or scenario-based risk assessments, flagging emerging risk states, and supporting prioritization of mitigation actions. Engineering platforms that integrate 3D CAD and digital twins can further strengthen governance by enabling a shared, version-controlled design basis across engineering, procurement, and construction teams and station operators, improving traceability to standards, design targets, and management-of-change expectations prior to physical modifications. For asset and maintenance governance, simulation and predictive analysis allow teams to evaluate operating envelopes, test and refine configurations virtually, and optimize maintenance planning and production scheduling while maintaining safety constraints. Interoperability is improved when open interfaces and technical standards are used so that data from multiple vendors and subsystems can be aggregated without creating “closed” safety architectures that impede oversight. Where lifecycle sustainability claims must also be enforced, blockchain-based chain-of-custody systems and related digital product passports can be used to track hydrogen origin and attributes and to maintain transparent, auditable records of carbon-footprint information from production through delivery, which can support compliance checks and carbon-accounting or pricing mechanisms. Finally, these digital records create auditable trails for regulators and assurance bodies, which can simplify verification of compliance across a range of applicable standards and requirements.

Implementation challenges & Governance roadmap

During the transition to a hydrogen economy, a primary barrier is the availability, stability, and bankability of fiscal support, both domestically and in regions where the industry is still emerging and financing conditions remain uncertain. In the United States, the Inflation Reduction Act established the Section 45V Clean Hydrogen Production Tax Credit, and the U.S. Department of Energy describes it as a new 10-year incentive with a four-tier value that depends on the carbon intensity of the hydrogen production process and on meeting prevailing wage and apprenticeship requirements. Treasury and the IRS, in releasing final rules for Section 45V, state that eligibility pathways include hydrogen produced using electricity from various sources, and they discuss electrolytic hydrogen pathways including “green” hydrogen using renewables and “pink” hydrogen using nuclear, subject to lifecycle emissions requirements and the rule’s accounting safeguards. Consequently, it is not correct to assert that nuclear-related pathways were not considered, rather, their eligibility depends on satisfying the emissions-accounting framework and associated conditions in the final rules. A related implementation challenge is how private developers and technology providers translate these incentives into cross-border investment and deployment, including in Latin America, where complementary host-country measures such as local tax incentives and investment facilitation can improve project financeability and support local production. Trade instruments, including free trade agreements, can reinforce this cycle by reducing transaction frictions and improving competitiveness, but they do not substitute for credible permitting performance and enforceable safety governance at national and subnational levels. Separately, the Department of Energy frames the Regional Clean Hydrogen Hubs funding opportunity as an \$8 billion (with an aim to expand) effort under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act intended to catalyze investment in hubs that demonstrate hydrogen production, processing, delivery, storage, and end use. These policy drivers interact with a structural reality often observed in project development, namely that advanced technology and manufacturing capacity are concentrated in the Global North, while high-quality renewable resources are often more abundant and lower-cost in parts of the Global South, including segments of Latin America. As electrolyser and balance-of-plant costs decline, overall viability increasingly depends on predictable local commitments and execution, including clear regulation, streamlined permitting, and demonstrable competence in safety management and emergency response aligned with applicable standards. For mobile hydrogen refueling station deployments, this requirement becomes more demanding because the safety case and approvals must address mobile operation, temporary siting, and coordination with local authorities and emergency services at each operating location. Off-grid and behind-the-meter configurations may also enable earlier projects where grid constraints or interconnection timelines would otherwise delay deployment, provided that equivalent safety and compliance expectations are maintained.

A pragmatic governance roadmap for hydrogen deployment should recognise that advanced equipment supply chains and engineering capabilities are often concentrated in the Global North, while high-quality renewable resources are frequently more abundant and lower-cost in parts of the Global South, including segments of Latin America, which can reshape competitiveness and investment flows. As IRA-driven markets scale, beneficiary technologies such as electrolyzers and associated equipment are expected to become more affordable, but project viability still depends on credible host-country commitments and effective local regulation. In practical terms, this requires capable subnational governance, including streamlined and transparent permitting processes, clear compliance expectations, and sustained investment in training for safety management and emergency response. In addition, off-grid and behind-the-meter configurations can support early deployment where grid constraints would otherwise delay projects, provided that equivalent safety and regulatory oversight are maintained.

Belém, Brazil, a key gateway to the Amazon region, has been selected to host COP30 in November 2025, placing the conference in a location that symbolically underscores the link between climate policy, ecosystems, and development. The summit is widely viewed as a critical checkpoint roughly a decade after the Paris Agreement was adopted on 12 December 2015, providing an opportunity to evaluate whether the mechanisms created under the Agreement are producing measurable results. For the hydrogen sector, and particularly for the safe scaling of refueling infrastructure, the governance question is not only whether ambition increases, but whether implementation systems mature, meaning permitting discipline, credible safety cases, and enforceable operational controls that keep pace with deployment. The present governance challenge is also shaped by the scale of private-sector mobilization and by the increasingly compelling economic rationale for climate action, as markets for low-carbon technologies expand and structural transformation accelerates. At the same time, a persistent gap remains between the pace of implementation required and the level of governmental commitment and delivery, and many governments acknowledge that private investment must provide much of the capital for scale-up while practical mechanisms to mobilize private finance at sufficient scale remain under development. The ongoing transition to renewable energy and electrified transport is already associated with air-quality improvements and public-health co-benefits, and it is also contributing to job creation in sectors such as energy and manufacturing, even as progress varies significantly across countries and some jurisdictions advance while others fall behind.

Those seeking to reduce their carbon footprint should also recognize that climate change is associated with material economic risk, including growing liabilities linked to extreme weather, which reinforces the need for active risk management by business leaders and institutions across the workforce, labor organizations, safety authorities, and public policy. In the climate-finance domain, COP29 concluded with a New Collective Quantified Goal that calls on developed countries to take the lead in mobilizing at least \$300 billion per year for developing countries, within the context of a broader objective of scaling finance to at least \$1.3 trillion per year by 2035, highlighting both progress and the remaining uncertainty around delivery at scale. Against this backdrop, expectations for COP30 are centered on strengthening national commitments and implementation planning, improving how finance reaches the countries and communities with the greatest needs, and advancing reforms that enable public and private capital to support a transition toward clean, inclusive, and resilient economies, including increased attention to adaptation and resilience-building measures. For hydrogen, this same governance agenda translates into investable and auditable frameworks for low-carbon hydrogen certification, infrastructure approvals, and safety assurance, so that assets such as mobile hydrogen refueling stations can be deployed rapidly without compromising leak prevention, emergency preparedness, or public confidence.

Conclusions & Future Outlook

Mobile hydrogen refuelling stations (MHRS) can accelerate early hydrogen adoption, but only when deployment is coupled to rigorous safety-by-design, including leak detection and monitoring, dispersion and ventilation-informed layout, hydrogen-compatible materials selection, and demonstrable operating controls that satisfy permitting and emergency-response expectations. In practical terms, MHRS readiness is as dependent on governance and workforce competence as it is on equipment performance, because mobile operation introduces repeatable siting, inspection, and stakeholder-coordination requirements that must be executed consistently across locations.

Key concluding questions for future outlook include the following, framed to support policy and investment decisions aligned with MHRS deployment realities.

- Can the region position itself among the lowest-cost green-hydrogen producers within its subregion, while also demonstrating a safe, permit-compliant pathway to deliver that hydrogen to end users through refuelling infrastructure, including MHRS?
- Will regional initiatives accelerate the energy transition and expand green hydrogen capacity, alongside parallel investments in safety governance, competent operations, and emergency preparedness needed for routine MHRS operation?
- Will incentives make exported hydrogen LCOE competitive despite distance to demand centres and relatively high logistics or infrastructure costs, including the cost of meeting refuelling safety requirements?
- If a temporary tax benefit is structured as a credit against the First Category Income Tax (IDPC) for purchases from local producers of green hydrogen (H₂V) or derivatives such as ammonia or methanol, will it materially increase domestic consumption and strengthen the business case for early refuelling buildout, including MHRS?
- Over the next decade, will local initiatives credibly sustain support above approximately \$3 per kg for green hydrogen production, a level comparable to leading international incentives, and will that be sufficient to compete with other global production hubs?
- Should incentive eligibility also include blue hydrogen, with support explicitly linked to measured carbon intensity so that policy rewards emissions performance while maintaining clarity for permitting, certification, and investment decisions?

A practical way to bind these questions into an actionable outlook is to treat competitiveness and safety assurance as co-equal requirements: incentives and market design should be paired with enforceable technical standards, auditable monitoring practices, and training systems that allow MHRS projects to scale without compromising public safety or regulatory confidence. Under this framing, the most credible regional strategies are those that reduce delivered hydrogen cost while simultaneously strengthening compliance capacity, including inspection readiness, emergency-response integration, and consistent operational performance across multiple MHRS operating sites.



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